Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Angela E. Stent
Muriel Atkin
Dale R. Herspring

MARCH-APRIL 1986

COMMUNISM IN SPAIN

Eusebio Mujal-León

Chinese on SDI

Bonnie S. Glaser
&
Banning N. Garrett

Castro and Gorbachëv

W. Raymond Duncan

NOTES

1985 CP Checklist

Richard F. Staar

Fronts in 1985

Wallace Spaulding

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Cover: Followers of the Communist Party of Spain at a 1977 election rally in Bilbao. Photo from Katherine Young.

Paul A. Smith, Jr., is on a one-year sabbatical from his duties as Chief Editor to conduct research on the theory and practice of international political communication. Wayne Hall, Managing Editor of *Problems of Communism* since 1978, will be Acting Chief Editor during Mr. Smith's absence.

EDITOR
Wayne Hall

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism

Eusebio Mujal-León

The Communist Party of Spain entered the post-Franco era confident that it would become the dominant force on the political Left. Instead, the party has become a minor actor in the politics of democratic Spain. The PCE's decline precipitated factionalism, and then fragmentation. Communist hopes to regain political influence by joining the opposition to Spain's membership in NATO were shattered when Felipe González's Socialist government won the vote to stay in NATO in the March 12, 1986, referendum.

Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative

Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett

The Chinese leadership began to focus on the Strategic Defense Initiative of the United States sometime in late 1984 or early 1985. Beijing instructed various ministries and research organizations to examine SDI and its implications for China. Leading analysts at foreign policy institutes and defense, science, and technology organizations held conferences and wrote position papers on this important topic. What has emerged from these efforts is a picture of informed and diverse opinion with as wide a range of views on SDI as is found in the West.

Castro and Gorbachëv: Politics of Accommodation

W. Raymond Duncan

A warming trend in Cuban-Soviet ties was evident at the party congresses held this year in Havana and Moscow. While the expressions of warmth may be more dramatic than usual, fluctuations between accommodation and discord are not new to Cuban-Soviet relations. Economic considerations and a growing awareness of the fiscal contraints attendant to supporting Third World revolutionary movements underlie the most recent upturn in relations.

Notes

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1985

Richard F. Staar

The "world communist movement" as seen or defined by Moscow remained largely unchanged in 1985 according to the latest version of the checklist published by *Problems of Communism* in conjunction with the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA). The Soviet Communist Party remains unable to convene a new worldwide gathering of this "movement" (the last such meeting was in 1969). While most parties of communist-ruled states continue to increase their memberships (the Polish United Workers' Party being an exception), the communist parties in democratic societies are experiencing a drop in electoral support and related intraparty factional strife.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Communist Fronts in 1985

Wallace Spaulding

A survey of the activities of the major communist international front organizations in 1985 reveals continued strong Soviet guidance despite a facade of leadership "independence." The major theme of front initiatives has been the perennial "peace struggle," whose new emphasis has been on blocking the US Strategic Defense Initiative. Not all front events were successful in Soviet eyes, the 12th World Youth Festival revealing weaknesses in the ideological staunchness of Soviet youth and considerable inclination on the part of foreign delegates to denounce Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Essay-reviews

East German Quest for Legitimacy

Angela E. Stent

Since its founding in 1945, the GDR has had to struggle for recognition at home and abroad. The 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies increased the international stature of the GDR, but it did not provide the one form of legitimacy the GDR most wanted: de jure recognition as a separate state by West Germany. Although the treaty has led to substantial economic interaction between the two German governments, intra-German contacts potentially raise doubts among GDR citizens about the regime's legitimacy.

Rethinking the Iranian Revolution

Muriel Atkin

The course of Iran's Islamic Revolution caused Soviet analysts to revise their earlier interpretation of developments there. Although they now argue that the revolution was a promising opportunity that went wrong, there are significant variations in their assessments of the nature and role of Islamic fundamentalism in the Revolution. Western scholars of Soviet-Iranian relations would benefit by consulting these and similar Soviet sources.

Soviet Military Politics

Dale R. Herspring

The Soviet military by and large appears satisfied with its share of the nation's economic resources and disinclined to mount an institutional challenge to party dominance of the society. However, this quiescence may in part reflect the nature of the current high command. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, removed from duties as chief of the General Staff in 1984, was a much more vocal advocate of a distinctly "military" perspective at a high political level.

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Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism

Eusebio Mujal-León

Spanish communism is today struggling for its very survival. Once the premier force in the anti-Franco opposition and confident of becoming the hegemonic force on the Spanish Left, the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE) has seen its dreams shattered and itself rendered marginal in the politics of a democratic Spain. In the national elections of October 1982, the Spanish Communists received only 3.8 percent of the vote (and 4 out of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies) and, what was worse, found themselves overwhelmed by their rivals (the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party or PSOE), who won 48 percent of the vote and an absolute majority of the seats in the *Cortes*, the Spanish parliament.

Since then, the situation has worsened for the Communists. Their party's electoral defeat aggravated existing tensions in its leadership. During the last four years, two splinter groups (one led by former Secretary General Santiago Carrillo, the other by former Executive Committee member Ignacio Gallego) have emerged, each disputing the PCE's claim to represent Spanish communism.

This article seeks to analyze the causes for the decline and fall of the Communist Party of Spain. The first section places the PCE in historical perspective and assesses the Communists' efforts to balance the competing demands of maintaining organizational and ideological cohesion while pursuing broad alliances both during the Franco era and in the first years of democracy. The second section analyzes the conflicts and debates which developed within the PCE in the wake of the October 1982 debacle, devoting particular attention to the struggle among supporters of the present and former secretaries general (Gerardo Iglesias and Santiago Carrillo, respectively) for control of the party's organization. The conclusion speculates on the PCE's future, and on the party's chances in the next parliamentary elections that are to be held in June 1986.

Eusebio Mujal-León is Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). He is author of Communism and Political Change in Spain *(1983) and co-editor of* Spain at the Polls *(1985), and has just completed* Looking Beyond the Pyrenees: Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco. *During 1984–86, Professor Mujal-León was a Visiting Fellow at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, where he was working on Soviet–Latin American relations.* *The author wishes to thank Ann-Sofie Nilsson of the University of Lund for her helpful comments on the draft of this article.*

Preparing for the Post-Franco Era

The Communists were a major reference point on the Left and in the opposition during the Franco era. Although the PCE had been an insignificant force prior to the outbreak of the Civil War (1936–39), its influence grew markedly during that conflict. Yet, because the party subordinated its policies to the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy during the Civil War and aborted whatever chances may have existed for a social revolution (and—others on the Left believed—victory in the war), it became an outcast among the anti-Franco opposition in the aftermath of the Civil War.

Paradoxically, it was the Franco regime that helped the Communist party regain credibility and influence. For the regime, the PCE represented the ideological and political quintessence of what was wrong with modernity and the 20th century. By attacking the Communists as a "foreign" force, as the principal source of dissent in Spanish society, the Franco regime legitimated itself as a defender of genuine Spanish national

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interests. By so doing, however, the Franco regime helped make the Communists a reference point for the student and worker elites coming to political maturity during the 1950's and 1960's, who adopted anti-Franco positions. To them, the PCE was one of the few real opponents to the regime, and membership in or collaboration with the Communist party became almost a required rite of passage for this new generation of politicized Spaniards.

However, the Communists' role in Spanish politics was defined not only by their historic relationship to rivals on the Left or by the Manichean arguments of the Franco regime. A further source of Communist strength during the Franco years lay in the adaptive and innovative policies pursued by the PCE. Beginning with a call for National Reconciliation made by the PCE in 1956 on the 20th anniversary of the Civil War, the Communists spared no effort in trying to overcome their decades-long *exilio dentro del exilio*.[1] These efforts involved the modification and adaptation of party policies on political and social alliance strategies, on organization and ideology, as well as on international relations. Two objectives animated these efforts: (1) to galvanize a broad coalition of parties and social forces to overthrow the Franco regime (with the PCE playing a major, and preferably a determinant, role in the process); and (2) to insure a broad base of electoral and political support in the post-Franco era for the PCE.

Pursuit of such coalition-building efforts made it incumbent on Communist leaders to convince ordinary PCE members that such policies would ultimately redound to the advantage of their party. To justify these policies, the Communist leadership argued that the triumph of the "financial oligarchy and latifundist aristocracy" in the Civil War could be reversed if a coalition of the working class, the peasantry, and the "non-monopolist" sectors of the middle class could bring about the overthrow of the Franco regime. In its wake would come an "anti-monopolist" phase during which the feudal remnants in agriculture would be eliminated, autocratic and centralistic political structures modernized, and banking and credit facilities as well as major industrial concerns nationalized. By phrasing the argument in this way, the Communist leadership could insist on the necessity for a broad coalition of political and social forces, as well as on the peaceful nature of the forthcoming changes.[2]

The PCE's emphasis on moderation and broad alliance was appropriate insofar as the party hoped to reassure the middle classes and to broaden its acceptance among Spaniards in general, but it was hardly adequate for the task of organizational maintenance and mobilization of the PCE itself. In order to inspire party militants and to increase the party's strength as an organization, Communist leaders emphasized the imminence of the Franco regime's demise. Insisting on this as well as on the profundity of the forthcoming changes was important because veteran party cadres were often none too happy about the changes in party ideology introduced in the late 1960's and 1970's, accepting many of them not so much out of genuine conviction as out of organizational loyalty or "party spirit." Such loyalty, as well as internal party discipline, could best be maintained by painting a catastrophic picture, by insisting that the explosive nature of the political and social situation in Spain would lead to the rapid (albeit peaceful) overthrow of the regime and to the emergence of a Communist party strong enough to be the hegemonic force on the Left and the pivotal actor in Spanish politics.[3]

Keeping a balance between these two aspects of Communist strategy—catholicity in the search for allies and insistence on imminent political change—was a major challenge for the PCE as it prepared for the transition to the post-Franco era. Maintaining this equilibrium required more than political dexterity. It could be accomplished only if the Communists were successful in imposing their version of the *ruptura* (break) with the Franco regime during the transition to democracy in Spain. When the party failed to prevent the adoption of a "reformist" solution (promoted by King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez), and when it then had to watch its Socialist competitors take advantage of the time and opportunity provided by the "reformist" victory to catch up on the Communists' 20-year organizational head start, the contradictions in the Communist strategy became much harder to handle and ultimately provoked the PCE's fragmentation.

Having emphasized so much the need and even inevitability of a *ruptura* with the Franco regime, the Communists eventually found it very difficult to recognize that it was not going to happen. In fact, as late as

[1]The phrase "exile within exile" is from Ignacio Fernández de Castro's *De las Cortes de Cádiz al Plan de Desarrollo* (From the Parliament of Cadiz to the Development Plan), Paris, Ediciones de Ruedo Ibérico, 1968, p. 286.

[2]See the *Programa Manifesto del PCE* (Program Manifesto of the PCE) approved at the second National Conference in September 1975.

[3]Although the Communists were rarely explicit in this regard, in 1971 Carrillo compared the Spanish Communist position to that of the PSOE in 1930. The thrust of his message was clear to those who knew something about Spanish history: 1930 was the year before the instauration of the Second Spanish Republic; in the June 1931 Constituent Assembly elections the PSOE emerged as the dominant party on the Left with 105 out of 470 seats. See Carrillo's interview with *La Nouvelle Critique* (Paris), October-November 1971, p. 24.

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1978, Communist leaders insisted that the process of "democratic change . . . coincided with the analyses made by the PCE."[4] Even after Adolfo Suárez and the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) emerged victorious from the June 1977 election, and the PSOE received three times as many votes as the PCE, the Communist leadership still claimed that Spain was "immersed in a political revolution."[5] The persistence with which Communist leaders held to these notions suggests how integral to Communist identity was the belief that the Franco institutions had to be dismantled before a democratic Spain could be built. Ultimately, it might be said, the PCE fell prey to its old nemesis, Francisco Franco. Although the party made great efforts to show how much it had changed since the Civil War and how well it understood the social and economic transformations Spain had undergone, its frame of reference remained the 1930's, and its guiding light opposition to the ancien regime.

The Communists' failure to accomplish the *ruptura* was at the root of subsequent discontent with Carrillo's leadership and his policies, but there were few Communists at the dawn of the post-Franco era who explicitly blamed him for that failure. What is more, regardless of what his critics subsequently said, at the time Carrillo had little choice but to pursue the course he did. The Communists did their best to galvanize a broad-front coalition against the regime and pursued a mass-mobilization strategy on selected occasions,[6] but the PCE had to maneuver in a context that was largely unfavorable to it. The Communists were constrained by the distrust that other political groups as well as many Spaniards felt toward the PCE.

These limits might have been overcome if the situation in Spain during 1973–1977 had in fact been "prerevolutionary." This was not the case. First of all, the memory of the Civil War had inoculated the political elites and the population against violent upheavals as well as against those groups (like the Communists or the neo-Francoist Popular Alliance) whose identities were inextricably tied to the past. Second, social and economic changes (especially since the late 1950's) had created a sizable middle class and a consumer society. Whatever the injustices and the unequal distribution of wealth in society, by the 1970's Spaniards had more of virtually everything than ever before. Third, the political opposition was also split. Some wanted a clear break with Francoism, others a negotiated *ruptura*, and still others wanted simply a democratic government, caring neither how nor under whose auspices this was brought about. In this context, the reformist faction associated with King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez successfully wrested control of regime institutions from more conservative elements. The King played an especially important role in this process. As the institutional symbol of continuity, he maintained the cohesion of the military but prevented its radicalization; and he gained the acquiescence of senior military officers to a reform program about which they were most certainly not enthusiastic.

Given these contraints, the accomplishments of the Communists were not insignificant. By organizing demonstrations and strikes in late 1975 and early 1976, they played a major role in mobilizing popular opinion against those who favored *continuismo*. This pressure from below showed the extent and intensity of popular support for democratization. It was crucial in tilting the balance in favor of the reformists and in reducing the chances for polarization and direct confrontation between Right and Left.

By late 1976, the party's legalization rather than the *ruptura* had become the Communists' most important objective. This shift was never formally acknowledged. Instead, many Communists chose to view the legalization of the party as a necessary element of the *ruptura*. But the myth of the *ruptura*, which had originated in harsh clandestine experience and was perpetuated by Communist leaders for organizational and mobilizational reasons, was no longer functional by early 1977.[7] Moreover, by the mid-1970's the Bolshevik Revolution had lost much of the propelling force it had had for European leftists in the 1940's. Of course, the PCE had contributed to this process by its own doctrinal evolution, but the dissipation of the October 1917 myth itself also eroded the foundations of the Communist subculture and, therefore, the PCE's social and political base.

A final dimension of the Communist weakness related to the PCE's search for a new role in the politics of a democratic Spain. Until the transition to democracy, the PCE had had an easy time defining itself. The party was the most determined opponent and the antithesis of the Franco regime. This role was at once difficult and comfortable—the latter because it assured the

[4]This formulation was contained in Thesis 1 as presented by the Central Committee to the 9th PCE Congress. See *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Mar. 23–29, 1978.

[5]See the retrospective analysis in ibid., Jan. 16–22, 1981.

[6]For example, the Communists encouraged strikes and demonstrations in early 1976 in Madrid and Barcelona.

[7]With respect to engendering a total break, the Spanish Communist capability in 1977 compared unfavorably with that of the Italian and French Communists in 1945. Although both faced major hurdles, they were mass parties and drew substantial sustenance from their (occasionally self-inflated) role in the wartime resistance and in the victory over fascism.

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Communists of constant reinforcement for their identity. With the end of the Franco era, the certainties of the past dissolved, and the Communists confronted the challenge of relating to a new and democratic system. This was not an easy task for them, because operating clandestinely for so long had prevented the PCE from fully understanding the magnitude of the changes in Spanish society since the 1950's. Clandestinity had also reinforced the PCE leadership's autocratic style, which in turn cast a shadow over the party's ability to adjust to an open society.

The June 1977 parliamentary election transformed the role of the PCE in Spanish politics. Despite the influence the Communists had exerted in the opposition to the Franco regime during much of the preceding two decades, they garnered only 9.4 percent of the vote in that election whereas the PSOE received 29 percent.[8] Although PCE leaders reassured their supporters that this was only a temporary setback and tried with some success in the next two years to play the UCD and PSOE off against each other in an effort to further their proposal for a Spanish version of the "historic compromise,"[9] their party did not improve perceptibly on its performance in the next parliamentary elections held in March 1979. On that occasion, the PCE received only 10.8 percent of the vote. Thereafter, the dwindling prospects for the party combined to produce the most serious crisis the PCE has faced since the de-Stalinization campaign in the 1950's.

Communism in a Democracy

The PCE entered the post-Franco era confronted by several urgent tasks. It needed to consolidate the identity and structures of the party as well as to redefine its relationship vis-à-vis the Spanish domestic environment as well the international communist environment. The Communists would have faced these tasks in any case, but their failure to bring about a clear-cut break with the institutions and heritage of the Franco regime visibly complicated the situation.

To insist on the centrality of Communist identity—in ideological and organizational terms—as the principal theme around which to discuss the crisis of the PCE may appear at first glance to be somewhat extravagant. The PCE, after all, had a very definite past, a history, and a tradition. As a quasi-religious, countercultural society, the Communist party has had its own rituals and language as well as a pantheon of heroes dating back to the Popular Front and Civil War period. But even as the Communists stressed the constancy of their struggle, to the degree that their leaders had reacted to the changes affecting the international communist movement and Spanish society by adjusting their policies and strategies, they had compromised their party's identity.

Spurred by the weakening of Soviet control over West European communist parties after 1956 and confident that by distancing themselves from Moscow their party would break out of its isolation in Spain, the PCE redefined its relationship to the international communist movement and in the process came out in favor of a specifically West European, pluralistic, and parliamentary model of communism. Espousal of "Eurocommunism" led the PCE away from the Bolshevik model for the seizure and exercise of power and toward strengthening of ties with other Eurocommunist as well as socialist and social democratic parties. Paradoxically, while the shift away from Moscow ("It is no longer our Rome," Carrillo declared in June 1976) could be undertaken rather easily in clandestine conditions when the leaders exercised unquestioned control over party organizations, these conditions in turn made a real *aggiornamento* virtually impossible. Moreover, the progressive abandonment of the Bolshevik model did not by itself create a new and distinct paradigm. Insofar as the Spanish Communists adopted positions already staked out by democratic socialist parties, they were implicitly abandoning their claim to a unique role and character. As long as the PCE appeared to be an ascendant force in Spain and "Eurocommunism" was on the rise, the crisis over the Communists' identity remained latent. When the bubble burst—the French Left's defeat in the March 1978 legislative elections as well as the Aldo Moro kidnapping in Rome provide useful international benchmarks; the weak Communist showing in the March 1979 elections, a Spanish one—the ensuing frustration and uncertainty aggravated other problems faced by the PCE.

With the dawn of the post-Franco era, the Communists could no longer maintain the role of irreducible and systemic opposition. The PCE's commitment to consensus politics did not change, but under a democratic regime the justification for such policies had to change. Indeed, its policies became primarily defensive in orientation: to pursue consensus politics as a means of preventing a return to dictatorship and precluding the consolidation of a bipolar system in which

[8]For a detailed analysis of democratic Spain's electoral map, see Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio Mujal-León, Eds., *Spain at the Polls: The General Elections of 1977, 1979 and 1982*, Raleigh, NC, Duke University Press, 1985.

[9]The PCE called this a "government of national concentration." The "historic compromise" refers to the efforts in the 1970's by the Italian Communist Party to work with the ruling Christian Democratic government.

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the Union of the Democratic Center and the Socialists would be dominant. As before, Communist calls for consensus politics and coalition-building may have served to reassure the Spanish middle class, but support for the status quo made mobilization of PCE members and sympathizers increasingly difficult. The difficulty was not insurmountable, as long as a desirable objective—for example, PCE entry into the government—was within reach. However, moderate policies that neither brought the Communists into the government nor made them as popular as the PSOE went against the grain of many members. Complicating the situation was the make-up of the Spanish polity. Alongside quite politicized worker, student, and professional elites stood a public with a largely moderate orientation.[10] For this public, the Communists were not an attractive electoral choice, especially in comparison to the Socialists, who were perceived as youthful, dynamic, and cosmopolitan.

The consequences of the Communist failure to impose a *ruptura* were not immediately apparent either to the Communists or to other Spanish political forces. The political situation in Spain in late 1977 and early 1978 was still quite fluid. Indeed, as the subsequent disintegration of the UCD attested, the parties and party system had not yet crystallized. The surprisingly strong Socialist performance (29 percent of the vote and 118 out of 350 seats in the Chamber of Deputies) in June 1977 only masked the PSOE's still unconsolidated organizational structures. Thus, the Communist situation did not appear overly grave. The PCE still retained the aura of strength it had developed during clandestinity as well as a very real influence exerted through the trade union known as the *Comisiones Obreras*.

Moreover, the PCE made an almost ideal alliance partner for Suárez and the UCD, which sought to contain the Socialist competition, draft a new Constitution, and get working-class acquiescence to the economic austerity package known as the *Pactos de la Moncloa*. Although the PCE had not done nearly as well as it had expected in the 1977 elections, there appeared to be room for its influence to grow. Electorally speaking, the PCE was perceived as "democratic" by a larger proportion of Socialist and Centrist voters (60 and 38 percent respectively) than was the Italian Communist Party in 1975 by the voters affiliated with other Italian parties. A dramatic increase in membership—from approximately 15,000 in 1975 to nearly 200,000 in April 1978—suggested that the PCE was developing a mass base, which would allow implementation of the Gramscian strategy of "presence" at all levels of society.[11]

From this perspective, the problems provoked by the PCE's organizational restructuring in 1977 and 1978 did not appear insurmountable. The Communist leaders viewed the problems that surfaced after the PCE was legalized in April 1977 as being quite normal after 40 years underground. Communications between the different party organizations operating within Spain had often been difficult and had created a center-periphery cleavage. The resurgence of regional nationalisms at the end of the Franco era and the demands made by left-wing nationalists on the new political system also complicated the Communists' situation. The forging of a cohesive, unified national party was complicated by the inevitable conflicts that arose in this period between the older, exiled leaders of the party (who returned to Spain in 1976 and early 1977) and the younger militants who had had a good deal of latitude in formulating party policy under Franco. Carrillo had deliberately advanced some of these younger cadres to high positions in the party. Thus, the frictions were not due to generational conflict as such between the Secretary General, as representative of the exiled leadership, and the leaders from within Spain. Rather, they developed when "historic" figures returned to important positions either in provincial party organizations or in the national headquarters. This conflict was intensified on occasion by the obvious unsuitability of some cadres—both from among the exiles and from those who had been in Spain—for work in legal, mass organizations.

A further source of friction was the displacement of many intellectuals and professionals from prominent positions in the PCE. The entry of these "forces of culture" into Communist ranks during the 1960's and early 1970's had been greeted with enthusiasm by party leaders because it seemed to confirm not only the decline of the Franco regime but also the correctness and viability of the adaptive strategy pursued by the PCE since 1956. Active in dissident university movements, many of these young professionals helped the PCE to turn these movements into centers of anti-Franco activity. The professionals and intellectuals also played a major role in delegitimating Francoism through their participation in various united fronts calling for amnesty and democratic liberties.[12]

After the failure of these efforts and the disappointing outcome of the June 1977 elections, the PCE

[10]See Ch. 4 by Jose Ignacio Wert in *Spain at the Polls*.

[11]The figures are from an analysis of the Communist voter and his attitudes by Juan Linz, "A Sociological Look at Spanish Communism," unpubl. ms., 1979. See especially the section on "The Image of the PCE-PSUC."

[12]See the discussion in Eusebio Mujal-León, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1983, esp. Ch. 8

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leadership began to rely more on the Communist presence in the labor movement as it struggled against the Centrists and the Socialists. This displacement of the "forces of culture" at an organizational and political level combined with several other factors—the most important of which were the persistence of an anti-intellectual or *ouvrièriste* bias within the PCE and the intellectuals' unwillingness to suspend their critical faculties for the sake of "party"—to create serious strains after June 1977.

These problems were by no means unique to the PCE, nor were they sufficient by themselves to provoke the political crisis of the PCE. What activated the crisis and deepened latent and real fissures was the PCE's failure to join the government. For the Communists, this would have been the most expeditious way of legitimating themselves to the Spanish public and of shortening the distance that separated them from the Socialists. Carrillo and others in the leadership believed that a Spanish version of the "historic compromise" was not only possible but, given Spanish conditions, probable and necessary. To realize this end, during 1977 and 1978 the Communists pursued a number of initiatives in alliance policy, international relations, and internal redefinition and reform whose riskiness the Communist leadership appeared to underestimate.

Communist strategy had a dual aim. On the one hand, it tried to retain the loyalty of traditional party members; on the other, to attract new members and voters. The contradictions inherent in this strategy became visible in a number of specific policy initiatives pursued by the PCE. Thus, the policy of consensus in national politics that the Communists followed (its formal appellation was *concentración democrática*) drew on and fostered contradictory pulls.[13] The moderation of the Communists, their efforts to calm partisan tempers, and their collaboration with the UCD were designed to attract Center-Left voters. But if they urged collaboration across class lines, the Communists also directed especially biting attacks against their ostensible partners on the Left, the Socialists, precisely because the latter's commitment to "real" change was weak.

The contradictory pulls were also visible in the ideological sphere, particularly in the proposal Carrillo made in late 1977 to delete the self-description "Leninist" from the PCE program. This initiative, as might be expected, provoked a storm of controversy. As with the policy of consensus, its objective was the legitimization of the PCE, the breaking down of barriers to

Marcelino Camacho, secretary general of the Workers' Commissions (CC.OO.), at a press conference on October 9, 1980, in connection with trade union elections.

—Pictorial Parade.

Communist participation in the government. In order to have this otherwise bold initiative approved at the 9th Congress in April 1978, however, party leaders relied on support from trade union activists and the party apparatus, who went along not because of enthusiasm for "Eurocommunism," but because Carrillo put the issue in organizational terms. Party discipline and cohesion demanded approval of the proposal; as Executive Committee member Simon Sánchez Montero aptly and simply put it during the Congress debate: "It is Leninist to drop Leninism."

Opposition to the proposal that the party no longer term itself "Leninist" came from two, rather different, sources. The "traditionalists" objected to the proposal on the ground that it meant abandoning a core part of Communist identity. The more "liberal" elements within the party objected because they believed that in order to sustain a viable "Eurocommunist" strategy, the PCE needed to overhaul its policies drastically and engage in profound criticism of its internal organization and principles. To these individuals, the Carrillo proposal smacked of a public relations gambit resembling the "unanimous" French Communist party decision in early 1976 to drop the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" from its program. For this group of Spanish Communists, there had not been nearly enough time for

[13]It crystallized in the *Pactos de la Moncloa* (1977), the new Constitution (1978), and in the *Acuerdo Nacional sobre el Empleo* (1982).

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debate on an issue that went to the very core of the Communist identity. What was more, the change could hardly signify much if the same people remained in control throughout the Spanish Communist organization and the autocratic style of leadership personified by Carrillo was perpetuated.

As long as the possibility remained that the Communists might recover influence, the contradictions in these policy initiatives as well as between the competing needs of organizational maintenance and electoral expansion did not become too great. Rank-and-file Communists remained optimistic (or at least amenable to being convinced) about the future prospects of the PCE well into the summer of 1979. Although the PCE had not done particularly well in the March 1979 parliamentary elections, the party had improved on its performance in the municipal contests a month later—sufficiently so as to compel the Socialists into alliances at the local level.

The 1979 municipal elections were also the backdrop against which the PSOE debated whether to drop the term "Marxist" from its self-description. First Secretary Felipe González made a proposal to that effect, and it became a source of conflict at the 29th PSOE Congress in May 1979. There the proposal lost, and the PSOE was thrown into a crisis when González subsequently refused renomination to his post of First Secretary. Behind the dispute over the inclusion of the word "Marxist" lay not just personal and organizational conflicts within the PSOE. Also involved were competing perspectives on alliance strategies.[14] Those who wanted retention of the term sought closer collaboration with the Communists and a leftist identity for the PSOE. When, four months later, González returned triumphant as First Secretary at an extraordinary congress held in September 1979, the chances for a strategy based on unity of the Left virtually disappeared.[15]

The González victory and the growing unwillingness of the UCD to join forces with the Communists after the March 1979 elections isolated the PCE politically. This, combined with a worsening international climate after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a declining domestic economy (there was virtually no growth in the gross domestic product, and unemployment began to rise sharply), brought the Spanish Communist crisis into the open.

Carrillo Is Challenged

Earlier in this article, I noted the existence of several competing groups within the PCE in the months after its legalization. Alongside the party apparatus and its labor activists, there were hard-line (sometimes described as pro-Soviet) components and a small group of "liberal Eurocommunists." By late 1979 and early 1980, competition between these groups increased. Party labor activists, who had been among Carrillo's most loyal supporters at the April 1978 Congress, grew disenchanted with the policy of consensus and urged a turn to "mobilization"—a euphemism for more strikes and demonstrations in response to the worsening domestic economic situation. Speaking for hard-line labor activists, Fidel Alonso wrote in the party newspaper *Mundo Obrero*:

Over a long period of time, the party has appeared not as the most dynamic and combative opposition party, leading the working class and the popular strata . . . but rather as a party of collaboration and restraint of mobilization . . . .[16]

Just how realistic these demands were in the Spanish context or how serious labor activists were about going through with them is questionable. Unquestionable, however, was the significance of this breaking of ranks with the leadership. It reflected frustration at the dwindling prospects for the PCE, and it showed the Carrillo leadership's growing inability to maintain a balance between the organizational and electoral needs of the PCE.

Another manifestation of the crisis was a decline in the PCE's membership. It had risen dramatically after Franco's death, reaching an official total of 201,757 by late 1977.[17] Thereafter, membership began a slow but inexorable decline, down to 171,332 by the end of 1978, and then to 140,000 by late 1979. In the same period, the party organizations in Madrid and Catalonia lost nearly 50 percent of their membership.[18]

The growing boldness of hard-line sectors in labor (and in the party apparatus) divided the heretofore dominant "Eurocommunist" faction, whose unques-

[14] In an interview with *Zona Abierta* (Madrid), September 1979, p. 12, González clearly expressed his opinion: "The Socialist party's capacity to attract [voters] diminishes in inverse proportion to links through stable agreements with other parties and, especially, the PCE."

[15] As far as González was concerned, in order to win national power the PSOE had to unload its 19th century Marxist baggage and rhetoric. Modernization of Spanish society, not nationalization and class conflict, was the driving force of his program.

[16] *Mundo Obrero*, Feb. 13–19, 1981.

[17] For membership figures, see the articles in *La Calle* (Madrid), Jan. 15–21 and 22–28, 1980.

[18] *El País* (Madrid), Dec. 24, 1980 and also Victor Díaz Cardiel, then regional secretary for Madrid, in *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 25–Oct. 1, 1981.

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tioned leader and animator had been Santiago Carrillo. The response of Carrillo and his supporters was to emphasize continued adherence to "Eurocommunist" tenets, such as the commitment to political pluralism and consensus politics while at the same time affirming party discipline and the value of traditional communist organizational doctrine.

His "liberal" critics saw in this approach the inevitable emasculation of "Eurocommunism." Unless party leaders pushed forward with the internal democratization of the PCE, the "hard-liners" would not be really defeated, nor would the Spanish public be convinced about the democratic transformation of the party. Such arguments had already been heard prior to the 9th congress in 1978; the small "liberal" minority associated with some intellectuals and professionals had made them.[19] Their reoccurrence in 1980 was noteworthy because members of the apparatus were now voicing these arguments. Individuals like Pilar Brabo, Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, Ernest García—all under 40 years old, members of the Executive Committee, and, most important, members of the inner circle around Carrillo—pressed in this direction and came to be dubbed the "renovators."[20]

As these factions crystallized and the struggle between them grew more heated, each strove to articulate a general strategic line. Nuanced differences were apparent in their respective conceptions of alliances (both political and social), ideology, and international policies. Appropriately enough, however, it was over principles of internal organization and Communist identity that the cleavages within the "Eurocommunist" group became most explicit.

Organizational questions have always had a privileged place in communist debates. Since the classic formulation of such questions by Lenin in *What is to be Done?* communists have debated what appeared to be obscure organizational issues and drawn broad political conclusions from them. The historic importance of organizational questions stems from several theses propounded by Lenin (and subsequently accepted by the Third International) including the one that "class political consciousness could be brought to the workers *only from without.*"[21] In order to develop class consciousness among the proletariat and to overthrow the existing capitalist order, the working class needed to have a tightly knit organization of revolutionaries at its disposal. Although there were subsequent elaborations of Leninist party doctrine (among them PCI Secretary General Palmiro Togliatti's post–World War II argument in favor of a mass-based party), communist parties retained their commitment to a distinct organizational tradition whose centerpiece was the doctrine of democratic centralism. This was true as well of the Spanish Communists who, even as they changed other components of their ideology during the 1960's and 1970's, remained firm in their adherence to this doctrine. Other than promising to return to "Leninist" interpretations of doctrine and to promote greater internal democracy once the PCE was legalized, party leaders had made no major concessions on organizational matters.[22]

Despite the contradictions implicit in coupling a commitment to political and social pluralism with an autocratic form of internal organization, the PCE experienced only scattered debate on these questions until Carrillo proposed that "Leninism" be dropped from the party program. Approval of his proposal at the 9th Congress in April 1978 (by a vote of 968 in favor, 240 against, with 40 abstentions) marked the beginning of what was to become a tortuous and still uncompleted debate within the Spanish party.

By the early 1980's, there had emerged within the PCE three competing interpretations as to the nature of the party, its relations to mass organizations, and its organizational response to peripheral nationalist movements. The majority position, articulated by Carrillo, argued for continued innovation and adaptation at the level of general policy. It emphasized, however, the continuing relevance of traditional communist organizational precepts and the need for loyalty to the party line as articulated by its leadership. For these *oficialistas*, the legalization of the party and the decision to expand its membership so as to make it a mass-based party entailed an adjustment but not a dramatic transformation in the flow of authority within the party. The three-tiered system of the PCE—leaders, activists, and members—did not require the elimination of democratic centralism. True, as an organizational rule, it might not be altogether enforceable in relations between activists and members, but democratic centralism remained very much in force for the *real* members, the leaders and the activists. For this group, democratic centralism was not only an organizational mechanism to insure unity despite the heterogeneity of the Communists' social base but also a

[19]An example was the speech of PCE lawyer José María Mohedano given in March 1978, prior to the Madrid provincial conference.

[20]The term caught on after 250 critics published a document in *El País* (June 3, 1981) entitled "Eurocomunismo y Renovación."

[21]This is a much quoted sentence from V.I. Lenin's *What is to be Done?* See in James E. Connor, Ed., *Lenin on Politics and Revolution*, Indianapolis, Pegasus, 1968, p. 53.

[22]For the evolution of the PCE's organizational doctrine, see Mujal-León, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, Ch. 5.

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distinguishing feature of Communists and their party organization.[23]

The Communists were the vanguard party in Spanish society (even if—in a concession to the sensitivities of other groups on the Left—the PCE agreed it would have to earn that leading role), and their primary constituency remained the working class. Although the extension of communist influence among all sectors of society was vital to the fulfillment of the vanguard role, the party had to direct and not merely respond to the needs of social sectors. This was true not only with respect to "new" social movements but even with respect to the working class. *Comisiones Obreras* might be "independent," but Communists were under an obligation to work within the *Comisiones* to insure that those groups' policies were consistent with those of the PCE. Although the party could not expect *Comisiones* to fall into line automatically, the *oficialistas* saw democratic centralism as the means by which party policies were made effective in relation to other organizations and movements.

As the intensity of the party battles increased, the rhetoric of the *oficialistas* became more strident, their positions tougher. This could be seen in party statute changes. Whereas the emphasis at the April 1978 9th PCE Congress had been on unlimited discussion and renewal, at the 10th Congress in 1981 the focus was on discipline. Thus, the articles that established the guidelines for expulsion and other sanctions—Articles 63 and 64—were four times as long as the corresponding articles in the 1978 statutes. In the section of the 1981 statutes dedicated to the "rights" of party members, there was a newly-incorporated reference to "the acceptance of directives and decisions made according to the principles of subordination of the minority to the majority, of inferior organizations to superior ones" (Article 10). Amendments calling for acceptance of different currents of opinion within the PCE, the "federalization" of the party, the elaboration of alternative lists, and the use of proportional criteria in the selection of representatives to leading party bodies were turned down. Paralleling these developments was the stress Carrillo now put on "party patriotism," on "the roots and sources that are ours."[24] His emphasis on "party-mindedness" further narrowed the communist base in Spanish society but aimed at drawing a favorable response from the party faithful.

The opponents of the *oficialista* position included the "hard-liners" as well as the "renovators." The former were the traditionalists within the party who wanted a return to conventional Leninist/Stalinist formulations. They placed greater emphasis on mobilizing the proletariat than on working within "institutions" (read the parliament), and advocated a supportive position toward the Soviet Union. These "hard-line" critics had viewed Carrillo's "Eurocommunist" innovations with ill-disguised contempt.

In Catalonia, the "hard-liners" won a startling victory at the 5th Congress of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) in early 1981, when they eliminated the word "Eurocommunism" from the party program.[25] Then, as other groups in the PSUC leadership and in the central party organization moved to isolate them, they responded by setting up a parallel, quasi-clandestine leadership structure in the Catalan party. This flagrant violation of democratic centralism led to the expulsion of the pro-Soviet elements in December 1981. A similar pattern emerged in Madrid.[26] There, after joining forces with the "renovators" to gain approval at a June 1981 provincial conference of an amendment permitting factions (it was defeated at the 1981 PCE Congress), Fidel Alonso and his supporters distributed a letter decrying "the scandalous situation" within the party, a situation that, in their view, "threatened to dilapidate the political capital obtained with so much sacrifice during the struggle against the dictatorship."[27] The "hard-liners" favored the re-Leninization of the PCE, but paradoxically, they joined forces with the "renovators" in most party organizations after 1979 in trying to bend, if not emasculate, democratic centralism.

While the "hard-liner" challenge to the *oficialistas* was vehement, it was not as significant as that emanating from the "renovators." The latter represented the "liberal" wing of the PCE and included several persons, like Pilar Brabo and Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, who had once been close to Carrillo and owed their careers in the party to him. The "renovators" did not question the PCE's general political strategy, attributing the recent failures of the party instead to the "lack of fit between the PCE's organizational strategy and its political project."[28] These organizational failures, in their view, had made it impossible for the Communists

[23]See Ignacio Latierro, "Thoughts on Eurocommunism and the Party," *Nuestra Bandera,* (Madrid), No. 108, no date, pp. 13–17.

[24]See Carrillo's interview in the weekly organ of the PSUC, *Treball* (Barcelona), June 1–7, 1982, and his July 1981 Central Committee report in *Mundo Obrero,* July 28–Aug. 5, 1981. See also his speech at the PCE Fiesta, *Mundo Obrero,* Oct. 2–8, 1981.

[25]For an extended discussion, see my article "Cataluña, Carrillo, and Eurocommunism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1981, pp. 25–47.

[26]As noted in *La Calle,* July 14–20, 1981.

[27]*Mundo Obrero* (Special Madrid Edition), November 1981, carried the text of the letter.

[28]Pilar Brabo, "Eurcommunism and the Party," *Nuestra Bandera,* No. 106, March 1981, pp. 21–23.

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to recapture political initiative after the party's legalization. The core elements of the organizational proposals made by "renovators" were: (1) to overhaul radically the party structures; (2) to eliminate "Stalinist political culture"; and, (3) to create "democratic centralism of a new type." For Brabo, the model to be followed was that of the early Bolshevik party where "there existed debate, internal as well as public confrontation, and the broadest possible democratic discussion, [with allowances even for] the formation of organized tendencies."[29] This model of internal pluralism would complement the social and political pluralism to which the PCE was committed in Spanish society, and also insure the party's openness to the needs and impulses of mass movements, be they labor-based or devoted to ecological or feminist issues.

Aligned with the "renovators" were several prominent intellectuals, professionals, and academics who—although they were party members and even, in the case of Ramón Tamames, belonged in the Executive Committee—could not be classified as members of the apparatus. The "renovators" also had a Basque component, led by Basque Communist Party (EPK) Secretary General Roberto Lertxundi, which supported the "federalization" of the PCE. Translated, this meant favoring party decentralization through the creation of autonomous regional units. Despite the defeat of his "federalist" thesis at the 10th Congress, Lertxundi had pressed ahead with this proposal—which infuriated Carrillo not only because it meant tampering with the "historic" structure of the party but also because it threatened to undo Carrillo's decades-long effort to reassure moderate and conservative Spaniards and the military that the PCE did not favor separatist movements. In response to Lertxundi's decision to fuse the EPK with the Basque nationalist coalition known as *Euskadiko Eskerra,*[30] the *oficialistas* dissolved the regional EPK Central Committee and then expelled Lertxundi and five other PCE Central Committee members who supported him.[31]

The Basque affair triggered a general crisis with the "renovators." Several members of this group became sponsors of a public meeting in Madrid at which Lertxundi and other Basque leaders could present their views.[32] They too were expelled—by a vote of 67 in favor, 24 against, with 8 abstentions. Their ouster more or less completed the "normalization" of the highest policymaking bodies of the PCE.

But the price for this "normalization" was high. Not only had the leadership been decimated, but the party had also badly damaged its public credibility. Worse, all of this occurred as the process of political realignment gained impetus. By late 1981, the UCD, suffering from bitter internal strife and under challenge from Manuel Fraga Iriborne's conservative Popular Alliance, was in an advanced state of decomposition. For its part, the Spanish public had lost confidence in the UCD (in the wake of the failed February 1981 coup attempt, the Centrist government had given every sign of drift), and it was now ready to put its support and hopes for the consolidation of democracy in the hands of the PSOE. After the May 1982 regional elections in Andalusia, where they received over 60 percent of the vote, the Socialists stood ready to assume the mantle of government.



Santiago Carrillo in fall 1982 after the poor electoral showing of the Communist Party of Spain raised questions about the efficacy of his leadership as secretary general.

—Katherine Young.

Rampant Factionalism

The Spanish Communist crisis reached a new high in the wake of the October 1982 parliamentary elections in which the PSOE won 48 percent of the vote (and 202 seats in the Congress of Deputies) while the

[29]Ibid., p. 21.

[30]One of EE's components, EIA, was the political arm of the less radical Basque terrorist group, ETA (Politico-Militar).

[31]For the relevant texts, see *Mundo Obrero,* Nov. 6–12, 1981, special appendix.

[32]*El País,* Nov. 25, 1981; also *La Calle,* Dec. 10–16, 1981.

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Communists received 3.8 percent of the vote and only 4 seats. Devastated by the Socialist landslide, the Communists turned on themselves, questioning not only the adequacy of their strategy but the relevance and future of the Communist Party itself. The polemics within the PCE took on both a more virulent and a more irrelevant tone since the debates and decisions at Central Committee sessions after 1982 have had little impact on the political life of the country. For a party whose members were used to being at the center of all political discussions, this was a difficult situation indeed. Ultimately, it seemed that the Communists had lost their self-confidence, a quality essential for successful politicians and parties, and one which had been characteristic of the PCE until its resounding defeat in October 1982. Already shaken by the failure to assume a leading role during the transition and by its meager voter support in 1977 and 1979, the PCE now became concerned whether it would ever recover political influence or close the gap in electoral support separating it from the PSOE.

The first casualty of the October 1982 elections was Santiago Carrillo, PCE Secretary General since 1960 and the architect of the party's Eurocommunist strategy. On an earlier occasion, at a Central Committee session in June 1982, he had offered his resignation—rightly confident that his colleagues in the party leadership would reject his move. It was another story at the marathon Executive and Central Committee sessions in November 1982. While few party leaders called openly for Carrillo's resignation, more and more of them were coming to the conclusion that Carrillo's authoritarian style had become the single most important obstacle to the PCE's internal pacification, and that his inability to ameliorate intraparty tensions had contributed decisively to the disastrous Communist electoral showing. Even so, few were willing to mount a direct challenge for the secretary generalship.

Carrillo tried to take advantage of this reluctance by offering his resignation and proposing his successor. The plan had an attractive simplicity. By resigning, Carrillo could sidestep the attacks of those who would seek to remove him at the next PCE Congress. Having thus seized the initiative, he was also in a better position to block the ascent of the man who had become his archrival within the PCE, Nicolás Sartorius, a former *Comisiones Obreras* leader who was not only an eminent theoretician but also a spiritual ally of those who identified with the expelled "renovator" faction.[33]

Followers of Socialist Party candidate Felipe González celebrate his electoral triumph on October 28, 1982.

—CONTACT.

An additional consideration undoubtedly entered Carrillo's mind. By resigning, he was in a position to designate a successor who would defer to him on major issues. Indeed, Carrillo apparently had in mind the creation of a bicephalous secretary generalship, in which he would deal with matters of state (such as representing the PCE when the King consulted with the political parties) and with major political and ideological issues, while his successor would handle internal party affairs and coordination.[34]

With these ideas in mind, Carrillo proposed for secretary general the leader of the Asturian Communist Party (PCA), Gerardo Iglesias. Iglesias was a young man. He had joined the PCE in 1960 at age 15, and he had risen through party ranks as a labor activist. Elected PCA Secretary in March 1978, Iglesias had made a name for himself as a "hammer of the heretics," one who had not hesitated to purge "liberal" dissidents from PCE ranks.[35] During the tumultuous debates that shook the party between 1979 and 1982, Iglesias had shown himself to be a loyal, if not exactly inspired or inspiring, supporter of Carrillo and the *oficialista* faction. Iglesias was also a young man from a working-class background whose orthodoxy could not be simply attributed to his age or to predilections formed during the Stalinist period. He appeared to be

[33]On the confrontation between Carrillo and Sartorius at the June 1982 Central Committee session (after which Sartorius resigned as PCE Vice Secretary), see *Mundo Obrero*, June 18–24, 1982, and the coverage in *El País*, June 11–14, 1982.

[34]See *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 30–Oct. 6, 1983, p. 44 for a reference to this.

[35]As Carrillo remarked during an *El País* interview: "It was in Asturias where the conclusions of the 10th Congress had been best applied." *El País*, Nov. 14, 1982.

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Party delegates remain seated in silence as Santiago Carrillo, former party secretary general, walks to the rostrum at a national conference of the Spanish Communist Party in December 1982.

—Photo by Bernardo Perez as published in *El País* (Madrid), Dec. 20, 1982.

the ideal candidate, one who would make sure that things in the PCE did not change too much and that Carrillo would retain his influence.

But orderly transitions are difficult, and controlled ones even more so. Iglesias was neither a charismatic speaker nor a bold conceptualizer. He was, however, a proud man and, upon assuming the post of secretary general, his horizons changed. In the first place, he was simply unwilling to become a pawn in another man's efforts to retain power. Carrillo's resignation opened the floodgates of criticism within the party, and Iglesias found himself compelled to propose and to entertain solutions to the PCE's crisis that he could have ignored in his earlier post as regional party secretary.

At first, he was not bold. He did not agree with those who wished to convoke a new congress, and urged instead that a national conference (whose powers were much less extensive) be convened to discuss the 1982 election results and their implications. But even at this early stage, he did not defend Carrillo or the PCE's record as much as the former Secretary General might have liked. Instead, he marked his distance from Carrillo. As secretary general, Iglesias insisted during his first address to the Central Committee (much to the discomfort of Carrillo who was in the audience), he and not another would be in charge. Several weeks later, in an interview with the Madrid daily *El País,* Iglesias pointedly remarked: "I do not mimetically follow one or another person, that is not my style."[36]

No less important than this public distancing from Carrillo were Iglesias's diagnoses of the causes of the Spanish Communist crisis. In the *El País* interview, he

[36]Ibid, Nov. 30, 1982; see also the much later interview in *Tiempo* (Madrid), Mar. 25, 1985.

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alluded to the "loss of contact with social movements" by the Communists prior to October 1982, and he called for the reincorporation of those intellectuals and artists who had either left or been expelled from the PCE.[37]

That things were not going well between Carrillo and Iglesias became quite apparent at the party's National Conference in December 1982. The former Secretary General missed the first two days of the meeting, and arrived (to an embarrassing lack of applause) only on the final day. At issue was the report Iglesias presented in the name of the Central Committee, which the Executive Committee to which Carrillo still belonged had debated in the days prior to the conference.[38] The report presented a preliminary analysis of what had gone wrong with and for the Communist Party. Couched in somewhat vague terms, the report nevertheless insisted on the "need for profound criticism, self-criticism, and changes in the PCE." More specifically, Iglesias argued that Carrillo's proposal to create a "democratic front" of the UCD, PSOE, and PCE after the February 1981 coup attempt had been incorrect. Then and now, he said, the PCE should have pursued a "strategy of democratic collaboration" with emphasis on closer ties with the Socialists. Under present circumstances, a pillar of this strategy should be critical but constructive criticism of the Socialist government. In slightly more elliptical fashion, Iglesias also referred to needed improvements in the relationship between the party and "mass organizations," and he criticized the chasm that had developed since the onset of democracy between the party leadership and the PCE's membership.

Iglesias also called for as yet unspecified changes in the party's leadership organs. When broached in the Executive Committee prior to the National Conference, this had elicited sharply negative responses from the still incipient *carrillista* faction. Some changes in the PCE leadership had occurred during the summer of 1982. Marcelino Camacho, who was head of the *Comisiones Obreras,* had resigned from the Executive Committee; the Central Committee elected José Carlos Mauricio, Eulalia Vintró, and Andreu Claret Serra to the Executive Committee.[39] But even with the addition of the Catalans (whose relationship with Carrillo had never been good), the balance in the Executive Committee and in the Secretariat remained clearly with Carrillo. As the *carrillistas* now understood from his report, Iglesias had in mind more profound changes. These proposals would become the source of ever greater controversy as the battle for control of the PCE's apparatus got under way.

While the election of Iglesias as secretary general marked a major transition for the PCE, another significant development was the split in the old guard of the party. Most of the latter (including Executive Committee members Simon Sánchez Montero, Francisco Romero Marín, José María González Jerez, Ignacio Gallego, and Armando López Salinas) had been closely aligned with Carrillo since the early 1960's. Although some of them had viewed the PCE's "Eurocommunist" evolution with concern, generally they provided a solid and dependable base of support for Carrillo in the highest councils of the party. This core of support began to disintegrate during 1982.

One member of this group—Ignacio Gallego—would resign from the PCE in December 1983, and subsequently head the unified pro-Soviet Communist party, *Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España* (PCPE). Gallego had made no secret of his lack of enthusiasm for the "Eurocommunist" direction of the PCE, and most party members assumed he was in close touch not only with pro-Soviet and hard-line dissidents within the party but also with diplomatic personnel from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gallego had been the PCE's organizational secretary through the mid-1970's, when his relations with Carrillo became strained. Partly for political reasons and partly for personal ones, however, Carrillo had kept him on the Executive Committee, where he gave expression to the latent pro-Soviet sentiment shared by many militants, but which few of them expressed openly. Though he voted after November 1982 with the *carrillista* faction, Gallego did so primarily because he opposed the direction in which Iglesias and his allies had begun to take the party.

More ominous for Carrillo were the defections of Simón Sánchez Montero and Santiago Alvarez, old friends who parted company with him in late 1982. Of the two, Sánchez Montero was the more important, since he had been closely associated with Carrillo's effort both at the 9th Congress and later to rally support around the "Eurocommunist" position and to contain the combined "renovator" and "hard-line" challenge to Carrillo's power. It is difficult to determine why Sánchez Montero decided to support Iglesias. Undoubtedly personal considerations played a role: Sánchez Montero may have been offended by Carrillo's assumption that he had a right to life tenure in the secretary generalship. He may also have concluded that Carrillo was an obstacle to the recovery of the

[37] *El País*, Nov. 14, 1982, and *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 3–9, 1982.

[38] See *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 17–23, 1982, pp. 9ff., for the quotations in this paragraph.

[39] Ibid., July 9–15, 1982.

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PCE. Whatever the explanation, Sánchez Montero's support for Iglesias was crucial in the first weeks of the latter's mandate, since it eventually encouraged others in the old guard (for example, Romero Marín and González Jerez) to rally around Iglesias. This did not take place over night, of course. When Iglesias presented his specific proposals for personnel changes to the Executive Committee in February 1983, Romero Marín and González Jerez abstained (as did PCE president Dolores Ibárruri) on a very close vote of 13 in favor and 10 opposed.[40]

The parameters of debate in the PCE changed significantly after Carrillo's resignation. He was now in many respects just another party baron. No longer could "Santiago" and the PCE be identified in one breath, and this opened the doors to a realignment within the party leadership. The change in the old guard's position was both a reflection and a cause of this transformation and presaged changes among other segments of the party. Iglesias rallied a heterogeneous coalition around himself. One group represented the old guard. A second group represented labor activists, whose principal exponents were *Comisiones Obreras* leader Marcelino Camacho and former PCE Vice Secretary General Nicolás Sartorius. They criticized Carrillo's organizational heavy-handedness and his excessively "traditional" (and "instrumental") conception of party–trade union relations. Sartorius also provided a rallying point for a third group, among which could be numbered most Catalan Communist leaders who generally identified with the "renovators."[41] They wanted not only an "updating" of the PCE's program and practices, but the reintegration of the dissidents expelled during Carrillo's last years. A fourth group, representative of younger elements in the party apparatus, threw its support behind Iglesias. Individuals like Enrique Curiel and Juan Francisco Pla had been unstinting in their support for Carrillo, but they were not about to back a loser in the post–October 1982 horse race, especially when Iglesias seemed intent on bringing his own followers into the party administration. They could protect their own positions best by changing sides.

The *carrillistas* thus became the rump of the formerly dominant *oficialista* faction. Their common denominator (at the risk of some oversimplification) was opposition to the "renovators." According to the *carrillistas,* the "renovators" were to blame for the hemorrhage in PCE membership and for the electoral defeat in October 1982. Had they not been "social democrats" in disguise, and had they had more "party spirit," the PCE would have been united for the elections. Even if the Socialists had won, the recovery of the party's political space could have been quickly accomplished. Party leaders were wasting their time in trying to convince the "renovators" to return to the party, since they were neither wanted nor needed. Moreover, to seek the return of the "renovators" was, in effect, to apologize for their expulsion and to imply no confidence in the stewardship of Carrillo.[42] According to his supporters, neither Carrillo nor those who had backed him had anything for which to apologize.

This perspective dominated the analyses of the *carrillistas,* who had been ruthless executors of party policy between 1978 and 1982. Thus, Adolfo Piñedo, Ignacio Latierro, Juan Villalba, and José Luis Pérez de la Fuente had been party secretaries in several regions (Madrid, the Basque country, Valencia, and Galicia) where the "renovator" challenge had been strong but ultimately unsuccessful.[43] By contrast, in Asturias, where Iglesias had been in charge, the "renovators" had challenged, as it were, before their time. Party discipline and self-confidence were still strong in March 1978 when the confrontation had taken place; the national leadership was not yet divided; and the Asturian party had a strong *ouvrièriste* orientation as well as a tradition of discipline. Together, these factors contributed to the defeat of the "renovators" there.[44]

The crystallization of *carrillista* and *gerardista* factions had become apparent by early 1983. As noted earlier, Iglesias's proposal for changes in the organization of the party had been adopted by a narrow margin in the Executive Committee, and even in the Central Committee the vote of 44 in favor and 32 against was probably too close for comfort. But the *gerardistas* were in the majority, and they quickly set about consolidating their control. This meant, in the first place, changing the composition of the Secretariat. Jaime Ballesteros, a long-time Carrillo protégé, remained as PCE vice secretary general and assumed the duties of international secretary, but he was ousted as head of the crucially important organizational department.[45] In his place, Iglesias named Francisco

[40]On the changes, see *Mundo Obrero,* Jan. 28-Feb. 3, 1983. *El País,* Jan. 31, 1983, reported the Executive Committee vote. The Central Committee approved the changes by a vote of 44 to 32.

[41]The PSUC leadership had always had difficult relations with Carrillo, and many blamed him for the party's troubles in Catalonia in 1981–82.

[42]Carrillo explained his view of the PCE crisis (in Barcelona's *La Vanguardia,* Mar. 11, 1983) when he said that some members had not been Communists to begin with and others had stopped being Communists

[43]See the discussion in Ch. 8 of my *Communism and Political Change in Spain.*

[44]For coverage of the Asturian regional congress, see *El País,* Mar. 28, 1978, and *Diario 16* (Madrid), Mar. 27, 1978.

[45]*Mundo Obrero,* Jan. 28–Feb. 3, 1983.

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Palero, a relatively obscure provincial secretary from Guadalajara, whose principal merit was that he owed his ascendance to Iglesias. Iglesias also confirmed Eulalia Vintró as the cultural secretary (thereby solidifying his alliance with the Catalan Communists) and proposed Enrique Curiel for the post of vice secretary general.[46] Although Sartorius did not figure among those named, he was becoming the gray eminence behind Iglesias, and his influence was especially visible in the political and ideological arguments Iglesias presented in subsequent months.

Parameters of the Communist Debate

The political debate between *carrillistas* and *gerardistas* focused on the conditions and desirability of unity between the PCE and PSOE, about appropriate relationships between the PCE and "mass-based" organizations, and about the development and extension of internal party democracy. It began with a controversy over what had gone wrong since Franco's death in November 1975. What could or should the party and its leadership have done differently? The *carrillistas* argued that the PCE had done everything it could to assure the success of the *ruptura* with the Franco regime. However, conservative international (read the United States) and domestic (read the UCD, but with a hefty assist from a PSOE that buckled under to pressure from the military, the Church, and other *poderes fácticos*) forces had conspired to prevent the *ruptura*. Despite the party's best efforts to compel the formation of a "government of national concentration," the UCD and PSOE strategy of bipolarization had prevailed. The February 1981 coup attempt (and the subsequent rapid decomposition of the UCD) made the Socialists appear to be Spanish democracy's only salvation. When coupled with the Communists' own internal crisis (blamed on the "renovators"), the Socialist landslide was easily explicable.[47]

What did the *carrillistas* propose that the PCE do under existing circumstances? For one thing, they argued, there should be immediate and constant criticism of the Socialist government. No truce was possible, nor was it desirable to look for points of convergence with the Socialists. As Adolfo Piñedo declared in mid-June 1983: "It is one thing that we demand and call for the unity of the Left as an essential condition of our political project, but quite another that we invent the conditions when they do not exist."[48] This diagnosis left exceedingly little room for accommodation. The *carrillistas* therefore urged the PCE to lead strikes and demonstrations against the Socialist government's conservative economic policies, and particularly against its efforts at industrial reconversion prior to Spain's accession to the European Economic Communities (EEC).[49] The PCE had to offer a choice, not echo government policies. It had to attack the Socialists from the Left, not compete with the PSOE for the Center's political space.

The argument was at odds with the justifications Carrillo had offered during the transition and in the early period of the democratic regime for pursuing alliance with Suárez and the UCD. But the contradiction was more apparent than real. Underlying the *carrillistas'* position (in 1977 as in 1983) was a reflexive anti-PSOE thrust. To the *carrillistas,* the PSOE was a "social-democratic" party, with all its pejorative connotations for communists.[50] In the Spanish context such sentiments were reinforced by the two parties' competition during the Civil War as well as by the more recent battle for political supremacy on the Left during the transition. However much Carrillo insisted on his "Eurocommunist" credentials, he had had his ideas formed by experiences in the 1930's, and he never lost his animosity toward socialists.[51]

But there was another, more immediate, reason for the resentment Carrillo and his allies felt toward the Socialists. They reaped, Carrillo believed, the fruits of decades of Communist labor in the vineyard of Spanish society. This almost pathological dislike for the PSOE and its leaders undergirded Carrillo's search for an accord with Suárez and the UCD in 1977, as well as his demand for frontal Communist opposition to the Socialist government in the wake of the October 1982 elections.[52]

[46]Ibid.

[47]For a succinct and typical statement, see the editorial in *Ahora* (Madrid), No. 1, July 1984, pp. 4–7. Carrillo began publishing this monthly in mid-1984, alleging the PCE leadership was cutting off debate in the regular party press.

[48]*Mundo Obrero*, June 17–23, 1983.

[49]See Robert Fishman's "Socialist Government without Redistribution: The Spanish Experience," presented at the conference on "Socialist Government in Market Economies," Center of International Studies, Princeton University, January 1986. For the *carrillista* argument against "social pacts," see Julián Ariza's article in *Hora de Madrid* (organ of the PCE's Madrid regional organization), June 19, 1984.

[50]The origins of this visceral distrust of social democracy are not difficult to find. Social democracy was despised by communists from the very beginning and use of the term "social fascism" in the late 1920's and early 1930's was merely the most explicit expression of this sentiment.

[51]Even at the height of the PCE's Eurocommunism, the antisocialist edge had been pronounced. At a September 1973 Central Committee meeting, Carrillo actually said: "However many have been our errors and those of our comrades, the social democrats represent an example of the kind of policy the proletariat should never have followed. And any future unity demands from them a much more profound self-critical revision than the one we have to do." *Eurocomunismo–Socialismo en Libertad* (Eurocommunism—Socialism in Freedom), Madrid Ediciones Forma, 1977, p. 32.

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Having once defined the Socialists as their principal political target, the *carrillistas* presented their ideas as to who the PCE's potential social and political allies were. In contrast to the *gerardistas* (who argued in favor of a convergence with ecologists, pacifists, and other "new" social movements), the *carrillistas* called on the PCE to pay more attention to traditional alliance partners, such as the labor movement. A final component of the *carrillista* argument related to the PCE itself and how the party ought to recover its internal cohesion and dynamism. Here the *carrillistas* opposed the Iglesias leadership's efforts to regain the allegiance of the "renovators."[53] Such a course was not only impractical but would lead the party toward even greater concessions on ideological and organizational questions. The concessions would move the PCE further away from the communist ideal and toward complete "social-democratization."

The *gerardistas* brought a different perspective to the post-October 1982 Spanish Communist crisis. As Iglesias explained in late June 1983, the PCE's problems had begun in mid-1979 when the party leadership (and in particular Carrillo) had "failed to comprehend the full magnitude of the changes taking place in the country."[54] Iglesias and his supporters argued that in the aftermath of the March 1979 parliamentary elections, Spanish democracy entered a period of profound crisis. The UCD's swing to the right and its implicit acceptance of the Socialist strategy of bipolarization changed the dynamics of the party system. These circumstances made any accord "between a disunited Left, with hugely disparate positions on the political situation, and a disintegrating democratic Right, assailed by a strong attack from conservative sectors," impossible to attain. But the PCE, Iglesias argued, had continued to call for such a "democratic front" even while warning the electorate against voting for the PSOE. By so doing, the Carrillo leadership had profoundly misjudged the real situation in the country. Spaniards' "desire for change" and support for democracy had increased (especially after the February 1981 coup attempt), even as "reaction was forcing the UCD's policy to turn increasingly to the Right." By painting a catastrophic picture of the situation, by "presenting the country with a choice between a democratic front and repression," the Carrillo leadership had "facilitated the PSOE's task, granting it a free hand to interpret and assume as its own the desire for change."

What should the PCE do in the wake of the Socialist landslide? The *gerardistas* had a two-pronged answer. The PCE should not "attack the PSOE's clearly moderate policy." To do so, Iglesias and his allies argued, would be to lose "all our credibility." What the country and the PCE needed was to press for "cooperation between Socialists and Communists." In this way alone could the PSOE's concessions to the Right be thwarted. Such a course would also create conditions for "a genuine progressive alternative" in the 1986 parliamentary elections. Even if the PCE were unsuccessful in compelling the Socialists into forming a coalition, the Communists would have worked "to bar the way for the Right and to prevent the PSOE from governing as moderately as it is now." "There are great opportunities for the PCE," Iglesias declared, "if we put forward a consistent strategy in which criticism of the PSOE is complemented by unity between Socialists and Communists." "To break the two-party system," he went on, "let us work for the alternative of a left-wing government of Socialists, Communists, and other progressive forces."

The other dimension of the *gerardista* strategy for the PCE's "recovery" was "to undertake the renewal of the party as an instrument for political action . . . to discover new forms of work, and to take up and develop certain forms that we have abandoned." The language may have been uninspired, but the *carrillistas* could not have missed its meaning: Carrillo and his supporters had not understood what the "new concept of the mass party" was all about; they had not "normalized disagreements, strengthened participation in deliberations and collective work," or encouraged "autonomy of initiative vis-à-vis society by various party sectors."

The PCE's "regeneration" had profound political as well as organizational implications. In terms of alliance strategy, Iglesias urged the PCE to be flexible toward "new social movements." "The party ought to be very sensitive and attentive toward every kind of more or less stable mass social organization with more or less comprehensive objectives for modifying the current system."[55] And it should pay particular attention to those pacifist and ecologist movements whose "struggle" was "objectively one for transformation." The second aspect of the *gerardista* proposal (one

[52]See Adolfo Piñedo's articles, "On the Necessity for the PCE to Have a Political Line," *Ahora*, No. 2, October 1984, pp. 6–9; and "On the Recovery of the Left," ibid., No. 4, December 1984, pp. 7–9. For the PCE leadership's contrasting view, see the authoritative article by Executive Committee member Simón Sánchez Montero entitled "PCE Policy Toward the Socialist Government," *Mundo Obrero*, June 24–30, 1983.

[53]Piñedo expressed the *carrillistas*' opposition to "concessions" in an interview-debate published in the PCE's theoretical journal, *Nuestra Bandera*, September-October, 1984.

[54]The quotes in this and succeeding paragraphs are from Iglesias's address to the PCE Central Committee as published in *Mundo Obrero*, July 1–7, 1983, pp. 7–15.

[55]Ibid.

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which Iglesias addressed indirectly in his June 1983 Central Committee speech when he referred to the need for a better "dialectical approach" toward "sectoral groups") was to link the PCE's "recovery" to the party's success in "facilitating the return of many Communists."[56] Here again, even though he did not explicitly mention the "renovators," there was no mistaking the thrust of Iglesias's remarks. Unlike the *carrillistas,* he thought that the "renovators" were recoverable. And, even more significant, he still regarded them as "Communists."

When the Central Committee met in late June 1983, the stage had been set for a sharp confrontation between the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions. As we have seen, debates within the Executive and Central Committees had already been ascerbic. Even so, there were many on both sides of the factional struggle who still hoped that differences could be resolved. After the municipal elections of May 1983 these hopes began to evaporate.[57] The *gerardistas* had been quick to seize on their good outcome as proof of the PCE's recovery, and Iglesias himself wasted little time in ascribing the Communists' success to his policy of maintaining "an intelligent balance between a constant attack on Fraga as the principal opponent, and well-argued and responsible criticism of the most negative aspects of the government's policy."[58] He argued that the Communists should press forward with their efforts to conclude municipal agreements with the PSOE, to engage in a "peace struggle" against Spain's membership in NATO and American military bases on Spanish soil, and to seek negotiations with the Socialist government on economic policy. These proposals were directly contrary to the *carrillistas*' position, who had little hope for agreement with the Socialists. Although they agreed with the *gerardistas* on the "peace struggle," they saw in the NATO issue not so much an instrument for compelling the Socialists toward closer collaboration with the PCE, as a sledgehammer with which to pound the González government for having renounced its earlier call for immediate Spanish withdrawal from NATO.[59]

The 11th PCE Congress

If the May 1983 municipal election results confirmed the *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* in the correctness of their respective positions, then the preparations for the 11th PCE Congress to be held later in 1983 merely hardened them. The agenda for this congress had been the principal item of business at a Central Committee plenum in late June 1983. Iglesias defined the



Gerardo Iglesias shown in November 1982, shortly after his election to replace Santiago Carrillo as Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain.

—/Etienne Montes/GAMMA-LIAISON.

tasks of the 11th Congress as follows: "to develop, promote, and update" the PCE's Eurocommunist character. Iglesias's reference to "Eurocommunism" as a "movement of recovery and creative regeneration of Marxism" clearly conveyed—without use of the word "renovation"—the meaning of this proposal. The battle lines were thus drawn. Iglesias's report to the full Central Committee repeated his call for reconciliation with those who had abandoned the PCE, urged that criticism of the Socialist government be constructive, and called on the party to have an open attitude toward alliance with the "new social movements." The report elicited strong opposition at both the Executive and Central committees. In the former, the vote was 13 in favor, 7 against, with 1 abstention; in the Central

[56]Ibid.

[57]The election results showed the PCE gaining approximately 600,000 votes relative to October 1982, while the PSOE lost more than 2.5 million votes.

[58]*Mundo Obrero*, May 20–26, 1983.

[59]For an analysis of the PSOE's foreign policy, see my *Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco: Looking Beyond the Pyrenees* (forthcoming), Chs. 1 and 2.

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Committee, the vote was 43 for, 27 against, with 1 abstention.[60]

The Central Committee session in particular showed the depth of the fissures that had developed in the PCE. In an address that was notably leftist in tone, Carrillo sharply contradicted the theses in Iglesias's report by describing the PSOE's policies as "liberal-bourgeois," and demanded both greater state control over the economy and a moratorium on Spanish entry into the EEC. Describing himself as "boxed in" by the *gerardista* majority, Carrillo refused to join the commission that would draft the political documents for the 11th Congress. His allies Adolfo Piñedo and Julián Ariza adopted similar positions.[61]

There was evidence at the plenum of further disaggregation in the top PCE ranks. Executive Committee member Ignacio Gallego reacted irately to Iglesias's reference to the "degenerative process in the countries of 'real socialism'," and he launched into praise of the Soviet Union's accomplishments. Vice Secretary General Ballesteros—in a move that was in clear violation of party statutes and that elicited objections from Francisco Romero Marín—tried to present an alternative report to the Central Committee.[62]

There was little room left for compromise after the June 1983 Central Committee plenum. Indeed, in the months leading up to the 11th Congress, this reality began to dawn on ordinary party members. Agonized, almost plaintive letters were published in *Mundo Obrero* in the next six months. One writer implored: "We Communists should stop looking at each other as enemies or adversaries."[63] But the party base was dismayed not simply because acrimonious disputes had erupted in the highest organs of the party. The decision to convene a new party congress also unleashed a bitter fight in party federations and *agrupaciones* for control of the delegations that would attend the congress. Precisely because no single faction had overwhelming support (more than 40 percent of the Central Committee had voted against Iglesias's report in June 1983), the *gerardista, carrillista,* and pro-Soviet factions threw themselves headlong into the fray.

Of the three groups, the pro-Soviet faction was the weakest. Due to the expulsion or resignation of many of its stars,[64] the pro-Soviet faction had only scattered support. At the Executive Committee level, there were Gallego and Armando López Salinas; in the Central Committee, the faction had more support including the charismatic but utterly unpredictable leader of the Andalusian agricultural proletariat, Juan Antonio Romero. Among regional party federations, the pro-Soviet faction had some organizational weight in Castille, but its most significant stronghold was in Andalusia where it probably represented 25 to 30 percent of PCE members.[65] The importance of the pro-Soviet faction was not to be underestimated however. Given the close balance between *gerardistas* and *carrillistas,* the pro-Soviets were to prove a crucial swing vote at the Congress.

The numerous pro-Soviet groups that existed outside the official Communist Party also provided an important though negative (from the *gerardista* as well as *carrillista* perspective) reference point for PCE members. Just as the pre–11th Congress debates were beginning, these groups announced their intention to pursue negotiations to create a unified pro-Soviet party.[66] The unification congress met in January 1984 and elected Ignacio Gallego—who had resigned from the PCE Executive Committee in early December 1983—as the secretary general of the *Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España* (PCPE).[67]

There had been other pro-Soviet splinter efforts in the past, but the creation of the PCPE signaled a new phase.[68] For one thing, it came after nearly five years of continuing crisis in the course of which "historic" party figures were publicly attacking and insulting each other. The PCPE soon boasted several former PCE Executive Committee members, including Jaime

[60]*El País,* June 26 and July 1, 1983.

[61]Ibid., June 29, 1983.

[62]*Mundo Obrero,* Aug. 5–11, 1983.

[63]Another described the spectacle at Central Committee meetings as "a pack of dogs fighting over meat." See ibid., Nov. 4–10 and Nov. 25–Dec. 1, 1983.

[64]Francisco García Salve, a defrocked Jesuit who had been a leader in the *Comisiones Obreras* as well as a member of the Central Committee, was expelled from the PCE in July 1981; pro-Soviet Catalan Communists had set up their own party in April 1982; and *Comisiones Obreras* leader and Central Committee member Fidel Alonso had been expelled in June 1982 by the *carrillista*-controlled Madrid Regional Committee.

[65]At the Andalusian regional party congress in December 1983, a resolution supporting Eurocommunism had been approved by a vote of 179 for, 57 against, with 41 abstentions. *Mundo Obrero,* Dec. 8–14, 1983.

[66]Involved in this venture were the *Celulas Comunistas* (led by Fernando Sagaseta), the *Movimiento de Recuperación del PCE* (with José Cabo), the *Movimiento de Recuperación y Unificación del PC* (Fidel Alonso and Francisco García Salve), the *Partido de los Comunistas de Cataluña* (Pere Ardiaca and Joan Ramos), and the *Partido Comunista de España Unificado* (J.R. Carvajal). One of the original pro-Soviet splinter groups, the *Partido Comunista Obrero Español,* whose leader was Civil War veteran Enrique Lister, also joined the negotiations but eventually withdrew.

[67]For Gallego's public letter of resignation, see the *Carta de Dimisión de Ignacio Gallego Dirigida al Comité Ejecutivo del PCE* (Letter of Resignation by Ignacio Gallego to the Executive Committee of the PCE), 1983. The PCE's response was published in *Mundo Obrero,* Jan. 20–26, 1984.

[68]On earlier splinter groups, see my article, "The Soviet and Spanish Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, and Negotiating Behavior," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Autumn 1982, pp. 236–65. For a concise exposition of the PCPE's views, see Ignacio Gallego's *Informe/Resúmen al Congreso de Unidad de los Comunistas* (Information/Summary to the Unification Congress of Communists), January 1984, no place of publication.

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The cover of a pamphlet in which Ignacio Gallego publishes his "Letter of Resignation to the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Spain" in December 1983; in the following month, he became secretary general of a new Communist Party (Spain), which later became known as the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain.

Ballesteros (as of December 1984) and Armando López Salinas (in July 1985). This pro-Soviet group was also different in that its adherents were not simply aging Communists with a nostalgia for the 1920's and 1930's. Gallego was the secretary general and other old-timers joined the PCPE. But there was no dearth of young people involved in the new party, and the PCPE also had a strong nucleus of labor activists. Their impact on the *Comisiones Obreras* was disproportionate to their numbers. They were never strong enough to make a bid for the leadership of the *Comisiones*, but they were a constant thorn in the side of the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions within the *Comisiones*. Moreover, their very presence reduced the *Comisiones'* stature and encouraged many labor activists to seek an escape from "party" politics.[69] This latest pro-Soviet enterprise had every appearance of seriousness, a quality apparently recognized by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which sent an official delegation to the constituent congress and began to provide the PCPE with both moral and financial assistance.[70]

Important though the convergence among pro-Soviet groups was, the main battle in the pre–11th Congress period was between the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions. The former had a number of advantages. They had been in control of the party's organizational department for nearly a year. Among other things, this gave them the right to certify the number of delegates any party federation could send to the congress. The *gerardistas* wielded this instrument judiciously but effectively, reducing by a small but not insignificant number the delegation of the *carrillista*-controlled Madrid federation. Locked in a tight battle for a majority at the Congress, the Iglesias leadership also made overtures to the "Leninist" faction in Andalusia led by Juan Antonio Romero. Thus, despite serious misgivings about the enterprise, the Iglesias leadership offered its support for the so-called "March for an Integral Agrarian Reform," the brainchild of Romero, who wanted to organize a 40-day trek through Andalusia by agricultural laborers to protest the high unemployment rate (25-30 percent by official counts) in the region as well as the Socialist government's economic policies in general.[71] The *gerardistas* controlled party federations in Andalusia, Asturias, and Catalonia (these three could claim 37,000 of the total 84,000 PCE members), while the *carrillistas* held sway in Madrid, Valencia, the Basque country, and Galicia. Although control of the latter gave the *carrillistas* an automatic four seats on the PCE Executive Committee, it did not provide them with large numbers of delegates to the Congress. Galicia and the Basque country, for example, only had 3,900 members between them.[72] Despite these disadvantages, at the onset of the Congress the *carrillistas* could not be entirely counted out. Carrillo had been secretary general for a long time, and loyalties toward him (as well as animosities) were still very strong.

[69]One reflection of this disenchantment was the resignation from the party of Catalan CC.OO. Secretary General José Luis López Builla, who had been on the PCE Central and the PSUC Executive committees.

[70]PCE President Dolores Ibárruri (and Iglesias) sent a letter to then CPSU General Secretary Yuriy Andropov complaining about this "unfriendly act." *Mundo Obrero*, Jan. 20–26, 1984. Obviously, figures on Soviet aid to the PCPE are impossible to obtain. The PCPE (and its Catalan homologue, the PCC) do not lack for office space and propaganda. Party officials travel a great deal to the Soviet bloc. It can be assumed that much of the support is transferred through mixed trading enterprises.

[71]Ibid., Sept. 9–15, 1983.

[72]On the official regional membership figures, see ibid., Dec. 16–22, 1983. The party claimed a total of 84,652 members in December 1983.

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The anticipation and uncertainty surrounding the 11th PCE Congress climaxed on the first day, with a vote on the report Iglesias had presented to the delegates on behalf of the Central Committee. The vote was favorable by the narrowest of margins (386 for, 376 against, and 25 abstentions);[73] nevertheless, this sufficed to generate an ultimately unstoppable momentum in favor of the *gerardista* position. Iglesias's report drew on and developed many of the ideas he and his collaborators had advanced in the course of the previous year.[74] He called for an *alternativa de progreso* to the PSOE government. While emphasizing the importance of "criticizing and mobilizing" against the Socialists, Iglesias also called on the PCE "to avoid creating the danger or the sensation of trying to bring the PSOE down." With respect to the sources of the Spanish Communist crisis, Iglesias identified 1978 as a turning point, and criticized the "methods of leadership" that, he said, affected not only the way Leninism had been discussed at the 9th Congress but also encouraged the party's "growing de-mobilization." Pointedly, he noted that his predecessor's errors had been less "in the political [sphere] than in the way of executing that policy, and in the methods of work within the party." The crisis in membership and the problems with the "renovators" had developed because the previous leadership had been incapable of carrying out "more collective and participatory work." Finally, in what must have been a bitter pill for Carrillo to swallow, Iglesias called for the "recuperation of the revolutionary and class nature of the party."

The 11th PCE Congress signalled the organizational consolidation of the *gerardista* position. By close but still quite predictable margins, the delegates approved the *gerardista* version of the Congress theses, and the election of the new Central Committee left little room for doubt as to the balance of forces. Iglesias was reelected secretary general by a 69 to 31 margin, and his supporters had an overwhelming majority in the Executive Committee. More important, no *carrillista* was appointed to the Secretariat, a body which, in subsequent months, would become a super-Executive Committee.

In the wake of the 11th Congress, Iglesias and his supporters moved to consolidate their influence and control over the PCE. They did this in three ways. The first was to press forward with organizational housecleaning. Within a few weeks of the Congress, the PCE Secretariat focused its attention on those regional organizations where the *carrillistas* remained strong or were in control. Madrid and Valencia were special targets. In meetings with the regional executive committees, Secretariat members pressed the *carrillista* majority to implement the resolutions approved at the 11th Congress.[75] Some of the criticisms were over apparently trivial issues such as the failure to distribute copies of the new party statutes or tickets for the PCE 1984 Fiesta. Others went more directly to the core of the disagreement between the *gerardista* and *carrillista* factions. Specifically, the Secretariat demanded that the regional party organizations adopt a truly "open door" policy toward the "renovators." None of the *carrillista*-controlled organizations was willing to do this. As a result, the Madrid-based PCE leadership began to develop its own parallel party networks in the affected regions. Another set of organizational initiatives involved the decision to bypass regional or provincial party organizations altogether in order to negotiate the simultaneous entry—as in Valladolid in mid-February 1984—of several dozen "former militants."

The second set of initiatives involved cultivation of the PCE's international contacts and credibility. Spanish Communist relations with other communist parties had eroded since 1979. Not only had ties with the CPSU and other Soviet bloc parties deteriorated, but so had the party's links with its West European counterparts. The *gerardistas* needed international contacts not only to legitimate themselves before the party base but also to undercut Carrillo's claims to international stature. After all, he had been one of the founding fathers of "Eurocommunism," and his international experience was unmatched by any other party leader.

Against this background, there developed the *gerardistas'* search for new international relationships. Gone were the heady days when the PCE had refused to deal with parties (such as Czechoslovakia's) which it considered too pro-Soviet. The Iglesias leadership reaffirmed the PCE's earlier criticism of "real socialism," but it did so *sotto voce*. "Communist internationalism," wrote Simón Sánchez Montero in early 1984, involved two principles: "active solidarity with all the peoples who struggle against imperialism," and "reinforce[ment] of links with all Communist parties."[76] In line with this approach, the Iglesias leadership undertook to renew its contacts with ruling communist parties. A PCE delegation traveled to China in April 1984, and Iglesias made trips to Bulgaria, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Romania in May and June 1984. A lower-level PCE delegation (headed by international Secretary Sánchez Montero) visited Hungary in May 1984, and

[73]Ibid., Dec. 23–29, 1983.
[74]Ibid., Dec. 16–22, 1983, pp. 17–35.
[75]Ibid., Mar. 30–Apr. 5 and May 24–30, 1984.
[76]Ibid., Feb. 17–23, 1984.

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signed a communiqué that referred to "great cordiality and mutual comprehension" at the meeting between the two parties.[77]

Even before the 11th Congress, there was a noticeable improvement in PCE relations with its Portuguese counterpart, a party known for its close alignment with Moscow. Ties between the PCE and PCP had been frigid since 1974, and the hostility between Carrillo and Alvaro Cunhal had been scarcely veiled. By December 1983, however, relations had improved to a point where Iglesias attended the 10th PCP Congress, and a Portuguese Communist delegation reciprocated by attending the PCE Congress a week later.[78] How to explain these developments? The PCP had not deviated from its pro-Soviet stance in the intervening period, and neither had many of the ruling communist parties represented at the PCE Congress. The answer is that the *gerardistas* were eager to normalize relations with the CPSU and those parties that were aligned with it, not least because they hoped thereby to undercut the pro-Soviet splinter groups.

What were the CPSU and its ruling (and non-ruling) allies doing about the situation? Here the answer is a bit more involved. Certainly, the Soviets had little sympathy for the PCE leadership, although if forced to choose, they would prefer Iglesias to Carrillo. The CPSU and its allies actively supported the creation of the pro-Soviet PCPE in January 1984, and beginning with an official visit by Ignacio Gallego in May 1984 (he was received by the chiefs of the CPSU International Department, Boris Ponomarëv and Vadim Zagladin), there were numerous official exchanges between the CPSU and PCPE.[79] More recently, the CPSU (together with the East German and Polish communist parties) sent delegations to the Fiesta sponsored by the PCPE in late summer 1985.

Nevertheless, the CPSU and its allies also maintained ties with the PCE. Representatives of both the PCE and the PCPE attended the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow in February 1986, with both Sánchez Montero and Gallego addressing the congress.[80] A certain evenhandedness was also evident in the congratulatory telegram the CPSU sent Dolores Ibárruri on the occasion of her 90th birthday in December 1985. Their emphasis was on the importance of unifying the Communists in Spain.[81] Overall, the Soviet approach reflected both caution and growing sophistication in dealing with "dissident" parties. The Soviets were not entirely confident about the PCPE's prospects, but they were willing to wait. Moreover, they wanted to be sure that Iglesias won his battle with Carrillo. Second, even if they preferred an ultimate victory by the PCPE, their medium-term objective might be a variant of the Greek formula, by which the "autonomist" group (in this case the "official" party) could not claim for itself the status of being Spanish Communism's only representative.

There was a third policy initiative undertaken by the Iglesias leadership in the wake of the 11th Congress. It was to press forward to achieve "social and political convergence" of the PCE and various left-wing political parties and "new social movements," such as the pacifists and ecologists.[82] The idea was to create as large an umbrella as possible (in both political and social terms) in order to challenge more effectively the Socialist government and to lay the groundwork for a left-wing electoral coalition to run against the PSOE in 1986. Iglesias and his supporters had been toying with the notion of convergence for some time. Some sort of electoral alliance made sense given the feebleness of the Communist electoral base. Perhaps because they did not know how the bulk of the delegates might react (but also because in December 1983 it was still too early to lay out a course to follow in 1986), the *gerardistas* had chosen not to raise the issue explicitly at the 11th Congress.

By mid-1984, however, the situation had become more urgent. Accommodation with the PSOE government had become highly improbable. Despite the opposition of the PSOE's so-called *sector crítico* and of numerous labor activists affiliated with the Socialist trade union known as the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT), González had shown himself intent on following an economic program that aimed at controlling inflation, reviving private investment, reducing the public sector deficit, and holding down wage demands. Adding to the urgency of the moment were the results of the May 1984 Catalan regional electoral

[77]For these and other references, see ibid., May 3–9, 1984.

[78]Unlike other pro-Soviet parties, however, the PCP did not send a delegation to the constituent PCPE congress in January 1984.

[79]For a sharp exchange between the CPSU and PCE, see ibid., Feb. 3–9, 1984.

[80]The two parties' attendance in Moscow was undoubtedly a factor in encouraging the PCE and PCPE to subsequently pursue further discussions about a joint electoral slate. For an evaluation of the 27th CPSU Congress from the PCE perspective, see Sánchez Montero, "A Congress for the Year 2000," *Mundo Obrero*, Mar. 13, 1986. He declared: "Gorbachëv's report foreshadows. . .the early and complete normalization of relations between our PCE and the CPSU."

[81]The message stated that the CPSU hoped "for the unity of Spanish communism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." See *El País*, Dec. 10, 1985.

[82]For an article analyzing the dilemmas posed by the Green Party's emergence in West Germany and the relevance of this for Spain and the PCE, see Andreu Claret's article in *Mundo Obrero*, Mar. 16–22, 1984.

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contest. There, despite great expectations, the PSUC received barely more than 8 percent of the vote. This was quite a setback for the Communists in a region where the local party leadership had made the *gerardista* line its own.

Whatever the explanation for the electoral setback, Iglesias concluded in mid-1984 that there was "a major urgency in moving forward with alternative proposals from the real Left," and he sought backing from the Central Committee to begin formal discussions with various left-wing parties, among them Ramón Tamames's *Federación Progresista* and Alonso Puerta's *Partido de Acción Socialista* (PASOC).[83] But Iglesias and his supporters made the mistake of suggesting that the PCE might run in coalition with these groups on tickets that would not necessarily carry the Communist emblem.

The *carrillistas* became inflamed by the proposal, seeing in it little more than an effort at a quick fix, one that betrayed the *gerardistas'* continued lack of self-confidence. Carrillo and his allies saw Iglesias's proposals as a rehash of what the "renovators" had wanted in 1980–81, and coined the word "*eurorenovadores*" to describe the *gerardistas*. In seeking an alliance with these groups, Iglesias was calling on the PCE to treat on an equal footing groups composed of former Communists who had either left or been expelled from the party at some earlier date. These groups had, declared a commentator in *Hora de Madrid,* "very limited credibility in contemporary Spanish society."[84] Especially bothersome to the *carrillistas* was the notion of alliance with the group led by Ramón Tamames, a former member of the PCE Executive Committee and another of Carrillo's sworn enemies. The *carrillistas* minced no words in attacking the Iglesias plan, and now openly challenged the legitimacy of the so-called *gerardista* "faction."

In mid-1984, the PCE was still one party, but the *carrillista* faction had begun to act as if it were a separate organization. The regional committees controlled by it generally ignored Secretariat directives and, even when they participated in demonstrations against the Socialist government's economic or foreign policies (issues on which both factions formally agreed), the *carrillistas* always managed to slant their participation so as to give it a sharper anti-Socialist edge or to ensure that their organization not enter into overly close relations with the *gerardistas'* "convergence" targets. Few regional committees escaped the withering cross fire of the *gerardista* and *carrillista* currents. In Madrid, Valencia, and Galicia, where the *carrillistas* still held sway, two parties were in place, each with its adherents and support in different parts of the province or region. The tension between *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* also led to sharp divisions in many municipal governments, since each group had its ideas about how much collaboration there should be with the Socialists. Finally, the PCE's division into two hostile factions led to a weakening of the *Comisiones Obreras*.

The *Comisiones* were the last bulwark of Communist influence in Spanish society. Although the UGT had made great strides in cutting into the *Comisiones* membership, the *Comisiones* remained slightly more popular among workers than the Socialist-led union. *Comisiones* had become a Communist battleground already in the late 1970's and early 1980's. At that time, most of the dissidents had been aligned with the pro-Soviet position. The situation had changed by 1983–84. The pro-Soviet elements remained and held 6 of the 43 seats on the *Comisiones* national executive. But there had been another development in the meantime, reflecting the growing chasm within the PCE. Just as there bloomed a "majority" and a "minority" position in the PCE Central Committee, so there developed similar positions in the *Comisiones* leadership. *Gerardista* labor activists were led by Marcelino Camacho (who nevertheless was able to maintain an image of being above the fray), while the *carrillistas* found their leader in Julián Ariza, once a Camacho protégé but now a prominent member of the internal opposition to Iglesias.[85]

At issue in the trade union sphere were different views on how intransigent *Comisiones* ought to be in dealing with the government regarding wage and price demands, as well as different conceptions with respect to the CC.OO.'s relationship to the PCE. The *carrillistas* wanted a "hard" line on the former, and they insisted on the Communist right to guide CC.OO.[86] The polarization within *Comisiones* had proceeded apace with developments in the PCE, and at the 3rd CC.OO. Congress in June 1984, the *carrillistas* presented their own ticket for the national executive. When the votes were in, the *carrillistas* had 14 members on that 49-member body, while 26 were from the

[83]Ibid., May 24–30, 1984. See also the article by Nicolás Sartorius, "Political and Social Convergence" ibid., May 31–June 6, 1984.

[84]*Hora de Madrid,* June 5, 1984.

[85]See his article in ibid., June 19, 1984, pp. 6–7, where he stated his categorical opposition to any "social pacts."

[86]As Ariza put it (*Ahora*, No. 8, April 1985, p. 26): "The motor of the CC.OO. are the Communists." The *gerardistas* talked in more ambiguous terms and wanted "social pressure" combined with "negotiations." See the PCE Executive Committee statement published in *Mundo Obrero,* Apr. 13–19, 1984.

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gerardista group, 8 from the pro-Soviet one, and 1 from the Trotskyite *Liga Comunista*.[87]

Communism Divided

The chasm between *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* had become unbridgeable by mid-summer 1984, especially after Carrillo launched his own "collective organizer," the journal *Ahora*. No longer was it merely a question of *carrillistas* ignoring calls for discipline emanating from Madrid. They now had a national organ in *Ahora,* from which they could systematically assault official party policies. The temper of the debate between the two sides changed significantly. The *carrillistas* had begun to question the "moral" authority of the national leadership, charging that it was acting contrary to the spirit and letter of the 11th Congress.[88] Most *gerardistas* concluded at this time that there was probably no alternative to expelling the *carrillistas*. Consequently, they began to set the stage for the convocation of "extraordinary" congresses in the regions where Carrillo and his allies held sway. In early 1985, the Central Committee approved a proposal for a new Congress in Madrid, and invited "parallel" delegations from Madrid and Valencia to attend the PCE's National Conference in April.[89]

The prolonged factional struggle within the PCE had generated intense bitterness that was exacerbated by the gloomy prognosis for the party. It seemed that nothing could go right for the PCE. Between December 1983 and February 1985, the PCE lost 8,000 members, so that its total membership fell below 80,000.[90] The Iglesias leadership had emphasized the importance of "convergence." Yet, by early 1985, it had also become apparent that "the prospective *novios* do not want a wedding."[91] Those who did—the *Partido de Acción Socialista*, whose leader Alonso Puerta had lost a bitter fight for control of the Madrid PSOE leadership, and the *Federación Progresista* associated with Ramón Tamames—were armies without soldiers. What was worse, the PSOE and especially Felipe González remained enormously popular. Despite the cloud that hung over the PSOE government because of the pending referendum on Spanish NATO membership, there was little reason to believe it would not have an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies after the next election.

None of this hemmed the Spanish Communist drive toward self-annihilation. The showdown between the *gerardistas* and *carrillistas* came in the spring of 1985. Eager to appear as the aggrieved party, the *gerardistas* made public a "pacification" offer to the *carrillistas*.[92] They would incorporate Adolfo Piñedo into the Secretariat and Julián Ariza into the Executive Committee. Carrillo would be asked to join the commission drafting a new Program Manifesto, and he would be invited to those Secretariat meetings at which parliamentary issues were discussed. Carrillo would also be guaranteed a position "on the electoral lists . . .from which he would be re-elected deputy." After the concessions (such as they were) came the demands: cessation of all activity outside of the PCE organization; convocation of conferences or extraordinary congresses in Madrid and Valencia in order to integrate the minority, in this case the *gerardistas;* incorporation of the *gerardista* group into the leadership of the Galician party; discontinuation of *Ahora*.

The *carrillistas* replied with their own decalogue of demands, the core of which focused on rejection of "convergence" and "democratization of internal party life." But it was a dialogue of the deaf. The climax came at another Central Committee meeting in April 1985 at which the *carrillista* core (Carrillo and 18 other members of the Central Committee) were deemed "self-excluded" from the party.[93]

The ouster of Santiago Carrillo from the PCE Central Committee ended a historic era for the Spanish Communists and for the man who had been PCE secretary general for 22 years. In the wake of his expulsion, the *gerardistas* moved to consolidate their control of the dissident organizations. They convoked congresses in Madrid, Valencia, and Galicia, which removed the *carrillistas* from party leadership there.

Carrillo and his supporters did not, of course, walk quietly into the sunset. They published a special supplement to *Ahora* in which they insisted: "We are the Communist Party of Spain." The claim was exaggerated, but it contained a kernel of truth. Carrillo remained the natural leader for many Communists (perhaps as many as 30 percent of the PCE's membership). His group's existence could not be lightly dismissed. It is not likely to win any deputies in the upcoming parliamentary election, but its participation—in late 1985

[87] *Mundo Obrero,* June 28–July 4, 1984.

[88] *Hora de Madrid,* Mar. 20, 1985, carried an article charging the PCE's leadership with "a systematic effort at fractionalism and schism."

[89] *El País,* Mar. 29, 1985.

[90] The PCE claimed to have 84,000 members in December 1983. The *carrillista*-controlled *Hora de Madrid* reported on Feb. 19, 1985, that the PCE had 67,400 members in early 1985.

[91] *Liberación* (Madrid), January 4, 1985.

[92] See *Diario 16, El País,* and *Liberación,* March 6 to 10, 1985. The full text of the *carrillista* proposals is in *Ahora,* No. 8, April 1985.

[93] *Ahora,* No. 9, May 1985 (Supplement). For Carrillo's last speech to the Central Committee, see ibid., No. 10, June 1985.

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Carrillo registered the *Partido Comunista Marxista-Revolucionario* for electoral competition in Galicia—was enough to guarantee a significant erosion in the official PCE vote.

Internecine battles consumed and exhausted the PCE during most of 1985. Court battles over rights to party offices and to the appellation *Partido Comunista* as well as scarcely veiled personal insults became the order of the day, further confusing the average party member. Many members lapsed into inactivity. Somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 left the PCE to join forces with Carrillo; another 5,000 to 7,000 have migrated after 1984 to Gallego's PCPE.

Three rival groups (the PCE, the PCPE, and the *carrillista* Assembly for Communist Unity) were now in competition for the right to represent Communism's space in Spanish political life. But they were beggars arguing over crumbs. Despite continued uncertainty over how the promised NATO referendum would turn out, as well as some popular discontent with the Socialist government's economic austerity package, the González government remained enormously popular. Even in the best of cases, what the Communists could hope for in the next elections was only a partial improvement on the 3.8 percent they had received in October 1982. The divisions in the Communist camp made even such a prospect improbable. As it was, none of the three groups was strong enough to assert itself over the others in the electoral arena, and if the PCE had the best-known *siglas,* its leaders were also painfully aware of what might occur if the PCPE and the Assembly (singly or in combination) fielded candidates in a national election.

Under these circumstances, the PCE leadership had two alternatives. One was to seek reunification of the Communist "family," the other to reach an electoral entente with noncommunist groups like the *Federación Progresista* or PASOC. Playing for time, the Iglesias leadership pursued (or wished to appear as if it were seriously pursuing) both alternatives. Among the Communists, the PCE's preferred interlocutor was the pro-Soviet PCPE, a party which at least represented, said Iglesias in December 1985, a "cultural current." It should be evident by now why Iglesias might feel that way. At the core of the PCE-PCPE dispute was ideology. With the *carrillistas,* on the other hand, the differences went also deeper. There was a special kind of animosity between the two groups. It reflected what had become the two men's intense personal dislike and lack of respect for each other. Carrillo had sent Iglesias several (public) letters in the year after his "self-exclusion," but Iglesias and his people regarded these as little more than public relations exercises. They never deigned to enter into formal or informal conversations with the *carrillistas.* Several years of vituperation had left their mark.

No sooner had Carrillo and his followers left the PCE than they began to insinuate that they might run their own ticket in the Galician regional elections scheduled for the fall of 1985. Whether this was a ploy to compel Iglesias into negotiations is unclear. In any case, the gambit did not work. Any chance of reconciliation dissipated by October 1985 when Carrillo's supporters (carrying the appellation *Partido Comunista de España Marxista-Revolucionario*) competed in the Galician election. The *carrillistas* won only a little more than 8,000 votes in Galicia, but their concurrence in the election sealed the PCE's fate. The PCE tallied approximately 10,600 votes (a mere 0.84 percent of the total) and saw its hopes for electing deputies to the Galician parliament dashed. What was worse, on this occasion the PCE won only one-third of the votes it had captured in the 1983 municipal elections in Galicia.[94] The Galician elections made reconciliation between the *carrillistas* and the PCE virtually impossible. In their wake, it is true, some members of the PCE Executive Committee urged that a new effort be made to heal the breach with Carrillo, but they were very much in the minority.[95] If reconciliation was ever to occur, it would probably be after the next general election had rendered its verdict on the adequacy of the *gerardista* strategy. In late 1985, the bulk of the Spanish Communist leadership shared the assessment Iglesias made of the entire episode: "Santiago's only project is to turn the PCE to ashes."[96] Fittingly enough, Iglesias's report to the December 1985 Central Committee meeting paid Carrillo a backhanded compliment by identifying his "destructive work" as one of the two major issues confronting the PCE.[97]

In Search of Lost Influence

Throughout 1985 there was little hope of resolving the bitter factional divisions that afflicted the PCE. But this reality neither the Iglesias leadership nor its other Communist rivals could openly acknowledge. Even when speaking of the *carrillistas,* the PCE leadership insisted on its commitment to the reunification of the Communists, albeit under the PCE standard and without modification in the party's executive organs. Be-

[94] *El País,* Nov. 26, 1985.
[95] Ibid., Dec. 3, 1985.
[96] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1985.
[97] *Mundo Obrero,* Dec. 12–18, 1985 (Supplement).

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Supporters of the Assembly for Communist Unity (Unificación Comunista de España) *demonstrate in Madrid on February 23, 1986, in support of a referendum that would have required Spain to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (the Spanish acronym for NATO is OTAN).*

—GAMMA-LIAISON.

cause ordinary Communist party members attached so much importance to the concept of "unity," the "official" Spanish Communist leadership and its challengers could not stint on efforts in this direction.

Since agreement with the *carrillistas* appeared out of the question, it was only natural for the PCE to seek to bridge the gap with the Gallego-led PCPE. Here the obstacles were not as severe as with the *carrillistas*, but even so they were not insignificant. Many in the PCPE's leadership had been unceremoniously expelled (albeit most while Carrillo had been in charge) from the "official" PCE in the preceding five years. Moreover, Gallego and his party had received the CPSU's open support. It was unlikely to have been given simply so that the PCPE would disband and its leaders rejoin the PCE. Nevertheless, it was in both Gallego's and the PCE's interest to appear flexible, since this would reaffirm publicly their commitment to reinvigorate Spanish communism.

Thus, in late 1985, the pro-Soviet PCPE found itself courted by both the PCE and the umbrella group created by the *carrillistas* known as the Assembly for Communist Unity (*Mesa para la Unidad de los Comunistas*). Despite the animosity of most pro-Soviet diehards for Carrillo, there was support within the PCPE for negotiations with the *carrillistas*. This was not just because Ignacio Gallego and Jaime Ballesteros had once been close to Carrillo. More relevant in this case was the ideological affinity of such noted *carrillistas* as Adolfo Piñedo (former head of the Madrid PCE organization) and Julián Ariza (leader of the *carrillista* faction in the *Comisiones Obreras*) to PCPE positions. Already in May 1985, Piñedo had remarked: "There are many things that unite us [the *carrillistas* and the PCPE]. I would say, politically, very many things."[98] *Carrillista* groups in Madrid and Valencia had joined their PCPE counterparts in organizing demonstrations against the Socialist government's economic policies in June 1985, and they intensified such contacts in the fall during preparations for the NATO referendum. In the *Comisiones Obreras*, too, the *carrillistas* and PCPE supporters worked together against the PCE majority, and both sides attached a great deal of importance to Julián Ariza's attendance at a labor symposium organized at the PCPE's Fiesta in late summer 1985.

In early February 1986 leaders of the *carrillista* As-

[98] *Hora de Madrid*, May 14, 1985.

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sembly and their PCPE counterparts in Madrid approved a joint document in which they committed their respective organizations to strive for Communist unity and to collaborate actively in the campaign for a 'No' in the NATO referendum.[99] Their agreement came on the heels of the PCE's decision to reject any "mere electoral platform" between the Communist factions,[100] while insisting that a joint candidacy was possible only under the PCE's banner.

Although these initiatives were undertaken with Carrillo's support (and even at his behest), it was nevertheless true that the PCPE leaders also believed they had quite a bit to gain in this venture, perhaps even at the expense of Carrillo. Many in the pro-Soviet party felt an undisguised contempt for Carrillo, but they consented to conversations with the *carrillista* Assembly (or, at least, its representatives) because they considered Carrillo and his followers to be a "weaker" potential partner than the "official" PCE. Many in the pro-Soviet camp also believed that once Carrillo left the political scene people like Piñedo and Ariza would throw their lot in with the PCPE. Negotiations with the *carrillistas* also served to enhance the PCPE's leverage with respect to the "official" PCE. Secret discussions between the pro-Soviet party and the Iglesias-led group had begun in December 1985 and intensified (this time publicly) after the referendum.

Seeking its own leverage, the PCE combined its negotiations with the PCPE with overtures to the ostensible representatives of the Spanish "new left." This had long been the strategic dream of Iglesias and those advising him. They discounted the political potential of the *carrillistas* almost entirely and they believed that the pro-Soviet or hard-line "cultural current" would ultimately be unable to stand on its own since it had very little to offer the Spanish electorate. Either the PCPE would wither or the bulk of its members would eventually rejoin the PCE. Therefore, the PCE should bet on "convergence" with the new "social" movements represented by ecologists, pacifists, and the like. Iglesias and his supporters saw in the upcoming NATO referendum (which the Socialist government had decided to hold in March 1986 to fulfill an earlier campaign promise) the perfect vehicle for realizing this "convergence." To this end, the "official" PCE joined with numerous other Spanish groups and associations (among them, of course, the *Federación Progresista* and the PASOC) in creating the Civic Platform for Spanish Departure from NATO, an umbrella organization which, alongside the more pacifist and less partisan organization known as the State Coordinating Body of Pacifist Organizations, waged the anti-NATO campaign.

The NATO referendum represented the PCE's best hope for escaping political marginality. Strongly influenced by traditions of isolation and isolationism (as well as latent anti-Americanism), the Spanish public was unenthusiastic about remaining in NATO, to put it mildly. The decision to join NATO had been taken by the UCD government in May 1981, and approved by the Spanish parliament in October of that year. The PSOE, then the principal force in the opposition and carrying within itself a strong neutralist orientation, opposed Spanish entry and promised to hold a referendum to pull Spain out of NATO. From 1981 up until March 1986, all public opinion polls showed that a majority of the Spanish electorate supported this position.

Once in power, the Socialists had changed their minds on the NATO question but, contrary to the suggestions from many friendly governments on both sides of the Atlantic, Felipe González did not abandon the referendum idea.[101] Instead, he hoped to use it in order to legitimate his party's change of course on the NATO issue. What moved González to make this decision is impossible to determine. Probably he saw it in terms of his personal credibility (he had made a promise and would keep it), of definitively settling the most controversial issue on Spain's foreign policy agenda, and of reconfirming his popularity with the electorate by accomplishing something no other Spanish politician would dare or be able to do. Few thought he would win. And both the Right and the Communists saw great political advantage to be gained from the government's defeat.

Despite its position as a minority force on the Left, the PCE was the best organized and recognizable group among those opposed to Spanish NATO membership, and it hoped to use the referendum to recapture its lost political standing. For a while it looked as though the Communists and their allies might succeed. The electorate did not favor NATO membership. González's own party was divided on the issue, with the so-called Socialist Left faction actively opposing membership. Nicolás Redondo, the head of the Socialist trade union, had led the fight against the reversal in the PSOE's position at its last Congress in December 1984. But opinion polls and even traditions are one thing. Quite another, it turned out, was the vote on March 12, 1986.[102] Only 60 percent of the eligible

[99]Madrid Domestic Service, Feb. 6, 1986.
[100]*Mundo Obrero*, Feb. 6, 1986.

[101]For an extended discussion, see Ch. 2 of my *Spanish Foreign Policy Since Franco*.

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electorate voted. Of those voting, over 52 percent were in favor of continued Spanish membership in NATO (admittedly on such conditions as non-integration in the military wing of the Alliance, reduction in the number of American troops stationed in Spain, and prohibition of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil). Those opposed tallied nearly 40 percent, and there were nearly 8 percent blank ballots. Until the last days of the campaign, the Communists held onto the hope that González would lose the referendum. When he won, they lambasted the government's manipulation of public opinion and claimed a "moral" victory in light of the high abstention and of the 8.1 million Spaniards who either voted "No" or cast blank ballots.

Certainly, this pool of eight million voters represents an opportunity for the Communists in the next election. Whether they succeed in drawing some of them to the PCE standard is not clear. Much depends on the Communist factions' willingness to lay aside their differences and to join forces for an electoral contest. Barring this, there is still the question of how many voters would be affected by joint slates with the *Federación Progresista* and the PASOC.

There is also the "Felipe" factor. He had bet heavily on the referendum, and he won. True, many voters went against his recommendation and others abstained. The former might vote for a Communist ticket, but this is by no means assured. Given the PCE's penchant for self-annihilation, a trait so often displayed in the last seven years, these voters might simply opt to sit the next election out. Such could be the case whether the Communist camp remains divided or not. Indeed, an entente between the various claimants to the Communist electoral space might seem to voters altogether too opportunistic and incoherent. As for those who abstained, the choice was a conscious one, and many in this camp abstained precisely so González would win. In the final analysis, there is also González's enduring popularity. He is nearly as popular as the King. Since the next election—like the last one—will be run as a referendum on his leadership, there may not be much the Communists can do except to hope for a more respectable number of deputies in the parliament.

Much may still occur before the June national election. The "Communist" situation remains quite fluid. Negotiations between the *carrillista* Assembly and the PCPE continued apace, and in late March 1986 representatives of the two groups issued a communiqué in which they reaffirmed their commitment to forging "the unity of all Communists in a single party."[103] But the saga was not over. By mid-April the *carrillistas* appeared to be the odd men out. Discussions between PCPE and the PCE had intensified, and in what was a novel development—as *El País* reported on April 11, 1986—*Comisiones* leader Marcelino Camacho became publicly (though unofficially) involved by leading a *Comisiones* delegation which met with Gallego and other PCPE leaders. In another development, the principal pro-Soviet group outside the PCPE (the Spanish Communist Workers' Party or PCOE led by Enrique Lister) announced its dissolution and decision to rejoin the PCE.[104]

The impact of "unitarian" logic on Spain's Communists should not be underestimated. The prospect of the Andalusian regional election in June 1986 (in which the PCE would run as its candidate for the regional presidency the popular former mayor of Córdoba, Julio Anguita) was a further impetus for those seeking intra-Communist unity. Negotiations between the PCE and PCPE Andalusian regional organizations ended in agreement in mid-April to have a joint slate in the elections there. The Socialist government's decision to call national elections for June 22, 1986 (the same day as the Andalusian regional elections) injected a new element into the equation. It is not yet clear if the Communists will unite for the national election—they have until mid-May to file a joint slate. Alone, the PCE will not do well, although it will do undoubtedly better than the others. If Spain's warring Communist factions manage to file a joint slate, it has a chance to get 7 to 8 percent of the votes. While this would be a considerable improvement over the performance in 1982, it would still leave the Communists on the political fringes.

Regardless of what happens in the next few months, the PCE has seen its dream of playing a major role in Spanish politics shattered. The party, whose preeminence in the anti-Franco opposition could not be questioned, has become a bit player on the political scene. Its division into three factions has weakened the resolve and self-confidence of its membership and sympathizers, all of whom dearly wanted something else. Outside of Catalonia, the PCE never had much of an electoral presence; now it is emasculated as a national force. The outcome is one that the Socialists could not have imagined in their wildest dreams. The disappearance of the Communists as a viable political organization has eliminated the PSOE's major challenger on the Left. Without this challenge, the PSOE has little reason to abandon the moderate policies it has pursued so far and which have brought it such success.

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[102]For the results, see *El País*, Mar. 13 and 14, 1986.
[103]Ibid., Mar. 25, 1986.
[104]Ibid.

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Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative

Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett

In an interview published on September 16, 1985, Deng Xiaoping issued a carefully worded official Chinese position on superpower competition in space-based strategic defense systems.[1] "The space arms race," declared China's top leader in the authoritative journal *Liaowang,* "signals the qualitative escalation of the US-Soviet arms race rather than escalation in a common sense."[2] Such escalation, according to Deng, poses the danger that the arms race "will go completely out of control, thus increasing the factors of war rather than reducing the danger of war." For this reason, he said, "China openly opposes any plan leading to a space arms race."[3] Deng also reaffirmed an earlier statement to former US President Richard Nixon that China is "against whoever goes in for development of outer space weapons."[4]

Deng's stand on space-based missile systems reflects Chinese concern that the United States's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program could undermine China's efforts to advance four of his nation's most important objectives: preservation of a peaceful international environment; maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent; modernization of the Chinese economy; and enhancement of China's position in the international community. The Chinese predict that if the United States and the Soviet Union do not deploy space-based strategic defense systems, the international situation will remain favorable for pursuing these objectives through the end of this century.[5]

Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser are defense consultants with Palomar Corporation, Washington, DC. They have written extensively on the strategic aspects of the US-Soviet-Chinese triangular relationship. They are co-authors of War and Peace: The Views from Moscow and Beijing *(1984) and of an essay on US China policy and the strategic triangle, in the forthcoming* Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, *edited by Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild.* *The authors wish to express their appreciation to the Institute of Contemporary International Relations for hosting their visit and to the Chinese officials and analysts who were generous with their time and candid in expressing their views.* *The authors retain copyright © 1986.*

[1]Deng made his first public statement on SDI to Robert Maxwell of the Pergamon Press and Mirror Newspapers on August 2, 1985. Xinhua reported that Deng told Maxwell "that the 'Star Wars' plan must not be carried out because it would cause qualitative changes in the arms race between the two superpowers." Deng "pointed out the 'Star Wars' plan was different in nature from adding a few nuclear warheads or changing a few new types of missiles" (Xinhua [Beijing], Aug. 2, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* [Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–CHI*], Aug. 5, 1985). Deng's second public statement on SDI was issued partially in response to American concern—expressed privately to Chinese officials—that Deng's initial comment seemed to indicate Chinese opposition to the US SDI program, but not to Soviet activities in strategic defense. Deng clarified China's stand in a meeting with Richard Nixon on September 6. He maintained that "we are concerned about the escalation of the nature of the arms race and are opposed to any arms race in outer space. We are against whoever goes in for the development of outer space weapons" (Xinhua, Sept. 6, 1985, in *FBIS–CHI,* Sept. 6, 1985, p. B/1). Deng's third and final statement on SDI, up to the time of publication of this article, was published in *Liaowang* as part of an "interview" on September 16 ("Deng Xiaoping Talks Freely About the Situation at Home and Abroad," *Liaowang* [Beijing], No. 37, Sept. 16, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–CHI,* Sept. 30, 1985, p. K/2).

[2]"Deng Xiaoping Talks Freely About the Situation at Home and Abroad," loc. cit.

[3]Ibid.

[4]See Xinhua, Sept. 6, 1985, in *FBIS–CHI,* Sept. 6, 1985, p. B/1.

[5]In July 1985, the Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR) held an important national conference on the strategic environment until 1990. The conference was attended by scholars and officials representing a broad spectrum of government, party, military, and academic institutions, including the State Council, the Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, as well as numerous research institutes and universities. The participants discussed the likely evolution of the international situation in the coming five years and the appropriate policies that China should adopt to achieve its national and international objectives. We learned of their conclusions during conversations with Chinese in Beijing, Shanghai, and Washington.

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Chinese assessments of possible Soviet military responses to the US SDI program have heightened Beijing's concern about the space-based arms competition and its implications for international stability—what the Chinese call the "issue of war and peace." Indeed, most Chinese analysts hold the view that SDI will have a dangerously destabilizing effect on the arms competition between the two superpowers. So long as rough parity exists, they point out, neither side will risk attacking the other. But by extending the "arms race" to outer space—a new realm for such competition—one side could attain decisive superiority over the other. This would disrupt existing strategic parity and heighten the potential for either a preemptive strike by the side facing an imminent strategic disadvantage or an attack by the side that had attained superiority.

Regarding the shorter term, that is, prior to actual deployment of space-based ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems,[6] Chinese analysts and officials express concern that Soviet opposition to SDI and US

[6]In this essay, the term "space-based BMD system" is used to refer to a strategic defense system with the general characteristics that have been envisioned in the SDI program. This system is multi-tiered: it includes ground-based interceptors to destroy warheads during the midcourse and reentry phases as well as space-based lasers, particle beams or kinetic-energy weapons for attacking missiles and warheads in their boost, post-boost, and midcourse phases.

Note on Chinese Research Institutes

Research institutes in China produce a large portion of the analyses on foreign policy issues and strategic matters that inform senior Chinese leaders and policymakers. In the last five years, the role of the research institutes in China's foreign policy decision-making process has grown significantly.* The burgeoning influence of these institutes is due both to the growing expertise of Chinese researchers and to the increasing need on the part of Chinese leaders for sophisticated and well-informed analyses as China has become more deeply involved in world affairs.

Chinese institute researchers initiate studies as well as provide reports in response to requests from government or party leaders. Institute analyses are passed through various channels to top-level policymakers. Personal connections developed by institute directors and senior analysts with members of the political elite are often important in ensuring that institute views are heard. Some reports are sent directly to top decision-making bodies. Others are submitted to the leadership through the Center for International Studies, a research arm of the State Council, which loosely coordinates the research programs and activities of the institutes. The Center is headed by Huan Xiang, a highly respected retired diplomat and key adviser to the leadership on international affairs.

In addition to writing reports, research institutes provide inputs into the policymaking process in China by organizing ad hoc groups, which frequently include government officials, to examine urgent policy questions. The institutes also hold conferences ranging in scale and length from local, one-day seminars to nationwide, week-long meetings. These conferences focus on important international issues, often bring together institute experts and government and party officials, and usually produce policy recommendations for consideration by the Chinese leadership. Conferences were held in 1985 on such subjects as SDI, the strategic triangle, and the strategic environment until 1990.

There are approximately a dozen key research institutes on foreign policy issues and a few that concentrate primarily on strategic and defense matters. Two institutes are directly tied to specific government organizations—the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies (IIS) and the Ministry of National Defense's Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies (BIISS). While these institutes report primarily to their parent organizations, their studies are also sent to party offices and government ministries with which they are not closely affiliated. A third institute, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR), is the largest and most well-endowed among the Chinese foreign policy institutes. Although the ICIR is not a research arm of any particular government ministry, this "independent" institute provides analyses to the State Council and the Party Secretariat and apparently plays an increasingly influential role in advising Chinese policymakers. Several other important foreign policy research institutes—such as the Institute of World Economy and Politics, the Institute of US Studies, and the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies—are organizationally under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. An Institute of Strategic Studies, which was created last year under the PLA Military Academy, will be part of the newly created National Defense University. At present, it has only a handful of researchers studying a broad range of military and strategic issues, but as it expands and develops contacts with foreign institutes, the new defense institute will likely grow in importance and influence.

In addition to their primary function of advising the Chinese leadership, the institutes engage in academic research and educate the public on international issues. While much of their work is classified, some papers are published in institute journals aimed at the general foreign affairs community. Chinese researchers also write articles for publication in newspapers and popular magazines.

*For a discussion of the role of these research institutes in China's foreign policymaking process and a detailed profile of key institutes, see A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985.

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refusal to negotiate limits on its research program could lead to increased US-Soviet tension, repudiation of the ABM Treaty of 1972, collapse of the arms control process, and accelerated buildup of offensive nuclear weapons. Moreover, caution the Chinese, the deployment of a large-scale Soviet strategic defense system could neutralize or at least weaken China's nuclear deterrent force.

But China's national security could be at risk, say the Chinese, even if US and Soviet strategic defense deployments did not increase strategic instability—for example, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to agree to deploy space-based BMD simultaneously. In the strategic realm, Chinese leaders fear that in 20 to 30 years—the period of time their analysts predict it will take for large-scale space-based strategic defense systems to be developed and deployed—China's nuclear forces may no longer provide a credible retaliatory capability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. In the realm of conventional forces, the Chinese are worried that the current Soviet technological advantage vis-à-vis China will become even more pronounced. The new technologies developed by the United States and the Soviet Union in their BMD research, they fear, could further widen the overall gap in military technology between China on the one hand and the two superpowers on the other. This could place pressure on Chinese leaders to shift resources away from current economic development priorities to China's military modernization program.

Beijing's concerns about the destabilizing potential of SDI are not dissimilar from the reservations expressed by many West European and American analysts. In fact, it was in part the emergence of SDI as a contentious issue in Western Europe and the United States that prompted interest among informed Chinese in foreign policy and military institutes, government, defense, and party organizations, and prominent universities. In response to the growing attention accorded SDI in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States, Premier Zhao Ziyang issued a directive to the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy research institutes to conduct research on SDI and its implications for China. During a visit to Beijing and Shanghai in September 1985, we met with many of the analysts who responded to the Premier's call. Throughout our two-week stay, we held discussions with civilian and military analysts from seven research institutes and four military organizations (see box on p. 29), as well as with officials from the foreign and defense ministries.

What emerged from these talks was a picture of informed and diverse opinion with as wide a range of views on SDI as is found in the West. This essay examines these perspectives on SDI, including the implications of SDI for China's national security and Beijing's interests at stake in the US-Soviet BMD competition and arms control negotiations. While our primary aim is to illuminate Chinese thinking on this important topic, we also hope that the candid remarks of many of the participants in these discussions will convey some sense of the spirit and flavor of the debate among Chinese analysts.

In each section below, we first provide either the official Chinese position or the dominant view on the topic under discussion. We then present the various nuances and perspectives offered by the discussants. To help round out our study, we have also included pertinent statements and analyses that have been published in Chinese scholarly journals and official media. This will, we hope, enable readers to gain insight into the complexity of Chinese views on the SDI issue.

The Problem Defined

The Chinese are highly skeptical that US President Ronald Reagan's stated aim of eliminating nuclear weapons is the real goal of the SDI program. Rather, they maintain that SDI is part of an overall US economic, political, and military strategy aimed at enhancing the US position in the global balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The SDI program, according to this view, is intended to revitalize the US and other Western economies by stimulating rapid development of the US military-industrial complex and by accelerating the overall pace of technological and industrial development. A faster rate of economic growth, the Chinese contend, could provide the United States with the means for widening its lead in science and technology over the Soviet Union and could build domestic support for the Reagan administration and its military programs.[7]

Some analysts also maintain that the US objective is to exploit Soviet economic difficulties and ultimately

[7]See, e.g., Huan Suan and Li Changjiu, "U.S. Economic Recovery and Foreign Policy," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* (Beijing), July 13, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS–CPS*), No. 85-110, Oct. 28, 1985. In discussions in Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese analysts and officials expressed concern about the impact of the SDI program on the US economy. A weakened US economy not only could have severely negative consequences for China's Four Modernizations program, they maintain, but also could damage Chinese security by weakening the US global position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Some Chinese contend that SDI will financially drain the US economy, while others say that the economic benefits of SDI will be even greater than the costs and will provide the United States with a reinvigorated economic advantage over the Soviet Union.

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"exhaust" the Soviet Union. The United States wants to compel the Soviet Union to take countermeasures to SDI, these analysts assert, so that Moscow will be pressed economically, the modernization of its offensive forces disrupted, and its land-based ICBM's rendered obsolete.[8]

Militarily, say most Chinese analysts, the US SDI program is intended to achieve nuclear superiority (an objective viewed as also being pursued by the Soviet Union), which they define as securing a first-strike capability.[9] Some analysts, echoing the argument of a number of Western critics, warn that if the United States were to attain this goal, it would be able to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union, safe in the knowledge that it could defend itself against

[8]An analyst at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies maintained that "the US SDI program is based on the idea that the Soviet Union is in a crisis, the United States is ahead in technology, and the Soviet Union does not have the ability to keep up with the United States in the development of defensive systems . . . . The United States also has the idea that the Soviet Union is experiencing economic difficulties and will need hundreds of billions of rubles to develop SDI, and that the Soviets will be unable to shoulder this burden." He went on to assert that he disagreed with these assessments of the impact on the Soviet economy of a large-scale effort to compete with the United States.

[9]The view that the primary military goal of the SDI program is to achieve superiority was stated by a large number of civilian (fn. continued on p. 32)

Evolution of Chinese Interest in SDI

On March 23, 1983, when US President Ronald Reagan announced his program for developing a strategic defense system that would eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons, it attracted only limited attention in China. Through the remainder of that year, Chinese researchers focused more on the impending collapse of the US-Soviet INF talks than on SDI. Chinese interest in SDI increased somewhat after the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) in the US Department of Defense in January 1984. Some military and civilian researchers began to follow the issue, but no intensive efforts were applied to study of SDI and its implications for China.

In the spring and summer of 1984, a series of events led to a marked increase in China's interest in SDI. In March, the United States proposed allied participation in the program, and the following month, French President François Mitterrand put forward the "Eureka" plan for a collaborative West European program to develop advanced technology, primarily for civilian purposes (see fn. 26 to the text). In late June, the Soviet Union proposed talks with the United States on space weapons.

Some Chinese civilian researchers viewed these events as indicating that SDI would become a divisive issue in both US-Soviet relations and US relations with its allies. President Reagan's authorization to the Defense Department in November 1984 to set up a US Space Command to coordinate US military activity in space heightened the interest of some Chinese military researchers as well.

Chinese analysts closely followed the meeting between US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in January 1985 and the subsequent resumption of the US-Soviet arms control talks in March. They noted that the negotiations reached a stalemate in the first round due to the Soviet position linking progress in the talks on strategic and theater nuclear weapons to US willingness to negotiate on SDI. The Chinese ascribed importance to statements by Soviet leaders in May 1985 concerning SDI, especially threats by Soviet Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov that the Soviet Union would take countermeasures in response to the US SDI program. They also noted warnings by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv that the US program could undermine the arms talks in Geneva. In addition, Chinese analysts viewed SDI as a major issue dividing US and West European leaders in May at the 11th annual economic summit meeting in Bonn, West Germany.

The first important paper on SDI and its implications for China was prepared for Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984 by Zhuang Qubing, a senior analyst at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies (IIS). Zhuang's paper was widely reviewed in the government and was influential in shaping views of both officials and institute analysts. An unclassified version was published that October in the IIS journal, *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* (International Studies).

Several Chinese ministries and research organizations received a directive from the leadership in late 1984 or early 1985 to thoroughly examine the SDI issue and its implications for China. In response to this directive, a large number of analysts in China began researching SDI. Several conferences on SDI were held that year by foreign policy research institutes as well as by defense, science, and technology organizations. In the civilian foreign policy institutes, many of the researchers assessing SDI had previously focused on issues such as US-Soviet relations, Soviet economic reforms, the US economy, relations between the United States and its allies, arms control, and US-Soviet military competition. These analysts had redirected their attention toward SDI not only in response to the leadership directive but for three other reasons as well: (1) Chinese researchers judged that SDI, and strategic defense systems in general, would be an increasingly important element of US-Soviet competition for the foreseeable future; (2) SDI had become an important issue in Europe and in US relations with its West European allies and Japan; and (3) both military and civilian analysts in China judged that the development of strategic defense systems by the United States and the Soviet Union would have direct implications for China's nuclear deterrent.

The Chinese thus concluded that SDI would have significant implications for Chinese security and required continued in-depth study and analysis.

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a Soviet retaliatory strike. None of these analysts suggests, however, that the United States would actually use its first-strike capability to attack the Soviet Union. Rather, they say, SDI is the means by which Washington hopes to increase its leverage over Moscow in order to achieve political goals, such as gaining concessions in arms control talks or constraining Soviet military actions in the Third World.[10]

One of the most graphic presentations of the dominant Chinese view of the potential impact of SDI on US military capabilities was published under the name Cao Ye in the Beijing journal *Huanqiu*. SDI, Cao wrote, "will lay a foundation for the United States to seize control of outer space. Military history shows that controlling a new spatial sphere through the mastery of new technology will always help one establish military superiority." Thus, according to Cao, the US seeks to develop a warfighting capability in space by combining SDI with other elements of a total defense system:

The U.S. holds that by linking the establishment of the antimissile system according to the "star wars program" with the development of anti-satellite projects and the space shuttle plans, it will not only be able to protect its various space facilities, destroy the enemy's missiles and satellites, enable itself to see and hear better, and block the enemy's eyes and ears, but will also enable itself to occupy a commanding position high in the sky and contain the enemy so as to win decisive superiority in future wars.[11]

Not all analysts, however, see the US quest for an effective strategic defense system through SDI as being motivated by "offensive" intentions to achieve global hegemony. Some consider US intentions as primarily "defensive"—a response to the perceived need to protect US nuclear deterrent forces against a Soviet military buildup that has rendered US ICBM's increasingly vulnerable. This view, held primarily by military analysts and officials with a relatively sophisticated understanding of nuclear strategy and security issues, posits that the US SDI program is aimed at strengthening deterrence rather than at achieving nuclear superiority.[12] The proponents of this view argue that heightened public and congressional awareness of the increasing vulnerability of US ICBM's, of Soviet treaty violations, and of the development of a Soviet BMD program has led to considerable support in the United States for accelerated development of US strategic defense systems to maintain a credible deterrent posture.

Finally, a few knowledgeable Chinese analysts who have spent considerable time in the United States maintain that development of strategic defense systems by the Soviet Union and the United States is part of the evolution of nuclear strategy and military technology. In current US nuclear strategy, they say, deterrence is based not merely on mutual assured destruction, but also on a willingness to fight a nuclear war, including a limited nuclear conflict, should deterrence fail. Such a limited-war strategy, they point out, requires defense as well as offense. Only by making full preparations for fighting a nuclear war, according to proponents of this view, can the United States have a reliable deterrent, "stand firm," and defend its territory and that of its allies in case of outbreak of war.

Assessing Soviet Opposition to SDI

The Chinese see Moscow's strong opposition to the US SDI program as aimed at achieving four objectives: (1) banning the SDI program while continuing to conduct its own research on strategic defense technologies; (2) buying time to reinvigorate the Soviet economy and to catch up with the United States technologically; (3) preventing the United States from obtaining a first-strike capability and, at a minimum, maintaining parity with the United States in strategic offensive forces; and (4) gaining a propaganda advantage over the United States and driving a wedge between the US and its allies and friends in Western Europe and Asia, including China.

and military analysts at virtually every institute we visited. The assessments of SDI by analysts at any one institute frequently differed, however, and it was not uncommon for experts to disagree openly about this and other issues. The motivations behind the US SDI program have been analyzed in published articles by several experts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institute of International Studies (IIS). See, e.g., Zhuang Qubing, "An Analysis of the U.S. 'Star Wars' Program," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 4, October 1984, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-002, Jan. 8, 1985; and Tan Han, "U.S.-Soviet Space Arms Race," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu*, No. 2, April 1985, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-071, July 22, 1985.

[10]See, e.g., Huan and Li, loc. cit.

[11]Cao Ye, "What Actually Is the Reagan Administration's 'Star Wars' Scheme?" *Huanqiu*, Feb. 23, 1985, trans. in *JPRS–CPS*, No. 85-052, May 24, 1985.

[12]These military analysts and officials are conversant with such issues as ICBM vulnerability, counterforce and countervalue targeting, problems of verification, the military significance of qualitative as well as quantitative differences in US and Soviet strategic forces, and the strategic and arms control implications of SDI. Many of these analysts have spent considerable time studying abroad or representing the Chinese government in the United States or Western Europe. They include analysts at the PLA Military Academy's Institute of Strategic Studies (see fn. 19), some arms control and strategy specialists from the PLA General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense's think tank, BIISS. Other proponents of this view include retired military officials now working as analysts in research institutes and some civilian university professors who have studied in the United States.

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Chinese analysts who are familiar with Soviet military programs express doubt that Moscow ever really accepted mutual assured destruction as the cornerstone of deterrence. In their view, the Soviet Union has always favored developing a strategic defense capability as well as offensive nuclear forces. But, they say, the Soviets have not acknowledged conducting research in this area, even though they have continued such research unabated since the 1950's. Indeed, maintain the Chinese, the Soviets not only are engaged in strategic defense research, they also are upgrading their existing ABM system around Moscow to counter evolving threats from Great Britain, France, and China. Soviet concern about the SDI program, according to the Chinese, stems primarily from Moscow's perception that the United States has achieved a significant lead over the Soviet Union in strategic defense research.

The Chinese recognize that there is a wide gap in overall technological development between the Soviet Union and the United States and assert that the SDI program presents the Soviet Union with an unprecedented challenge. The Soviets realize that they are facing an economic crisis, the Chinese say, and that the USSR cannot compete successfully with the United States in developing strategic defense technologies at the same time it is attempting to solve its economic problems. Thus, in the Chinese view, Moscow hopes to pressure Washington into agreeing to a ban on the testing and development of space weapons.[13] The Chinese insist, however, that the Soviets' long-term objective is not to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, but rather to postpone the competition with the United States in space-based weapons until the Soviet economy has been strengthened.[14] Such a postponement is critical, note the majority of Chinese analysts, since Soviet leaders genuinely fear that the United States will deploy a space-based defense system first and seriously degrade Moscow's nuclear deterrent.[15]

Experts on the USSR and other Chinese analysts say that Moscow continues to seek nuclear superiority over the United States, but that it realizes this goal is unattainable in the foreseeable future.[16] The Soviets' immediate concern, the Chinese assert, is to maintain parity with the United States, which will place severe strains on the Soviet economy if Moscow fails to obtain a ban on space-based weapons.[17]

The Soviets' political strategy, contend Chinese analysts, is aimed at dividing the United States from its West European allies. A Soviet expert at the Institute of Contemporary International Relations (ICIR) noted that "the Soviets are trying to convince the West Europeans that SDI will [lead to neutralization of] British and French nuclear forces. This is aimed at discouraging them from participating in SDI." Other analysts assert that Soviet strategy is aimed at pulling China away from the United States and winning de facto Chinese support for Moscow's opposition to the US SDI program. For their part, the Chinese do not want to appear to be siding with either superpower on the SDI issue—especially with the Soviet Union—and they clearly recognize that Moscow is trying to exploit China's criticism of SDI to Soviet advantage. Chinese analysts further maintain that the Soviets hope to use the SDI issue—in particular the United States's unwillingness to reach an agreement on limiting the development of space-based weapons—to place the onus for escalation of the arms race on their superpower rival and to justify further increases in Soviet offensive forces.

Global Implications of SDI

A key Chinese concern about SDI is potential Soviet reaction to the US research program and to possible

[13]A Soviet expert at the ICIR stated that "the Soviet Union faces the problem of having to set priorities to improve the economy, especially since Gorbachëv took power. Since the end of the 1970's, the Soviet economy has been stagnant and the speed of economic development has declined. The technological gap between the United States and the Soviet Union may grow wider in the future. Soviet leaders are very concerned about this. They want to spend as much as they can on economic development. SDI is a competition in high technology. It will require a lot of money, and it may be too expensive for the Soviet Union, so they want to put a stop to it."

[14]This view was expressed by many Chinese analysts. A Soviet expert at the ICIR maintained that "of course, the Soviet Union wants to develop defensive systems [but] more time will be beneficial to the Soviets . . . . They will wait 10–20 years, until the Soviet economy is stronger, and then they will compete with the United States." An MFA official made a similar argument: "At the moment, the Soviets seem to want to ban SDI because they know that technologically and economically they are not in a good position to compete, although they do believe in defense." Several experts at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies also expressed this view.

[15]A senior analyst from the Soviet foreign policy section of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies stated: "The Soviets worry that if the United States realizes its SDI system, the offensive forces of the Soviet Union will be neutralized and US-Soviet parity will be broken. This would plunge the Soviet Union into a dangerous situation. For this reason, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to oppose SDI."

[16]A Soviet expert from the ICIR assessed US and Soviet strategic goals in the past decade in the context of the shifting balance of power and a changed international environment. He asserted that in the late 1970's, the US goal was to maintain parity with the Soviet Union, while Moscow sought to achieve nuclear superiority. In the 1980's, however, the situation is just the reverse, he contended. Now the US goal is to gain superiority, and the Soviet Union is seeking to maintain a balance, he said.

[17]Chinese analysts insist that despite the great cost to the Soviet economy, Moscow will allocate the necessary resources to keep up with the United States in research and development of strategic defense technologies. Some experts maintain that this competition with the United States might set back Soviet economic reform efforts. A minority view is that the technological developments achieved in defensive weapons research would benefit the Soviet economy in the long run.

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deployment of a space-based BMD system by the United States. Thus, many Chinese military experts and specialists on the USSR have been focusing their research on possible Soviet military, economic, and political reactions to the US SDI program. These analysts for the most part base their assessments on analyses of SDI by Western experts and on statements on SDI by Soviet leaders and defense officials.

The Chinese doubt that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the United States in making a transition to a strategic environment dominated by defense through negotiations on mutual deployment of BMD. Rather, they expect the Soviets to remain hostile to the US program and to use political means to try to block it. Chinese analysts expect the USSR to continue to compete with the United States technologically and militarily and even to employ force to prevent the United States from successfully deploying a space-based BMD system. As a result, Chinese experts generally agree that there are three possible Soviet responses to SDI: an expansion of offensive forces; development of countermeasures to penetrate a BMD system; and deployment of weapons such as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT's) to destroy a space-based BMD system.

Like many Western critics of SDI, most Chinese experts maintain that Moscow will calculate that no BMD system can be 100 percent perfect. The Soviets will base their strategy, the Chinese suggest, on the assumption that even if only a very small percentage of Soviet warheads were to penetrate the US defense system, the United States would sustain unacceptable damage. Thus, they say, the Soviets will react to SDI in the short run by (1) proliferating the number of warheads on their land-based missiles to quantitatively overwhelm the defense; and (2) developing and deploying new offensive weapons with qualitatively enhanced ability to penetrate the US defense system. One analyst from the Institute of US Studies noted that the former response would be especially cost-efficient, since the large throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's would allow Moscow to vastly increase the number of warheads on the missiles it has already deployed.[18]

While a minority of analysts maintain that Moscow will confine its efforts to defeating and destroying the US system, the dominant view among Chinese civilian and military analysts is that the Soviets will build their own space-based BMD system. "There will be no such thing as a one-sided BMD," asserted a senior analyst at the Institute of US Studies. "The Soviets will also develop it." By merely proliferating its warheads, he said, Moscow cannot have confidence that it will be able to defeat the US BMD system. In the event of a nuclear war, the analyst continued, the United States could attack specific Soviet targets, while the Soviet Union could only hope to randomly penetrate the US defense shield. In addition, maintained the analyst, although countermeasures developed and refined by the Soviet Union might be able to reduce the effectiveness of the US defense system, they could not neutralize it entirely. The Soviets' task would be made more difficult, he continued, because Washington surely would take preventive steps to offset such countermeasures. Thus, the analyst concluded, it would not be prudent for Moscow to rely solely on countermeasures to maintain its deterrent. Without an SDI system of its own, added an expert from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Military Academy,[19] "any nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union will be a suicide strategy."

Those analysts who maintain that the Soviets will succeed in deploying a BMD system frequently point to the recent history of US-Soviet weapons development as justification for their assertion. These analysts cite Soviet development of the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and MIRV's[20] as evidence that the Soviet Union will be able to match the United States in building a strategic defense system despite the USSR's relative technological backwardness. This argument was voiced primarily by Chinese Soviet experts who contend that the Soviet Union's centralized system allows for more efficient mobilization of manpower and resources to develop the military industry than is possible under capitalism. Not surprisingly, they caution against underestimating the Soviets' capabilities and potential.[21] A Soviet expert at the Insti-

[18]Chinese military analysts also echo other arguments made by Western critics of SDI. They say, for example, that the Soviets would be able to add a large number of penetration aids to their warheads bus, including decoys and chaff, to confuse the defense system's discriminating sensors during an attack. The Chinese also assert that the Soviets could spin their ICBM boosters to reduce laser effectiveness or deploy fast-burn boosters to reduce the critical boost-phase period during which a missile could be destroyed before its warheads are deployed. Chinese analysts also point to measures the Soviets could take to destroy the adversary's space-based BMD system such as deployment of space mines and ASAT's that are designed for attacking space-based battle stations.

[19]At the end of 1985, China announced that in September 1986 the PLA Military Academy will be formally absorbed by a newly created National Defense University. Since these analysts were affiliated with the Academy when we met with them, we have opted to cite their Academy affiliation throughout the essay. When referring to the Institute of Strategic Studies, which was created last year under the PLA Military Academy but will be part of the National Defense University, we also give its Academy affiliation.

[20]Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles.

[21]A senior analyst at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies claimed that "in basic science, the Soviet Union is not far behind the United States. It lags behind in applied sciences. The Soviet Union has a larger number of scientists than the United States. Its backwardness is attributable to its economic system, and Soviet leaders have realized this and are beginning to take measures to reform the system. After this reform, science and technology will be brought into play."

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

A Soviet SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher used for crew training and familiarization.

—US Department of Defense photo.

tute of International Studies (IIS) also asserted that Moscow will seek to keep up with the United States not only by relying on its own resources, but also by "using the KGB to steal the secrets of SDI."

One of the concerns frequently voiced by Chinese analysts and officials is that the Soviets will use force either against the US space-based defense system to prevent its deployment or against the United States itself before the system is deployed. In either case, they say, Moscow's response would likely trigger a US retaliation that could lead to a global nuclear war. Even those Chinese analysts who maintain that Washington has no such intentions say that the Soviets genuinely fear that the US is seeking to use SDI to achieve a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union.

Chinese analysts assert that the Soviet Union will not allow its offensive forces to be neutralized by US deployment of a space-based BMD system. Some say that a space-based system will be vulnerable and that Moscow will therefore try to preempt it. "If the United States builds SDI first," an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said, "the Soviets may go another way—develop an ability to attack the system." Other analysts disagree, however, contending that a Soviet attack on the US defense system would risk a US strike against Soviet space assets and even retaliation against Soviet territory, which could escalate to a global nuclear war.

Chinese analysts also worry that the Soviets might calculate that they had more to lose by letting the United States deploy an SDI system than by taking the risk of launching a first strike against the United States before such a system was deployed. A senior arms control specialist at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS), the think tank for the Ministry of National Defense, warned that Moscow could overreact and start a war: "If the Soviets are in a desperate position, the polar bear might become nervous and not be in a clear mind—it might make some miscalculations." A Foreign Ministry expert on the Soviet Union similarly suggested that the Soviets, fearing neutralization of their ICBM's, might launch an attack before the United States succeeded in deploying its BMD system. An expert on the United States from the

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Foreign Ministry disagreed with his colleague, however, arguing that Moscow would seek a political rather than a military solution to the SDI threat.

Superpower Strategic Relationship

Implicit in Deng's September 1985 statement on SDI is fear not so much of the continuation of the arms race per se—which the Chinese see as inevitable—but of its extension to outer space and to new areas of potentially destabilizing military technology. Thus, in the Chinese leadership's view, the further deployment of US and Soviet offensive forces, while obviously contrary to Chinese interests, will not in itself necessarily heighten the risk of war. Rather, it is the extension of the arms competition to the new realm of outer space that could, in Deng's words, cause the arms race to "go completely out of control."

As with most aspects of the discussion on SDI, however, there are numerous differences of opinion among Chinese experts, some of which are at variance with Deng's statements. A few military analysts, for example, maintain that instability and an increased danger of war are possible—but not certain—outcomes of SDI. An arms control specialist from BIISS said: "I put a very big question mark on SDI—on both its technological feasibility and its implications for the strategic balance. If the balance will be strengthened, I will raise my hand to support it. But I worry that the balance will be destroyed."[22] Another military analyst, from the PLA Military Academy, maintained that the technology of SDI is not sufficiently developed to determine its implications for stability.

It is hard to predict what the capabilities of the BMD systems will be. There is a great deal of room for development in this area, and thus it is likely that it will affect the stability that currently exists. Technological developments will determine whether there will be stability or instability. At present, BMD is inherently unstable because the technology is not yet mature.

Some analysts suggest that the SDI program of the United States could actually strengthen deterrence. Even if a BMD system were not 100 percent effective, notes an analyst at the Institute of US Studies, it could nevertheless discourage a potential attack if the attacker could not be sure of destroying a sufficiently large portion of the adversary's nuclear forces to prevent an effective retaliatory strike.[23] Another analyst, from the PLA Military Academy, holds out the possibility that SDI could actually enhance stability. If a space-based BMD system could set off a nuclear explosion when it destroyed an ICBM booster—which at present is technically impossible—deterrence could be strengthened, he suggested. Should the system be perfected in such a way, he said, the attacker would confront not only the attrition of its attacking warheads, but also the possibility that launching an attack could lead to the detonation of the attacking warheads over the attacker's own territory. "The attacker would then face a dilemma. If it wants to penetrate the system, it will launch more warheads, but then it will risk being destroyed itself."

A number of Chinese analysts are also concerned that some technologies being developed under the SDI program—lasers and kinetic-energy weapons—could be used as offensive weapons for attacking ground targets. One military official maintained that space-based weapons could be used to attack an enemy's territory, including its cities as well as missile silos.[24] But this view was disputed on technical grounds by an engineer at the Institute of US Studies. Lasers are not yet powerful enough to destroy wea-

[22]The majority view held by Chinese analysts is that the US SDI program will successfully develop a space-based defense system that will be able to intercept a very large percentage of Soviet missiles. For some analysts, this assessment is based on a scientific understanding of the technologies being explored for SDI. For other analysts, this conclusion appears to be based on a common tendency to assume that the United States can achieve any technological objective to which it applies sufficient resources. A senior analyst at the Institute of US Studies argued that within the next 20 to 30 years, the United States may not be able to achieve its goal of providing protection for US territory and population, but in that period it will be able to deploy a space-based BMD system that will enhance deterrence by protecting the US retaliatory capability. "Although a BMD system is not easy to develop, there is a definite technological base," the analyst contended, and "if it is resolutely pursued, sooner or later it will be successful."

[23]Most Chinese expressed opposition to the deployment of weapons in space, while indicating that ground-based point defense systems for defense of missile sites and other hard targets were not objectionable to China. A group of analysts at the ICIR agreed that a BMD system such as the Soviet Galosh system deployed around Moscow did not pose the same threat of instability as would space-based defense systems. One widely shared concern is that while a ground-based BMD system is purely defensive, a space-based system would likely have offensive capabilities. An analyst at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies contended, however, that even a point defense system can be destabilizing: "A small defensive capability can contribute to offensive capability . . . . If one side deploys something that gives it a sense of security and the other side does not have a sense of security, then this is dangerous. We can't look at one weapon system, we should compare the overall strength of the two sides."

[24]A military analyst from the PLA Military Academy's Institute of Strategic Studies asserted that "SDI has offensive capabilities that can be used in two ways. First, SDI can be used to attack an enemy's territory, including cities as well as missiles. Second, it can be used as a defensive shield for a first strike and can be changed to an offensive system and used to improve the attacker's capability." A BIISS analyst also maintained that space-based weapons will take on an offensive role and that "space-based kinetic-energy weapons will be more important than lasers." In his article, "An Analysis of the U.S. 'Star Wars' Program" (loc. cit), Zhuang Qubing also argues that space-based weapons would have offensive capabilities that could be used against objects in space as well as ground targets.

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pons in space, he reasoned, so "they are nowhere near having enough power for ground attack." In any case, the expert added, it would not be cost-effective to use space-based weapons to destroy missiles in their silos or other ground targets.

Western Europe and SDI. In their writings on SDI, Chinese analysts often point to West European fears about SDI to veil their own concerns. An article published in *Liaowang,* for example, outlined purported West European fears that SDI will: (1) lead to an intensification of the arms race; (2) jeopardize the US-Soviet nuclear arms talks; (3) violate the ABM treaty; (4) decouple US and West European security; (5) upset the prevailing US-Soviet strategic balance; (6) increase the likelihood of conventional war in Europe; (7) weaken or even neutralize French and British nuclear deterrent forces; (8) alter US reliance on a strategy of mutual assured destruction and so increase the danger of nuclear war; and (9) provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies and to promote further the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe.[25]

Some Chinese analysts see SDI as creating a dilemma for the West European states: if they do not become involved in SDI research, they may fall even further behind the United States and Japan technologically; if they do become involved, they are likely to become junior partners to the United States. One analyst from the Institute of US Studies maintained that even if there is some European cooperation on SDI, "the United States will keep [key US-developed] SDI technology secret and will not share it," thus exacerbating tensions within the alliance. But the Chinese also point to the possibility that cooperation could result in a drain of skilled West European personnel and material resources to the United States, which they say is quite likely in joint SDI research efforts.

The Chinese support the Eureka program—a French-sponsored European alternative to SDI[26]—as potentially providing an impetus to accelerated technological development as well as greater independence and political unity in Western Europe.[27] Chinese writings point to a direct link between Western Europe's technological capabilities and its international influence. A *Beijing Review* article, for example, noted the current gap between the United States and Western Europe in technology and asserted that "narrowing this technology gap is Western Europe's new imperative, especially because Europe's declining influence on the world economy is a direct result of the technology gap. The success of Eureka could restore Western Europe's decisive influence over world economies and politics." But the writer expressed skepticism about Eureka's prospects: "Conflicting interests among the participating nations and lack of funding are destined to make the success of Eureka a long time in coming."[28]

In discussions of the implications of SDI for Western Europe, Chinese analysts expressed particular concern that the US program could lead to a divergence of West European and US security interests. A specialist on Western Europe at the ICIR maintained that most West Europeans "think that NATO's flexible response strategy has guaranteed the peace of Western Europe and that SDI will weaken deterrence. They think SDI may reduce the effectiveness of their nuclear forces. But they are even more concerned that SDI will decouple US and West European security. They worry that the US will not be able to guarantee West European security."[29] Other Chinese analysts make similar arguments, noting that a US space-based BMD system will not be able to protect Western Europe from Soviet attack while a similar Soviet BMD system will neutralize US strategic deterrent forces. Western Europe, according to this view, would be faced with superior Soviet conventional forces and a dubious security guarantee from the United States. This new strategic situation, note these analysts, could lead to serious strains in the NATO alliance and to increased instabi-

[25]Li Yuan, "Why Western Europe Worries About Reagan's 'Star Wars' Program," *Liaowang,* Sept. 2, 1985, trans. in *JPRS–CPS,* No. 85-114, Nov. 15, 1985.

[26]Eureka is a multibillion dollar, multiyear program launched by France in April 1985 to sponsor and coordinate European research on many of the same technologies that are being developed by the US SDI program. The Eureka program will focus on civilian research and the development of technologies that are considered key to the job-producing industries of the future, including high-powered lasers, artificial intelligence, high-speed micro-electronics, information technology, and optical fibers. The primary objective of the Eureka program is to reverse the decline in Western Europe's technological capabilities relative to those of the United States and Japan.

[27]A *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) article examined the political implications of the Eureka program for Western Europe: "Participation in the US 'Star Wars' will make the nations of Europe dependent on the United States for a long time and lose their independent status, while the successes of 'Eureka' will strengthen not only the unifying of Europe but also its independent status." See Zhang Zihua, " 'Eureka' and 'Star Wars'," May 26, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–CHI,* May 30, 1985, pp. A/12–13. Another article linked West European independence with its ability to keep up with the United States in development of advanced technology: "If they do not get a jump on the new technologies, the nations of Western Europe will lag behind economically and will have a difficult time maintaining their independence in international affairs." Xing Hua, "SDI: Western Europe Faces Challenge," *Beijing Review,* Aug. 5, 1985, p. 25.

[28]Xia Zhimian, "Eureka: Cementing the Uncertainty," *Beijing Review,* Nov. 18, 1985, p. 14.

[29]This argument is also made by Li Yuan in his article "Why Western Europe Worries About Reagan's 'Star Wars' Program," loc. cit.

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lity in East-West relations and greater likelihood of conventional war in Europe.

Not all Chinese analysts agree with this view, however. A senior editor at *Shijie Zhishi,* who has written insightful articles on SDI, noted that SDI might be able to strengthen defense of West European countries rather than weaken deterrence. "It is hard to say which one will occur," he said.[30] Another view was expressed by an ICIR analyst who predicted that rather than leading to a major rift between the United States and Western Europe, SDI could encourage West European unity and "create a strong coalition that will promote the revitalization of West European economies and technological development." While there is a possibility that SDI could lead to "fiercer competition between Western Europe and the United States," he said, "this may be beneficial to both sides." A *Liaowang* article suggested that Eureka "will probably be merged with the 'Star Wars' program . . . to form a new US-Europe defense system. Although Europe's anxieties [about SDI] will not go away soon," the writer concludes, "they are not likely to affect the shared strategic interests of the Europeans and the United States."[31]

Arms Control and SDI

The SDI program, in China's view, will be a critical factor in determining the outcome of the US-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations. While Beijing opposes the deployment of weapons in space as envisioned in the SDI program, the Chinese see the announcement of stepped-up efforts by the United States in strategic defense research as having had some positive consequences. For one thing, they say, it has heightened the Soviet Union's concern about its future position in the military balance, and this has compelled Moscow to return to the negotiating table. For another, SDI has played an important role in shifting international perceptions of the global balance of power in favor of the United States. This has put the Soviet Union on the defensive, according to the Chinese, and forced Soviet leaders, at least publicly, to demonstrate a willingness to compromise on some arms control issues.

Chinese analysts candidly state that China's interests are best served by the current international situation, in which there is rough parity in the US-Soviet strategic balance, with Washington holding a slight edge over Moscow in the global balance of power. The United States has restored its military strength under the Reagan administration, they maintain, and reversed the trend of the late 1970's in which the balance of power had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. According to this view, the United States should now use the leverage over Moscow that SDI has provided to obtain Soviet concessions in the arms control negotiations. If the United States is willing to consider placing limits on its strategic defense programs, many Chinese contend, there may be an opportunity to reach an equitable agreement on substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

While the Soviet Union has not given up its goal of achieving nuclear superiority, the Chinese maintain, it has been forced to slow the pace of military spending due to its severe economic problems. Chinese analysts and officials are concerned, however, that US refusal to use SDI as a bargaining chip will lead to a stalemate in the arms control talks and an exacerbation of US-Soviet tensions. In addition, Beijing worries that Washington's intransigence on SDI could reverse the favorable perceptions of the United States globally and cause the Reagan administration once again to appear aggressive in the eyes of the world.

The Chinese are not optimistic about the short-term prospects for concluding a US-Soviet arms control agreement banning the deployment of weapons in space and drastically reducing offensive forces. Some are doubtful that the Reagan administration is sincere about wanting to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union at all.

But Beijing is even more suspicious of Moscow's intentions in the arms control negotiations. The Chinese contend that the Soviet Union used arms control and détente with the United States in the 1970's to mask a massive buildup of its military power. Many Chinese analysts maintain that even if the United States were to agree to abandon the SDI program, the Soviet Union may not be willing to make drastic cuts in its land-based missiles or to place limits on its own research program in defensive technologies and weapons. One reason for this, argues a Foreign Ministry official, is that the Soviet Union "won't let US paper weapons be used to force reduction of actual weapons." An analyst at the Institute of US Studies adds that the Soviet Union will not agree to a ban on testing and deployment of new BMD systems because it is seeking to upgrade its ABM system around Moscow to counter the "limited retaliatory capabilities of Great Britain, France, and China."

[30]This editor of *Shijie Zhishi* has written articles under the pseudonym Yuan He. See, e.g., "New Trends in U.S.-Soviet Relations" (co-authored by Wu Wei, also a pseudonym), *Shijie Zhishi* (Beijing), May 16, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1985, pp. A/5–8.

[31]Li, "Why Western Europe Worries About Reagan's 'Star Wars' Program," loc. cit.

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Chinese experts on the USSR are more hopeful that the Soviets might eventually compromise on arms control after a long period of negotiations with the United States. "There is a characteristic pattern in the Soviet negotiating style," noted an expert on Soviet foreign policy from the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies. "The Soviet Union first adopts a very hard line in the negotiations. After it has staked out a strong position, it will then make compromises. I remember that once Stalin said one should prolong negotiations until everyone is tired and then make an agreement. We should not rule out that possibility."

Most Chinese analysts say that a US-Soviet arms control accord is possible in the long run, but they doubt that an agreement would significantly reduce offensive weapons or ban deployments of weapons in space. They believe that Moscow and Washington would only make small concessions on offensive and defensive weapons while maintaining roughly equal capabilities. Even such a limited arms accord could be concluded only after extensive bargaining and negotiations, Chinese analysts say. At present, they see progress as inhibited by mutual suspicions and the desire on each side to seek an advantage over the other.

If the United States remains unwilling to compromise on SDI, note the Chinese, the Soviet Union will be able to use the SDI issue to gain a significant propaganda advantage over the United States. In discussions with Chinese analysts in September 1985, there was general agreement that the Soviets had scored a tactical victory on the issue by appearing to be more "peace-minded" than the United States. An arms control specialist affiliated with BIISS warned that "if the United States insists on going ahead with SDI, then the Soviets can blame Washington for the next round of the arms race." He added that the US task in Geneva is twofold: to convince the Soviets that the United States is determined to deploy SDI, so that Moscow will be forced to make some concessions; and to present a realistic proposal that will demonstrate to Moscow, Western Europe, and the rest of the world that the United States is not seeking superiority over the Soviet Union. "The United States needs to kick the ball back into the Soviet court with a good offer, proof of Soviet [arms control treaty] violations, and [evidence] of the Soviet BMD program." Another arms control expert from BIISS added that "the United States does not have to announce that it is using SDI as a bargaining chip, but it can play that role to test Soviet sincerity. If the Soviets are serious, they will put forward concrete proposals. But I don't think the Soviets are sincere."

The primary concern of these two military analysts is

Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection and Tracking Systems



—Adapted from an illustration on p. 51 of US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1986, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986.

that Washington manage the BMD competition with the Soviet Union in a way that will enhance stability and improve the global image of the United States. These analysts are knowledgeable about the extent of Soviet BMD research and are concerned about its implications. They insist that it is necessary for the United States to engage in this research to hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in BMD technologies. What concerns these analysts most about the US SDI program is the Reagan administration's seemingly confrontational approach to this area of competition with Moscow. "China is not against your research," one of the BIISS experts asserted, "but keep your mouth shut." "It would have been better if the United States had gone ahead with [SDI], but had not announced it," he added. An expert at the Institute of US Studies echoed this view: "It is a pity that the United States has said so much about SDI publicly. The Soviets are conducting the same research, but they don't admit it. So the first impression of people in China was that the United States started the arms race in space with SDI."

The Chinese see potential benefits for China in a US-Soviet arms control accord because such an accord could lead to an easing of tensions between the two

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superpowers and contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful international environment. An agreement also could halt or at least postpone the extension of the arms race to outer space and perhaps check the widening of the gap between Chinese military capabilities and those of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not surprising, therefore, that publicly the Chinese no longer use the rhetoric of the 1970's to criticize arms control. Instead of describing the SALT talks as "sham disarmament"—a cover for continuation of the arms race while both superpowers sought superiority—and as a form of "collusion" of the superpowers against China and other countries, the Chinese now say that arms control and improved US-Soviet relations are in China's and the world's interest. Nevertheless, privately, Chinese analysts remain somewhat suspicious, expressing fears that the United States and the Soviet Union could agree on terms that are harmful to China's security interests.

This concern was perhaps voiced most explicitly by a senior Soviet expert at the ICIR: "The possibility exists that the United States and the Soviet Union will reduce their strategic forces and that Soviet INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] will not be reduced or limited. We think that the United States and the Soviet Union should reduce both strategic and theater forces . . . . We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will consider the interests of third countries such as China. Third countries will oppose any arms control treaties that are not in their interests."[32]

SDI and Chinese Security

The potential impact of SDI on international stability and the US-Soviet arms competition has received primary attention in Beijing, largely due to the prominent role that SDI has assumed in the strategic arms control talks. A less immediate concern, but one that has more direct implications for Chinese security, is the viability of China's nuclear deterrent in the face of possible BMD deployments by the Soviet Union. Beijing's worst-case assessment is that China's nuclear deterrent force would be neutralized—its ballistic-missile warheads no longer able to penetrate Soviet defenses.

But this is an unlikely scenario. Soviet BMD may not be able to prevent China's nuclear forces from performing their military mission, which is to launch retaliatory strikes in response to a Soviet nuclear attack. Indeed, unlike US forces—which must be able to credibly threaten a wide range of Soviet targets to deter many different types of threats, including threats to US allies and friends—Chinese nuclear forces need only be able to attack a small number of major Soviet cities to maintain a "minimum deterrent" against a Soviet attack. The Chinese have sought to build such a minimum deterrent force by putting at risk a limited number of Soviet high-value targets. The credibility of that deterrent force rests on its ability to ride out a Soviet first strike and reliably deliver nuclear warheads to the target areas in retaliation. Thus, China's minimum deterrent force will be strongest if Beijing can credibly threaten a retaliatory strike against Moscow.[33] Nonetheless, the Chinese would still have some deterrent capability even if they could only threaten major cities in the Far East and Siberia.

The Chinese have long sought to increase the invulnerability of their forces through deceptive and protective basing of land-based ballistic missiles and have recently begun deploying a sea-based deterrent force to enhance survivability.[34] An advanced Soviet BMD system, however, could degrade the ability of Chinese forces surviving Soviet preemption to reliably retaliate, especially against Moscow. Nevertheless, China's limited deterrent goals, its geographic proximity to a few major Soviet cities, and the option of developing countermeasures suggest that Beijing's nuclear forces may be able to retain minimum viability in the face of a less-than-perfect Soviet space-based BMD system.

Both officials and analysts insist that, if necessary, steps will be taken to strengthen China's deterrent force. But countering a Soviet BMD threat would be costly, they say, and China does not want to increase its spending on military modernization. Nonetheless, Chinese military experts have been exploring the relevance for China of many of the countermeasures to

[32]An expert at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies also expressed concern that a US-Soviet arms control agreement could endanger Chinese security interests. "It is good for the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreements on arms control," he said, "as long as it is not at the expense of third countries."

[33]An analyst at the Institute of US Studies maintained that an expanded Soviet ground-based defense system could pose a serious problem for China's nuclear deterrent forces. He asserted that "the problem for China, France, and Britain is the possibility of a point defense system. I don't know if we can penetrate it. The Galosh system has 30-40 exo-atmospheric and 60 endo-atmospheric interceptors. At this point, it is not a problem for our limited retaliatory forces since there is no need for us to strike Moscow. We can strike Leningrad and Kiev. By the end of the century, a ground-based defense around major cities could pose a problem for China . . . . The Soviets will primarily focus on protecting civilian, not military targets. Chinese forces are targeted only at cities—they are not capable of killing hard targets." Most US experts believe that in the event of a nuclear conflict with the USSR, China would seek to penetrate Moscow's Galosh ABM system.

[34]According to *The Military Balance 1985–1986* (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies), China has two missile-carrying submarines, each with 12 ballistic missiles. China also is reported to have 6 ICBM's, 60 IRBM's, and 50 MRBM's. See pp. 111–13.

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space-based BMD systems that have been evaluated in the West. Some are a matter of launch tactics—such as "redout" and "blackout" detonations[35]—and others require technology that could feasibly be developed by China, such as enhanced penetration aids.[36]

In considering possible means for countering Soviet BMD, Chinese analysts have focused on technical as well as tactical solutions. For example, a senior analyst from the PLA Military Academy's Institute of Strategic Studies noted: "We can put a protective shield around the warheads and the missile and can also spin the missile. If we can shorten the boost phase to under 50 seconds, then directed-energy weapons will be useless. It is difficult to achieve, but this can be done." An analyst from BIISS said that nuclear short-range ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons "would be a good idea for China in response to Soviet SDI deployment." Another BIISS analyst maintained that an ASAT capability against Soviet BMD space platforms may be "cost effective" for China. These analysts pointed out that China's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union provides it with advantages over Britain and France in maintaining the viability of its deterrent forces. They also noted that the credibility of China's deterrent is enhanced by its independent political position.

Most military analysts say that they are confident that China's deterrent will be effective during the anticipated long period prior to Soviet deployment of a space-based BMD system. One analyst maintained that "no rational defense system can be deployed by the Soviet Union for at least 20–30 years, and Chinese forces will remain effective during this time." An analyst from the PLA Military Academy similarly asserted: "Strategic defense systems pose a new military challenge to China's nuclear force. But our nuclear forces will be useful for at least 30 years."[37] While such an appraisal may seem to suggest optimism among Chinese leaders, it is worth noting that insisting on the continued viability of China's nuclear forces would be consistent with Beijing's strategy of relying on psychological factors to enhance deterrence.

US-Soviet Condominium

Chinese analysts are quietly concerned that SDI could lead to a US-Soviet condominium at the expense of Chinese security interests. Such a condominium could be even more dangerous to China than the collusion feared by Beijing during the SALT talks in the 1970's. That "collusion" was in the context of the mutual *vulnerability* of the United States and the Soviet Union: military actions by either power—especially against the other's allies and friends—risked escalation to global nuclear war. This restrained both powers



Test-firing of a submarine-based Chinese carrier rocket in October 1982.

–New China Pictures Company from EASTFOTO.

[35]Heat and radiation from a nuclear explosion causes ionization of the surrounding air, which in turn disrupts radar signals—a phenomenon known as "blackout." A nuclear weapon exploded high over the target area would "blackout" radar equipment used for detecting and tracking incoming warheads and for guiding anti-ballistic missile interceptors to destroy the attacking warheads. A similar effect known as "redout" is produced by high-altitude nuclear explosions that blind infrared sensors. An attacking nation could explode a nuclear weapon several miles above its own missile sites to prevent space-based sensors from distinguishing the heat of the missiles from the intense heat of the nuclear blast itself.

[36]Penetration aids, or "penaids," are devices employed by ICBM's, SLBM's, and penetrating bombers to neutralize defenses. Both missiles and bombers employ penaids such as decoys, chaff, and electronic countermeasures to mislead or confuse the defender's radars.

[37]See footnote 33.

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from using military force at lower levels. A US-Soviet condominium in the future could give rise to quite a different dilemma. If deployment of space-based BMD systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union eliminated the mutual fear of escalation to nuclear attacks on their homelands, actions by the two powers against third countries—including potential Soviet attacks on Western Europe and China—might be far less constrained. At the same time, other countries without their own defensive shields would be highly vulnerable to military and political pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. A civilian specialist on NATO succinctly expressed Chinese fears of the potential impact of such a condominium:

Only the United States and the Soviet Union have the power and the capability to create these new systems. Other countries, including China, do not. If this program goes forward, I say forthrightly that the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to decide the fate of the world. After deployment of SDI, both sides could use their system to protect themselves and attack others. This is a great danger to world stability. Not only China, but also middle-sized countries such as France worry about this possibility.

An analyst from the Academy of Military Sciences who voiced similar concerns suggested that the US-Soviet arms talks might become a forum for agreement on mutual deployment of space-based BMD systems, which, he added, would "evoke strong opposition from other countries."[38] He noted that the dominant view in China is that a "bipolar world would return if such systems were deployed by both sides." A BIISS arms control expert added that "SDI would mean cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve mutual assured security. The other three nuclear powers—Britain, France, and China—cannot have assured security for themselves. So China takes this seriously."[39]

China's deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet Union relies in part on Moscow's uncertainty as to how the United States would react to a Soviet attack on China. The Chinese are thus concerned that deployment of space-based BMD by the United States and the Soviet Union could weaken US global deterrence, even though it would strengthen Washington's ability to defend US territory. On the one hand, such a strategic development could reduce the likelihood that the United States would respond to a Soviet attack on China; on the other hand, the Soviets' BMD shield would reduce dramatically the effectiveness of a Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike.

Chinese analysts and journalists also openly discuss the potential impact of US and Soviet deployment of space-based BMD systems on the security of Western Europe. They see BMD as potentially undermining the current US strategy of "flexible response," by which the United States commits its strategic nuclear forces to the defense of Western Europe. This could have two consequences, they say, either of which would be devastating for Europe: on the one hand, the United States and the Soviet Union might be more likely to fight a war in Europe since they would not risk nuclear attack on their homelands; on the other hand, the United States might be less likely to honor its commitment to defend its West European allies against a Soviet attack, especially given Moscow's superiority in conventional arms in Europe. In addition, note many Chinese analysts, the fact that only a very short time is needed for Soviet missiles to reach West European territory has caused many West Europeans to doubt that a US BMD system could adequately protect them.[40]

Conclusion

The Chinese are unlikely to change their basic view that the development and deployment of advanced space-based strategic defense systems by the United States and the Soviet Union would seriously threaten China's security interests. The Chinese see their interests as better served by the strategic status quo in which there is rough parity in US and Soviet strategic offensive forces, very limited Soviet BMD deploy-

[38]An analyst at the Institute of US Studies argued that a US-Soviet condominium is unrealistic because Moscow and Washington will not reach an agreement on a transition to deployment of strategic defense systems; the two sides cannot develop strategic defense systems at the same time, and neither power will share its technology with the other; and "mutual assured destruction" cannot be replaced by "mutual assured survival."

[39]A *Renmin Ribao* article observed that if the ability of nuclear weapons to deter war in Europe is neutralized by the deployment of US and Soviet space-based defense systems while the Soviet Union maintains its superiority in conventional weapons, then the likelihood of a limited war in Europe will increase. See Wei Wei, "Europe on the Eve of the US-Soviet Talks," Mar. 10, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 12, 1985.

[40]A *Beijing Review* article notes that "European leaders doubt whether the defense system could effectively protect their countries, since Soviet missiles are much closer and would take only a few minutes to reach European soil." See Xia Zhimian, " 'Star Wars' Plan Tests Relations," Apr. 8, 1985, p. 14. In a discussion at the ICIR, a PLA Military Academy analyst indicated similar concern that it would be difficult for a BMD system to intercept Soviet missiles aimed at China because of the close proximity of China to the Soviet Union. Short-range Soviet missiles that did not leave the atmosphere would not be vulnerable to space-based defenses yet could have sufficient range to reach high-value targets. The relatively short flight time between Soviet launch sites and Chinese targets would render even longer range ballistic missiles difficult to attack during their brief midcourse phase if they were not destroyed in the boost phase.

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ments, and deterrence based on the ultimate threat of mutual assured destruction. This favorable strategic situation, in China's view, could be undermined by a US-Soviet BMD competition that extended the arms competition to the realm of outer space and to the development of new, potentially destabilizing, military technology.

Even if the SDI program does not lead to the extreme consequences feared by many Chinese analysts and officials—such as the disruption of US-Soviet parity or neutralization of China's deterrent forces—the Chinese are likely to continue to view SDI as detrimental to their national interests. Chinese security would be jeopardized by enhanced Soviet BMD capabilities—whether ground-based or space-based—that reduced the credibility of China's deterrent. China also could be "left behind" by the accelerated development of advanced military and civilian technology resulting from the US-Soviet BMD competition.

As long as SDI is confined to a research program, however, it could benefit China by reinforcing current international conditions, which the Chinese see as favorable for achieving their goal of national development. Soviet preoccupation with the US threat and the SDI challenge could serve Chinese interests by keeping Moscow on the defensive globally and by providing the Soviets with further incentives to improve ties with Beijing. While some Chinese analysts and officials privately acknowledge these short-term benefits for China, it is unlikely that Chinese leaders will publicly point to any advantages accruing to Beijing from SDI. To do so could undermine the credibility of China's claim of pursuing an independent foreign policy and compromise China's "principled stand" against the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Chinese leaders have not decided how to respond to SDI beyond their initial, deliberately vague statements opposing the extension of the arms race to outer space. They do not see policy decisions as urgent in the next few years while the United States and the Soviet Union are still in the early stages of research. Meanwhile, the Chinese plan to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the SDI program and its implications for international stability and Chinese security.

The impact of US-Soviet BMD competition on Chinese foreign and defense policies will hinge on several factors: the pace of the Soviet BMD program; US management of its relations with the Soviet Union, of SDI, and of arms control; the effect of SDI on US relations with its NATO allies; the outcome of debates over SDI in the United States and Western Europe; the results of research concerning the feasibility of various SDI technologies and structures; American and Soviet offensive weapons deployments and changes in the US-USSR strategic balance; the relative progress and technological levels of the Eureka and SDI research programs; and the outcome of the ongoing US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva.

Sino-Soviet Relations. In the short run, the SDI program may provide Moscow with opportunities for expanding its dialogue with Beijing. The Soviets are likely to stress their common ground with China in opposing "the arms race in space" in order to heighten concern in Washington about a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement. While it is likely that the Chinese will remain suspicious of Soviet aims, Beijing may blame a lack of progress in arms control on US intransigence over SDI, should China perceive the Soviet Union to be seriously seeking an agreement.

In the long run, however, Beijing could seek closer military ties with the United States as a counterbalance to Soviet power if Soviet deployment of an extensive BMD system threatened to neutralize China's deterrent. Chinese leaders are likely to pursue this option only if they calculate that strengthened Chinese military cooperation with the United States would deter rather than provoke Moscow, and that it would enhance China's ability to defend itself.

Sino-American Relations. Chinese leaders place a high priority on minimizing any adverse effects of their indirect criticisms of SDI on Sino-American relations. The Chinese view SDI as a global disarmament issue, not a bilateral matter. They are likely to confine their public criticisms to opposing extension of the arms race to outer space by both the Soviet Union and the United States.

China's Defense Modernization. The Chinese are likely to postpone decisions on whether to modify their nuclear weapons modernization program until they complete their current assessments of the evolving US-Soviet BMD competition. They will closely follow Western technical discussions of countermeasures to BMD systems and will seek to determine the feasibility and cost of various means for China to counter advanced Soviet BMD systems. Possible Chinese responses already being discussed in Beijing include development of an ASAT capability to attack a Soviet space-based defense system and deployment of a ground-based point defense system to enhance the survivability of Chinese missiles.

Disarmament Positions. The Chinese do not expect that their opposition to space-based weapons will

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substantially affect either the SDI program or decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy weapons in space. While the Chinese prefer the continuation of the strategic status quo, they also see the "extension of the arms race to outer space" as virtually inevitable. The only question seems to be whether the process can be slowed or temporarily halted.

The Chinese are likely to step up their activity in multilateral forums, such as the UN Committee on Disarmament, in order to enhance China's prestige and to rally opposition to further increases in Soviet and US nuclear arms. But China is not likely to take a leading role in opposing the US SDI program, because it will want to minimize friction with Washington and avoid the appearance of siding with Moscow on the issue.

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Castro and Gorbachëv: Politics of Accommodation

W. Raymond Duncan

The events of the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (February 4–7, 1986) signal a new thaw in Cuban-Soviet relations. Not only did Moscow send to Havana a high-ranking team headed by the number two man in the Politburo, Yegor Ligachëv, but Fidel Castro and Ligachëv used the occasion of the Congress to shower high praise upon each other's countries.[1] Ligachëv acknowledged Cuba's international prestige and praised its social and economic advances, assuring Havana that it could "rely upon the Soviet Union" for continued support.[2] For his part, Castro described the Soviet Union as "our closest friend and our best political ally" and underlined that Cuban relations with the Soviet Union "enjoy priority and special attention."[3]

The warming trend was underscored by Castro's attendance at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 25–March 6)—his first visit to the USSR in over two years.[4] Accorded a place of honor among the foreign guests on the dias in Moscow's Palace of Congresses, the Cuban leader paid tribute to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv's "brilliant and valiant main report," which showed "the immense glories /of the/ Soviet people's historic deeds . . . on the road opened by the Great October Revolution."[5]

Yet, less than a year earlier, Castro had in effect snubbed the Soviet leadership by refusing to attend the funeral of Gorbachëv's predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko. Moreover, as recently as 1984, Cuba and the Soviet Union had openly disagreed on important foreign policy issues, in particular about the extent of support for revolutionary regimes and movements and about the desirability of improving relations between the superpowers. While the recent expressions of warmth may seem more dramatic than usual at first glance, fluctuations between accommodation and discord are part of the history of Soviet-Cuban relations.

What then are the developments that have led to renewed warmth between the leaderships of Cuba and the Soviet Union? Is the current accommodation likely to last, or will it give way to renewed discord? To help answer these questions, it is useful to review the interests that cement this relationship, as well as the objective and subjective factors that have strained it in the past. The factors that contributed to the chilly relations in 1984–85 will be used to illustrate how the Soviet-Cuban relationship can tilt out of balance.

[1]Technically, the 3rd PCC Congress was still in progress when this article went to press. Throughout this essay, however, I focus on the events that took place at the Congress's main convocation, which was held February 4–7. For coverage of the 3rd Party Congress see daily entries for Feb. 3–12, 1986, in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–LAM*), and *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*); *The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1986; and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 5, 1986.

[2]Moscow TASS, in English, Feb. 5, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 6, 1986, p. Q/2, and *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 6, 1986, K/1.

[3]See Castro's Main Report to the PCC Congress (hereafter Castro's Main Report), Havana Radio, Feb. 4, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. Q/1–63, at Q/60.

[4]Havana Tele-Rebelde Network, Feb. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 27, 1986, p. Q/1.

[5]Ibid.

W. Raymond Duncan is Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York (Brockport). He has written extensively on Soviet–Third World relations and Latin American politics, his most recent work being The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence *(1985). During 1984–86, he is Scholar-in-Residence with the National Intelligence Council in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the National Intelligence Council or of the United States Government.*

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Serving Mutual Interests

Cuba's alliance with the Soviet Union—measured in terms of magnitude of economic and military aid; the integration of economic, military, and political institutions; and longevity—remains the strongest of Moscow's patron-client ties with Third World countries.[6] It can best be described as a relationship in which neither partner exerts complete control or influence over the other and in which mutual interests of both countries are served but at costs to both sides. Each side regularly seeks to maximize benefits for itself from the relationship and to minimize the costs by exerting various types of influence. It is not a partnership of equals, however. Because Cuba depends heavily on Soviet economic aid to keep its economy afloat,[7] Moscow dominates the relationship. Thus, as one observer has noted, the Soviet Union can force the Cubans to "operate within the parameters set by the Kremlin."[8]

Given that the Soviet Union pumps US$4 to 5 billion a year into Cuba's struggling economy, it is obvious that it has vested interests in that country. However, unlike Brazil, which represents an important market for Soviet exports, or Argentina, which supplies the USSR with much needed wheat, Cuba's value for the Soviets lies in its geostrategic location and its commitment to communism and "proletarian internationalism." This compensates for its lack of purchasing power and its inability to supply foodstuffs to the Soviet Union.

Geostrategically and politically, Cuba gives the USSR leverage in the Caribbean Basin and helps to expand Moscow's presence in the Third World—two key assets in the Soviet Union's competition with the United States. The returns on Soviet investments in Cuba are numerous: intelligence information on the United States gathered at the Lourdes installation near Havana, Moscow's largest and most valuable base of this type outside the USSR; facilities for deploying Soviet Bear D long-range reconnaissance aircraft and



Fidel Castro addresses the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1986.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

naval combatants along North America's East Coast and throughout the Caribbean; and facilities for Soviet military and civilian technicians, including about 7,000 civilian advisers, a 2,800-man military brigade, 2,800 military advisers, plus approximately 3,100 technicians at the Lourdes electronic intelligence installation.[9] In addition, Cuban policies have the effect of diverting US attention from other regions to the Caribbean Basin (whose maritime routes carry about 55 percent of the petroleum imported by the United States, and approximately 45 percent of all US seaborne trade),[10] strengthening Soviet strategic positions in the Third World, bolstering the "world correlation of forces" in favor of socialism/communism against capitalism/imperialism, and facilitating Moscow's role as a global superpower competing with the United States. Cuba thus extends the Soviet political presence in the Third World and gives it a military dimension in the Caribbean.

Castro's interest in allying Havana with Moscow has been based from the beginning on Soviet economic

[6]For further discussion, see W. Raymond Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence*, New York, Praeger, 1985.

[7]William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1978, p. 61.

[8]Jacques Levesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategic Perspectives*, New York, Praeger, 1978; Cole Blasier, "COMECON in Cuban Development," in Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Eds., *Cuba in the World*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, p. 225.

[9]H. Michael Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985; also US Department of State, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985, pp. 3–4.

[10]Joseph Whelan, *The Soviet Union in the Third World, 1980–1982: An Imperial Burden or Political Asset*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984, pp. 295–96.

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A Soviet MiG–23 of the sort delivered to Cuba.

—J.P. Quittard/GAMMA-LIAISON.

and military aid, both to shore up Cuba's economy and to defend itself against the United States. Soviet help and support remains important for Cuba's economic survival, its defense, its preservation of the revolution at home, and its quest to spread Castro's brand of "proletarian internationalism."[11]

Economically, cooperation with the Soviets has been especially valuable in terms of direct and indirect subsidies, most notably the purchase of oil from the USSR at below world market prices for internal use and for resale for hard currency, and the export of sugar at above world market prices.[12] It has also gained Cuba membership in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Militarily, cooperation with the Soviet Union has meant deliveries of Soviet military hardware and assistance which, during 1981–84, reached levels unmatched since the 1962 missile crisis.[13] Politically, ties with the USSR have gained for Cuba recognition by other countries of its membership in the world socialist system and has provided it with a "progressive" identity as distinct from its pre-revolutionary identity as a "capitalist" dependency. Finally, alliance with the Soviet Union has helped Cuba shape a vanguard role for itself in backing revolutionary regimes and movements in the Third World, thereby advancing Cuba's ideological objectives.

[11] *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, op. cit., pp. 3–10; Whelan, op. cit., pp. 305ff.

[12] Cuba has purchased sugar on the open market at prices below its internal costs of production and has resold it to Moscow at a heavily subsidized price. A report by the Cuban National Bank, made public in 1985, indicates one such transaction: Cuba had acquired US$115 million worth of sugar on the world market and sold it to the Soviet Union for US$ 1.16 billion. The proceeds were then used to acquire 6,182 million metric tons of oil from the Soviets. Cuban sales of this "surplus" oil purchased from the Soviets amounted to over US$600 million during 1985. This sum represents over half the country's hard-currency earnings used to import Western goods and technology. See *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1985; and *The Financial Times* (London), Mar. 1, 1986. See also Jerry Flint, "Cuba: Russia's Wondrous Weapon," *Forbes* (New York), Mar. 28, 1983, p. 39; Lawrence H. Theriot, *Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980's*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 18–21; Blasier, loc. cit., pp. 225–56; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal*, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1981.

[13] This military aid has turned Cuba into a veritable garrison state with over 950 tanks, more than 200 jet fighters (mainly MiG–21's but also MiG–23's), an upgraded navy equipped with frigates and submarines, as well as missile/torpedo–firing patrol boats, and an overall military force of some 160,000 active-duty soldiers and up to 135,000 well-trained and experienced reservists ready for mobilization within two to three days of a summoning. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London, IISS, 1985, pp. 146–47; *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean*, op. cit., p. 6.

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Politics of Alliance Management

When either partner in the Soviet-Cuban alliance perceives the costs of advancing its interests through cooperation with the other as outweighing the benefits, it tries to use its influence to bring down the costs. Thus, in the past, when Moscow perceived Havana to be acting in ways that undercut Soviet interests—for example, in 1966–68, when Castro insisted on promoting revolutionary struggle in Latin America while the Soviet policy line advocated peaceful transformation—it has tried to induce Cuba's compliance by cutting back on aid and decreasing petroleum flows.[14] For its part, Havana has been able to exert some influence on Soviet decision-making concerning its policy in the Third World, in particular, the decision in 1975 to back the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) more directly and vigorously.[15] In all probability, Havana also influenced Moscow to revise its position on the efficacy of armed struggle in Central America after the Sandinistas—with active support from Cuba—overthrew Anastasio Somoza's regime in Nicaragua in July 1979.[16]

Not surprisingly, when seeking to influence each other's behavior, both sides have relied on their most valued resources as leverage, including a variety of objective and subjective factors that are used to reward or punish, supply or deny. Thus, the Soviets have drawn upon their key economic and military resources, the Cubans on their value as an ally in a strategic geographic location, their commitment to Marxism-Leninism at home and abroad, and their prestige in the Third World.

The form of influence most frequently used over the years by Moscow and Havana has been of a *cooperative* type. Cooperative influence comes into play when one side bargains with, induces, persuades, or cajoles the other to cooperate on an issue of mutual interest rather than compelling it to do so through sanctions. While the Soviets have at times used more assertive or coercive forms of influence, both Moscow and Havana have found that cooperation has tended to produce the best results.

Soviet-Cuban relations over the past quarter century reflect these two patterns of interaction. Cycles of cooperation have alternated with cycles of friction and conflict. The Soviet and Cuban venture in Angola in 1975 is an instance of the former; the period following the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, an example of the latter.

Chilly Relations, 1984–85

While continuing to be "correct," relations between Moscow and Havana in the early months of 1984 entered a decidedly cool period. This was evidenced by the departure from protocol in Moscow's congratulatory note on the 25th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. The note arrived without the customary signature of the General Secretary of the CPSU, at that time Yuriy Andropov. It was signed instead in the name of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. A cooling in relations was further indicated by Castro's infrequent references to the USSR in his New Year's address. This took place just weeks after differences of opinion surfaced about what caused the factionalism in Grenada and who was responsible for the murder of Maurice Bishop.[17]

In many respects, the strain in relations reflected deeper problems affecting both Moscow and Havana in the mid-1980's. This period differed markedly from the more hopeful mid-1970's. Problems of managing the "burdens of empire"—that is, of servicing Third World clients rather than bringing them to power—and of coping with US reactions to an expanding Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World were complicating Soviet international relations. The management of Soviet-Cuban bilateral relations under conditions of shrinking available resources and a continuing poor Cuban economic performance also needed adjusting.[18]

Friction arising from differing perspectives of each partner's geopolitical role also came into play. As a superpower, Moscow had global concerns among which East-West issues had the most attention;

[14]Levesque, op. cit., p. 135.

[15]Jiri Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Fall 1981, pp. 715–46; Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1985, pp. 29–50.

[16]Robert S. Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America*, The Washington Papers No. 93, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982, pp. 37–38.

[17]*Latin American Weekly Report* (London), Feb. 10, 1984, p. 4.

[18]On the rising costs the Soviets face in Third World countries and the foreign policy debates this situation has generated in recent years, see Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1986; and Robert G. Kaiser, "Exhausted Empire Faces Up to Shortfalls," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 25, 1984. On Cuba's lagging economy, see Mesa-Lago, op. cit., and Blasier, loc. cit., as well as Jeremy Main, "Castro Tightens Cuba's Belt," *Fortune* (New York), Sept. 16, 1985, pp. 120ff., and Carl J. Migdail, "Why Cuba Chases the Yankee Dollar," *US News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Dec. 8, 1985, pp. 40–41. On falling world petroleum prices and the USSR's declining oil production, as well as other internal roadblocks to higher Soviet economic productivity, see Marshall Goldman, *USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System*, New York, Norton, 1983.

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Havana was more concerned with North-South and regional issues, most notably—though not exclusively—in the geographical proximity of the Caribbean Basin.

This gave rise to differences in policy priorities as evidenced by Cuba's and the USSR's divergent approaches to the revolutionary New Jewel Movement in Grenada. Moscow was tepid in backing Bishop in his leadership struggle with Bernard Coard, reflecting, some have suggested, a Soviet preference for dedicated, mainstream communists.[19] It thus glossed over Bishop's death, referring to the episode in *Kommunist* as merely a "tragic turn of events."[20] Castro, on the other hand, took a more eclectic approach to revolutionary leadership, choosing out of friendship to support Bishop, whose orientation could be called more Caribbean than Leninist.[21] He condemned Coard's actions and tried to save Bishop's life. With respect to the US-led invasion of Grenada, Moscow kept a low profile in the US "strategic backyard," limiting itself to low-key denounciations of the action.[22] By contrast, Cuba actively sought to prevent the US invasion and ordered its soldiers in Grenada to fight.[23]

Divergences in Soviet and Cuban foreign policy priorities also came to the fore at that time over Nicaragua. Apparently, Castro became profoundly annoyed in March 1984 when Chernenko refused to let a Soviet naval flotilla proceed to Nicaraguan ports. The flotilla had been en route to Nicaragua when a Soviet tanker was severely damaged by a US mine in Puerto Sandino, Nicaragua's Pacific harbor. Public media reported rumors that Castro had urged Moscow to have the flotilla proceed to Nicaragua despite the incident, in order to signal Soviet military backing for the Sandinista government.[24] The Soviet refusal to heed Castro's urgings was in line with Moscow's intent to keep the United States preoccupied with Nicaragua, but not to the point of providing a pretext for intervention. This approach conflicted with Cuba's interest in providing the strongest possible backing for the Sandinistas, who have come to represent Havana's sole success in 25 years of supporting revolutions in Latin America.[25]

Differing economic priorities were an equally weighty factor behind the friction. Increasing competition for declining Soviet resources among CEMA states and Third World clients, the escalating costs of aid to Cuba's ailing economy, and the large Cuban foreign debt caused the Soviets to become increasingly impatient with Cuba's poor economic performance. They set a ceiling on aid to Cuba in an effort to pressure Havana into improving management of the Cuban economy.[26] This again threatened to undermine Cuban interests, since Castro wanted more Soviet aid so as to support rapid industrialization in order to diversify the economy and move Cuba away from its traditional role of agricultural supplier.

As a result of these various differences in priorities, relations became visibly strained. Cuba publicly decried the low level of attention that the Soviet Union was giving to Nicaragua's economic and military needs, and complained especially about Chernenko's conciliatory statements in the face of increasingly hostile US pronouncements about the Sandinistas.[27] Then came Castro's refusal to attend the June 1984 CEMA summit meeting in Moscow on the excuse that he was occupied with pressing matters at home.[28] Moscow responded by sending a low-level Soviet delegation to Cuba's 26th of July celebration in 1984.[29] More telling was Moscow's announcement that aid to Cuba in 1984 would not exceed US$4 billion in loans and subsidies and half a billion in military assistance.[30] This action probably influenced Castro's decision neither to attend Chernenko's funeral in Moscow nor to sign the book of condolences and personally visit the Soviet embassy in Havana to express official condolences.[31]

Utilizing Influence

Both Havana and Moscow continued to keep the door of communication open during the chill of 1984–85, even while advancing their own priorities. Thus Cuba assumed a more independent stance by choosing not to become engaged in Ethiopia's war

[19]Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1984, pp. 1–23; Robert Rand, "Grenada's Links with the USSR and Cuba," in Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE–RL), *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 401/83, Oct. 26, 1983, pp. 1–3.

[20]Whelan, op. cit., p. 168.

[21]W. Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Miami, FL), May 1984, pp. 168–75.

[22]Ibid.

[23]*Latin American Weekly Report*, Feb. 10, 1984, p. 4.; Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America," loc. cit.

[24]*The Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1985.

[25]See Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America," loc. cit., pp. 715–46; Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas in Power," *Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1985, pp. 1–27.

[26]Main, loc. cit., p. 120.

[27]*The Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1985.

[28]Ibid., Feb. 4, 1985.

[29]It is interesting to note that in the opening salutations of his speech at Cienfuegos commemorating the 31st anniversary of the assault on Moncada Barracks, Castro did not mention the Soviet delegate by name, although he did acknowledge the delegates from Ghana, Nicaragua, and the German Democratic Republic. See Havana Domestic Service, July 26, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Jul. 30, 1984, p. Q/1.

[30]*The Washington Post*, Feb. 4, 1985; Main, loc. cit., pp. 122 and 127.

[31]*The Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1985.

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A petrochemical refining column is prepared for shipment to Cuba at the "Volgogradneftemash" manufacturing plant in Volgograd, USSR.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

against the Tigrean and Eritrean national liberation movements, and by keeping open its own lines of communication with leftist insurgents in Central and South America. But it did so without undermining Moscow's position, and also began to cultivate improved state-to-state relations in Central and Latin America, a policy that accorded better with Soviet interests in the region.

Unlike Cuba, Moscow could and did exert *assertive* influence by resorting to economic sanctions to signal its discontent with the other's priorities. First, it leveled off Soviet economic aid. Then it insisted that Cuba raise its levels of productivity and honor its export commitments to the USSR. Yet, like Cuba, Moscow did not try to overexert its influence; instead it employed a "carrot and stick" approach to problems with Cuba, combining assertiveness with cooperation. It continued to purchase Cuban sugar at inflated prices and sell oil to Havana at less than market price; it also deferred from 1986 to 1990 a repayment of US$125 million on Cuba's debt to the USSR.

Soviet and Cuban efforts to improve mutual relations without compromising on important priorities seem to have produced a favorable outcome soon after Gorbachëv came to power. In May 1985, Moscow sent a high-level delegation to Havana, led by Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev,[32] for ceremonies commemorating the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cuba and the USSR. In October, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze came to Cuba and brought "warm wishes" from Gorbachëv. In turn, Castro praised "the world's first socialist state."[33] Considering these signs of a warming in Soviet-Cuban relations, the thaw and the events of the 3rd Party Congress were not entirely surprising.

[32]Havana Television Service, May 17, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, May 20, 1985, Q/1.

[33]TASS International Service, Oct. 30, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 31, 1985, p. K/1.

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Why the Thaw?

From the discussion above, it is obvious that economic considerations are a leading factor behind Cuba's most recent efforts to improve relations with the USSR. Despite years of trying to buoy Cuba's struggling economy, Castro has not been able to correct persistent problems of inefficiency, low worker productivity, absenteeism, and even corruption.[34] While there has been progress in health care, education, and social welfare, Cuba is not a model of "socialist efficiency." It continues to ration food, and there is an extensive black market. Urban areas are dilapidated, and the tourist industry (which Cuba has been trying to invigorate) continues to languish. Moreover, Cuba's inability to meet its export obligations to the USSR and Eastern Europe continues to embarrass the Cuban leadership and irritate the Soviet Union and other CEMA partners.[35] In addition, drought and then a devastating hurricane in 1985 have virtually guaranteed a poor sugar harvest in 1986.[36] The poor weather has thus dashed initial hopes that harvest yields would earn Cuba over US$200 million in 1986. Cuba will now have less, if any, sugar to sell and might be forced to use its scarce hard currency to purchase sugar on the open market in order to meet its commitments to CEMA. This might make it necessary for Cuba to borrow more money from the West in order to import food, food-processing machinery, technology for sugar production, consumer goods, and transportation equipment, as well as to service outstanding debts to the West now amounting to over US$3 billion.[37] Considering the vastness of its economic difficulties, Cuba cannot afford to jeopardize its status of privileged Soviet client (it now receives approximately 51 percent of all Soviet aid designated for communist and noncommunist developing countries).[38] Thus, accommodation to the USSR makes eminent sense.

A return toward warmer relations with the Soviet Union was also prompted by Castro's growing awareness of the fiscal constraints attendant to supporting Third World revolutionary movements. Indeed, while the limit of Soviet and Cuban staying power in bolstering Third World allies has not been reached, the economic, military, and political costs of backing the regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua are increasing.[39] Given the escalating costs of Cuba's military involvement in the Third World and Moscow's increasing emphasis on cost-effectiveness, Castro's present accommodation to Moscow's economic reformism seems virtually inevitable.

Cuban sugar shipped via Rotterdam being unloaded in Leningrad.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

[34]See pertinent sections of Castro's Main Report, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, esp. pp. Q/14–19.

[35]See ibid.; and Charles Wolf Jr. et al., *The Costs of the Soviet Empire*, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1983.

[36]Hurricane Kate brought torrential rains and 100-mph winds to western Cuba on November 19–20. It damaged nearly 2.5 million acres of sugar cane, about 25 percent of the island's cultivated land. The hurricane followed a period of drought which had already reduced the expected sugar yield by some 12 percent. Cuba went through droughts in 1981 and 1984, when rainfall was about only 67 percent of the annual average. *Latin American Monitor* (London), December 1985, p. 247. The fall in oil prices is a major problem. Some 40 percent of Cuba's export earnings between 1982 and 1985 were derived from the re-export of oil received from the USSR. Ibid., July 1985, p. 188; and *Financial Times* (London), Mar. 1, 1986.

[37]While sugar can be purchased on the open market for nearly one-tenth of the price at which Cuba sells it to Moscow, the Soviets apparently prefer to subsidize Cuban sugar production to ensure Cuba's integration into CEMA as an agricultural supplier. One wonders how long the Soviets will be willing to pay the high subsidized price for sugar Cuba purchases on the open market. The nature of this exchange poses problems for Cuba as well, since to meet its commitment to CEMA Cuba must use its scarce *hard currency* to purchase sugar rather than to purchase much-needed Western imports.

[38]Wolf et al., op. cit., Ch. 1.

[39]See the introduction to Hough, op. cit.

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Hope of retaining leverage should East-West détente blossom again, was another reason for Castro's accommodation to the Soviet Union. Improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West could possibly clash with Castro's more pronounced emphasis on North-South issues and his support for revolution, particularly in Central America. Moscow has undoubtedly assured Castro that any discussions between Soviet and US leaders concerning regional issues would not compromise Cuban interests.[40] In the past, the Soviet Union did not view progress in East-West negotiations as necessarily contingent on its behavior in the Third World.[41] Castro, for his part, has made it quite clear to the Soviet Union that the United States has nothing to offer that could wean him away from his Soviet patrons.[42] Still, renewed Soviet interest in East-West détente marks a change in the international environment in which Soviet-Cuban relations are conducted and—when coupled with other shifts noted above—creates a distinctly changed climate in world politics from what had existed after the collapse of Soviet-American détente in 1979.

Accommodating to the Moscow Line

The proceedings at Cuba's 3rd Party Congress put to rest any doubts that Castro might not realign his economic policies with those of the USSR. Gorbachëv's campaign to modernize the Soviet economy and ensure economic self-discipline with respect to foreign and domestic commitments has struck home in the Cuban capital. Castro's main report to the Congress was a graphic illustration of this. He stressed the need to improve Cuba's "insufficient," "undisciplined," and "mediocre" economy.[43] He succeeded in convincing Moscow that Cuba would emulate Soviet economic reform efforts satisfactorily. This became clear in Ligachëv's statement: "The PCC Congress convincingly shows that you have a realistic economic strategy, and we wish the Cuban Communists success in implementing it."[44]

Obviously taking his cue from Gorbachëv, Castro delivered the most systematic attack since 1970 on poor economic planning and bureaucratic inefficiency in Cuba. First he addressed the problem of the failure of the sugar harvest (only some 10 million tons). Then he went on to point out Cuba's inability to meet export commitments to socialist countries, the slow growth in sugar production levels despite huge investments, and the deficiencies in agriculture as a whole. He decried the shortcomings in construction and transportation equipment; poor economic planning and organization; negligence in health care, education, and environmental control; as well as insensitivity to human problems.[45]

Following a morning oration of some two hours, Castro stated that "deficient officials will continue to be replaced . . . . We will not tolerate laziness, negligence, inability, or irresponsibility." When some delegates were late coming back from a thirty-minute recess, Castro chided them: "We are talking about discipline and some of the delegates are late in returning."[46] It should be noted that the themes emphasized by Castro—accelerating economic development, building discipline, ending corruption, stimulating efficiency, and promoting competent managers—are remarkably consistent with Gorbachëv's main report to the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU, as well as with the predominant themes of the Soviet republican party congresses held in early 1986, prior to the 27th Soviet Party Congress.[47]

In a move resembling decisions in the USSR,[48] Castro changed the composition of the Cuban Politburo by elevating to it several new people who were known for professional competence. In the process, a number of *Fidelistas* were removed. Among those who lost their Politburo seats were Blas Roca (nearly 80 years old), and three men who had only recently been removed from their cabinet posts: Ramiro Valdés, former minister of the interior, Garcia Frias, the former transportation minister, and Sergio del Valle, the former health minister.[49] Castro also replaced Jésus Montané, a long-time revolutionary leader, but in his

[40]Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's October 1985 visit to Cuba was supposed to make this point clear. On Shevardnadze's trip, see Moscow TASS, Oct. 29, 1985, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 29, 1985, pp. K/1–2; and Havana Television Service, Oct. 30, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–LAM*, Oct. 31, 1985, p. Q/1. The visit was also reported by TASS Radio Broadcast, Oct. 29, 1985, and British Broadcasting Corporation, Oct. 30, 1985.

[41]Alexander L. George, *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

[42]See Castro's Main Report, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, esp. pp. Q/50–62.

[43]Ibid., esp. pp. Q/14–19.

[44]Moscow TASS, Feb. 5, 1986, in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 6, 1986, K/1.

[45]Castro's Main Report, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. Q/13–21.

[46]Ibid., p. Q/21.

[47]See, e.g., the supplement to *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 21, 1986, for coverage of some republican party congresses.

[48]Personnel shifts in the CPSU's upper echelons have resulted in the removal of many individuals with whom Castro had been doing business over the years, and their replacement with new efficiency-minded specialists. It is interesting to note, however, that the new Soviet Politburo also added two Cuban experts to its ranks, namely Vitaliy Vorotnikov, former ambassador to Havana (1979–82), who is deeply aware of Cuban economic inefficiency, and Konstantin Katushev, the chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, previously ambassador to Cuba (1982–85).

[49]*The New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1986.

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case the replacement was for reasons of health.[50] Vilma Espín Guillois, wife of Raúl Castro, was promoted from alternate to full Politburo member, the first woman to achieve this position. Moreover, to give a better ethnic balance to the Politburo, Castro added a black man, Esteban (Lazo) Hernández. Election of the new Central Committee produced a membership that was 28 percent black or mulatto.[51]

The Politburo changes came after the firing in 1985 of at least 11 top Cuban officials, most of whom were involved in economic management,[52] including Humberto Peréz, veteran of the Cuban Revolution, and Cuba's top economic manager. For a regime long noted for stability and slow turnover of its key personnel, the extensive changes were surprising. Observers had originally speculated that former ministers would simply be removed from their ministries to end any public criticism of their inefficiency, but that they would retain their position in the Politburo and continue to bolster Fidel Castro's personal following at the highest party levels.[53] This is not to say that these personnel changes have left Castro without loyal supporters in the Politburo and the Cabinet. General José Arbantes Fernández, for example, who replaced Valdés in the Interior Ministry, is known to be "fanatically loyal to Fidel."[54]

The 3rd Party Congress was not merely a media event dramatizing Castro's accommodation to Soviet economic pressure. Like any other congress of this type, it also served to enhance the prestige of the host country and its leader. The Congress can therefore be seen as an example of how Cuba musters its own "public diplomacy" capability and exerts indirect influence on the Soviet Union. For example, Castro used the occasion to revalidate his credentials as *lider maximo* of Cuba's quarter-century-old Revolution, of Third World causes, and of international communism and the working-class movement. Approximately 200 delegations to the Congress from communist and workers' parties, national liberation movements, socialist parties, and various revolutionary organizations helped confirm Cuba's high prestige. Castro's speeches also reaffirmed the PCC's role as vanguard of the Revolution. But the Congress also served to demonstrate that Cuba was a leading and most faithful ally of the Kremlin and an advocate of Soviet interests. Finally, Cuba demonstrated at the Congress that Marxist-Leninist principles continue to be strong in Cuba's polity and economy.

The signals Cuba sent to Moscow from the Havana Congress did not go unnoticed. Gorbachëv notified Castro that "our Cuban brothers can be sure of the unfailing solidarity of the Soviet Union with the Island of Freedom. Soviet-Cuban friendship is indestructible."[55]

Lingering Foreign Policy Divergence

Even though Havana's 3rd Party Congress was notable for demonstrating the closeness of Soviet-Cuban relations, it also indicated persisting foreign policy differences. On February 7, two days after Castro had delivered his main report, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez took the podium to read a hastily prepared resolution on foreign policy. This resolution called for a Cuban foreign policy marked by "close collaboration with the Soviet Union," and the "solution of international conflicts through dialogue and constructive negotiations." Reflecting Moscow's renewed interest in negotiations with the United States, the resolution emphasized Cuba's "unchangeable attitude in favor of a solution of the historic differences with the United States."[56] This resolution contrasted sharply with the more strident language of Castro's main report.

The introduction of the hastily drafted foreign policy resolution hinted that the Soviet delegation was dissatisfied with Castro's cursory initial treatment of Soviet détente efforts and his glossing over of Soviet-US arms control proposals. Passage of the resolution was important to Moscow, and once the Congress adopted it, the Soviet delegation immediately informed Moscow of Cuba's confidence in a policy "based on Marxism-Leninism . . . and close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community" as well as of Cuban recognition of the importance of a Soviet-US summit dialogue.[57]

This did not, however, mean that Castro was abandoning his foreign policy priorities. He remained hawkish on regional issues. In his rambling closing remarks to the Congress, Castro lashed out at increased US aid to the *contras* in Nicaragua, stating that "we will do

[50]Havana Television Service, Feb. 7, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. Q/28.
[51]Ibid.
[52]*Latin American Monitor*, July 1985, p. 188.
[53]Ibid.; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath, England), Vol. 31, October 1985, pp. 33917–19.
[54]*The Washington Times*, Dec. 4, 1985; *Latin American Weekly Report*, Dec. 13, 1985, p. 9.
[55]*Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 9, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. K/3.
[56]For text of the resolution see Havana Radio Rebelde Network, Feb. 7, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986, pp. Q/69–76, esp. 70 and 75.
[57]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 8, 1986, in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 12, 1986, pp. K/16–18.

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everything possible to step up our aid for the Nicaraguan people."[58] As for renewed US aid to the UNITA forces under Jonas Savimbi in Angola, Castro insisted that Cuban troops would not withdraw, that they would stay there "10 years, 20 years, 30 years . . . if necessary."[59] Daniel Ortega, who headed Nicaragua's delegation to the Havana Congress, reported Castro's offer of additional aid to the Sandinistas immediately after returning home.[60] Moscow's media apparently did not give the offer much prominence.[61]

Subtle differences in the Cuban and Soviet approaches to international relations were also in evidence at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. In discussing the present epoch, Gorbachëv stressed East-West strategic matters, the evils of imperialism, the division of world forces between socialism/communism and capitalism/imperialism, and global issues such as the pollution of the world environment. His foreign policy observations constituted about 15 percent of the report and focused on the need to stop the arms race and promote the Soviet version of "disarmament," as well as on the threat of the US "star wars" program.[62] Missing were references to national liberation movements in Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America, as well as promises of strong Soviet economic backing for developing countries. What is more, also missing was a discussion of the very Latin American regional issues that had occupied so much of Castro's attention at Havana's 3rd Party Congress.

In his own brief but energetic address to the Moscow Congress, Castro paid homage to the strength of Soviet-Cuban ties and also acknowledged Moscow's concerns with avoiding nuclear war and preserving world peace. However, he reminded his audience that Third World issues also demanded attention, and that national liberation struggles in "Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Western Sahara, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea" were not fought without great costs. He argued that "the fruit of the blood and lives of many of the best sons of our peoples" should not be reduced in world affairs to "so-called low-level conflicts." As if to urge Gorbachëv to meet Soviet obligations abroad despite his preoccupation with economic reform at home, Castro noted that "all progressive forces face the challenge of hunger, poverty, unemployment . . . and underdevelopment in Third World nations . . . . The Third World countries expect and are sure they will receive maximum solidarity from the socialist community in their struggle for just economic gains."[63]

Clearly, the debate over Havana's North-South and Moscow's East-West priorities is still very much alive. Despite assurances to the contrary, Castro apparently continues to doubt that Soviet-US dialogue has any relevance for easing Cuba's tense relations with the United States, or for his strong affinity with national liberation movements throughout the Third World.

Cuba's Fidel Castro is mobbed by delegates to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin on February 27, 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Will the Thaw Last?

There is no simple answer to the question of whether the thaw will last. Given the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship and its recent history, three alternate sce-

[58]Havana International Service, Feb. 8, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 10, 1986, p. Q/36.
[59]Ibid.
[60]Havana Radio Reloj Network, Feb. 8, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 12, 1986, p. Q/10.
[61]See, e.g., the coverage of Nicaragua and Cuba in *FBIS–SOV* for Feb. 8–13, 1986.
[62]Moscow Television Service, Feb. 25, 1986, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 26, 1986, pp. O/1–46.
[63]Havana Tele-Rebelde Network, Feb. 26, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 27, 1986, pp. Q/1–2.

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narios are plausible with regard to future Cuban-Soviet relations. Each is based on the assumption that both partners will continue to push for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of their ties. The first scenario anticipates a period of intense strain, unlike any in the past, which would threaten the very essence of Soviet-Cuban relations. However unlikely such an eventuality may appear now, it cannot be ruled out entirely as a possibility. The second scenario sees rising friction similar to past periods of strain (for example, 1984–85) that may reach a peak just prior to the 1990 deadline for Cuban repayment of debts owed to the Soviet Union. The third scenario envisages a continuation of the present warming trend (albeit with moderate frictions common to all partnerships) and seems the most likely one for the near future.

Political Winter. Least likely is the situation in which either the Cubans or the Soviets perceive the costs of the partnership to seriously outweigh the benefits. For this to happen, there would have to be a confluence of frictions of a kind that have happened in the past (for example, in the period 1966–68) with other dramatic developments, such as:

- A precipitous decline in Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba, owing to a shift in Soviet Third-World or East-West priorities;
- Latin America's cancellation of debts to Western creditors, if this induced Castro to follow suit by canceling Cuba's debt to the USSR;
- A split in the ranks of either the Angolan MPLA or Sandinista leaderships, with Moscow and Havana supporting different factions;
- Raúl Castro's assumption of increasing power but his inability to control rising popular discontent and elite factionalism.[64]

[64]The question of Raúl Castro's leadership merits some attention. Some observers argue that even if Raul Castro were to amass more power than he has already, Cuba would move into a period of growing political instability should his brother die or become incapacitated. Their hypothesis is based on the assumption that only Fidel Castro is able to control intense elite infighting over economic policy now taking place, which led to the postponement of the 3rd Party Congress from December 1985 to February 1986. According to this analysis, Raúl—though a talented administrator—simply lacks the charisma and personal vitality needed to hold the competing Cuban groups in check. With Fidel no longer ruling Cuba, economic strains would translate into political instability and undermine Cuba's political value to the Soviets. Other analysts discount this hypothesis, arguing that Cuba's institutions, including the PCC, assure against that eventuality, because all groups aspiring to power can pursue their interests through legitimate institutionalized channels. See Juan Benemelis, "Cuban Leaders and the Soviet Union," unpublished paper, Radio Marti, US Information Agency, Washington, DC, October 1985; *The Washington Times*, Feb. 3, 1986; and Institute of Inter-American Studies, *Problems of International Studies, 1985*.

Raúl Castro, left, Second Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and First Vice-Chairman of the State Council and Council of Ministers of Cuba, meets with CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, center, and Konstantin Rusakov in the Kremlin in March 1985.

TASS from SOVFOTO.

Rising frictions. Strain between Cuba and the USSR may increase should Cuba fail to make improvements in economic efficiency and production at all levels, and thereby be unable to meet its export commitments to the Soviet bloc. Moscow would then probably reinstate a hard-line approach to Havana's ineffectiveness, forcing Castro to introduce economic austerity measures and cut back on Western imports. These measure could give rise to popular discontent, particularly over ensuing unemployment, and tarnish Castro's image as a dynamic and effective leader.[65]

Any Soviet attempts to cut back on sales of oil to Cuba, on purchases of Cuban sugar, or on economic and military subsidies could conceivably lead to further strain. Gorbachëv's program of economic modernization could claim a larger portion of Soviet resources, as Soviet hard-currency earnings also decrease due to lower oil prices and fewer sales of military equipment to Third World clients. This might stimulate a reallocation of Soviet resources that would have a negative effect on aid flows to Cuba.

Cuban accentuation of foreign policy differences with the Soviets could also contribute to renewed

[65]Benemelis, op. cit.

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friction. Possible sources of tension are: lukewarm support for Soviet efforts at détente with the United States; and overextension in supporting the Sandinistas in particular and revolutionary movements in Central and South America in general.

Continued fraternity. For the future, a relatively straight-line projection of the current warming in Soviet-Cuban relations seems most likely, assuming that Castro will succeed in retaining for Cuba the status of a privileged Soviet ally by accommodating Moscow. In return for his emphasis on more efficient management of the Cuban economy, on loyalty to the world socialist community and the USSR, and on a foreign policy aligned with that of the Soviets, Moscow will keep Cuba's economy afloat and its military defenses strong. Should Raúl Castro assume a greater role in the daily management of Cuba's domestic relations, Soviet-Cuban ties will probably be strengthened all the more, given his evident pro-Soviet inclinations.[66]

Some aspects of current Cuban policy suggest that continued fraternity is probable. Havana has improved its state-to-state relations with South American governments, an important concession to the Soviet Union, which cultivates strong diplomatic and commercial ties with South America, especially with large industrial states like Argentina and Brazil.[67] It is also seeking rapprochement with the Hispano-Catholic Church in hopes of improving its image in South and Central America, a move that cannot but be applauded in the Kremlin. (There have been rumors that Ramiro Valdés was removed from the Politburo precisely because he opposed such accommodation.) Of course, Cuba is also courting liberation theologians in Latin America since it wishes to use them as added levers against regimes with which it is at odds.[68] In Chile, both Havana and Moscow support armed struggle against the government of Augusto Pinochet.[69]

For the time being, the Kremlin is backing Cuba's call on Latin American states to cancel their debts to Western creditors.[70] Increased Soviet military aid to Nicaragua during 1985 suggests a positive response to Cuba's call for stronger backing for the Sandinistas in their fight against the *contra* opposition forces.[71] Furthermore, both the Cubans and the Soviets back the Contadora process aimed at a political settlement of the Nicaraguan problem.

Cuban activities elsewhere in the Third World also suggest a drawing closer of Cuban and Soviet policy objectives. For example, in Angola, Havana and Moscow remain committed to supporting the MPLA against the strong UNITA opposition. And in Ethiopia, they have agreed to a division of responsibilities.[72]

Conclusion

The warming trend evidenced at the party congresses in Havana and Moscow demonstrates the remarkable tenacity of Soviet-Cuban relations. Despite serious disagreements, both countries continue to perceive the benefits of close collaboration as outweighing the costs. For Castro, the benefits derive from Soviet assistance essential for maintaining Cuba's economy and defense. Hence he is likely to continue accommodating the Soviet line, but only so long as it does not threaten his leadership of the Cuban party and his general standing among Third World revolutionaries, especially in Central and South America. For the Soviets, Cuba's strategic geopolitical position is the main asset. There are also past investments to protect and Moscow's reputation as the "natural ally" of the Third World to safeguard. Even if Gorbachëv's emphasis is on cost-effectiveness in domestic and foreign policies, the Soviet leader will probably still consider Cuba a useful investment as Moscow continues to compete with the United States.

Undoubtedly, Soviet-Cuban ties will experience some ups and downs in the future. Cuba's 3rd Party Congress was not officially closed, and the party's program was approved only in draft form, pending final approval after further discussion by party cadres and local organs. The postponement of the closing of the Congress is unprecedented, and it indicates that the more controversial issues on the party's agenda are still being debated. When the Cuban party reconvenes its Congress later in 1986 to ratify the final party program after it is "enriched" at the grass roots, the program may show changes not only in Cuba's domestic policy, but also in its perception of the Soviet Union. If so, this may have an impact on future Soviet-Cuban relations. Moscow will no doubt be watching to see whether the reconvened Congress will take decisions along lines of which the Soviet Union approves,

[66] *The Washington Times*, Feb. 3, 1986.

[67] *Latin American Weekly Report*, July 1, 1985, p. 24; and *The New York Times*, May 19, 1986.

[68] E.g., in February 1986, Havana hosted a Cuban National Ecclesiastical Meeting. See Havana Television Service, Feb. 23, 1986, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 25, 1986, pp. Q/1–4.

[69] *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 24, 1985, p. K/2; *New Times* (Moscow), October 1985, pp. 25–27, in *FBIS–SOV*, Oct. 23, 1985, pp. K/3–7; *Latin America Weekly Report*, June 28, 1985, p. 5; and Pedro Ramet and Fernanado Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the Revolutionary Left in Latin America," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1984, pp. 341–61.

[70] See the main reports of Castro and Gorbachëv to their respective congresses, in *FBIS–LAM*, Feb. 7, 1986 and *FBIS–SOV*, Feb. 25, 1986.

[71] *The Washington Post*, Nov. 5, 1985.

[72] See Whelan, op. cit., pp. 244–46.

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and whether Cuba, notorious for its economic mismanagement, will continue to match Soviet efforts at economic reform.

* * *

As this essay was going to press, the official Cuban newspaper *Granma* reported a 50 percent increase in Soviet economic and trade aid to Cuba for the five-year period 1986–90.[73] According to *Granma*, Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov signed four trade and economic agreements totaling approximately US$3 billion in new credits. The new agreement lends credence to the scenario of continued fraternity between Moscow and Havana. It indicates Gorbachëv's apparent satisfaction with Castro's reform initiatives, as well as his strong commitment to Cuba. It also demonstrates Castro's continuing ability to broker needed economic and military assistance for Cuba through diplomacy and the policy of accommodation.

[73]*The Washington Post*, Apr. 12, 1986.

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Checklist of Communist Parties in 1985

EDITORS' NOTE: By arrangement with Richard Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1985. This Checklist continues a series presented in Hoover's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) *since 1976, and jointly published with* Problems of Communism *since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1986 edition of the* YICA. *The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to the Editors,* Problems of Communism, *301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

Richard F. Staar

IN EARLY 1985, the first deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Vadim V. Zagladin, claimed that "fraternal parties now exist in 95 countries" and comprise "more than 80 million militants." These figures reflect little change from data that Zagladin had reported in 1984.[1] In an item for the Novosti Press Agency bulletin, broadcast by Radio Moscow at the end of 1985, Zagladin gave somewhat higher—if less precise—figures, claiming that the "communist movement functions in almost one hundred countries of the world" where "it unites about 90 million people."[2]

[1]V.V. Zagladin, "On the Contemporary Communist Movement," *Tribuna* (Prague), No. 5, Jan. 30, 1985, p. 3; cf. idem, "International Life: Communists on the Leading Edge of the Struggle," *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 17, September 1984, p. 39.

[2]Moscow Radio, TASS in English, 1619 GMT, Dec. 13, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Dec. 16, 1985, p. CC/3.

Richard F. Staar, coordinator of the International Studies Program at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA), resumed editorship of The Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA) *after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna from 1981 to 1983. His monograph,* USSR Foreign Policy After Detente, *appeared in 1985.* *He is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, John B. Dunlop, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, James H. Noyes, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the* YICA *editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.*

Official claims of this sort project the impression of a massive and united worldwide movement. The desired image is manifest in the new CPSU program, which states:

This is the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, of the historic competition of the two world sociopolitical systems, the epoch of socialist and national liberation revolutions, of the collapse of colonialism, the epoch of the struggle of the chief motive forces of social development—world socialism, the workers' and communist movement, the peoples of the liberated states, and the mass democratic movements—against imperialism and its policy of aggression and oppression and for democracy and social progress.[3]

Such rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow has been unable to organize a world conference of the so-called workers' and communist movement for the past 17 years. Indeed, there have only been three such gatherings—in 1957, 1960, and 1969—since the last one held under Comintern auspices in 1935, which had called for a united front with socialists. In early 1985, *Borba,* the daily newspaper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), carried a report that "a proposal to convene a world conference of communist and workers' parties has been repeated [in Moscow] three times in only two months." According to *Borba,* two successive issues of *Kommunist,* the organ of the CPSU Central Committee, had stressed "the urgent

[3]*Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 3, 1986, p. 4.

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need for a gathering of the 'communist world.' "[4] The SKJ's Presidium rejected this call for a world conference,[5] and subsequent reports indicated that the Italian Communist Party, and probably other West European parties, would not take part in such a meeting. The Chinese, too, have long been on record as being opposed to any such gathering.[6] In a May 1985 interview, the new CPSU leader Mikhail Gorbachëv himself admitted that the holding of a world communist conference at the present time was "inappropriate."[7]

The Checklist published herewith identifies the 95 or so "countries" with communist movements to which Zagladin presumably referred. In certain instances, where parties have been officially banned, it is difficult if not impossible to know whether any activity takes place inside the country. In some instances, the CPSU apparently acknowledges two parties (in Australia, Costa Rica, Great Britain, India, New Zealand, and Sweden), and in the case of Spain it may even recognize three. Soviet-recognized communist movements also exist in territories not considered to be sovereign under international law: Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin. In addition to those movements recognized by Moscow as "communist," the Checklist also includes 12 of the most radical of the approximately 20 political movements termed by Moscow "revolutionary democratic" parties.[8] For the most part, these parties are in power and openly espouse Marxism-Leninism, but, in Moscow's eyes, they lack the organizational and ideological development of a full-fledged communist party. These movements are in Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Grenada, Kampuchea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Yemen, and Zimbabwe. (To our knowledge, Moscow's inclusion of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front in this category, while implicit in a variety of party-to-party dealings, has not been publicly acknowledged.) Only the movements in Bahrain and Grenada are not ruling. The Checklist also notes in italics a few of the more significant communist movements that the CPSU does not recognize. They are frequently pro-Chinese.

If a given party's designation happens to be other than "Communist Party of. . . ," the acronym is provided in the table and the full name is given in the legend. Except where specifically noted, all population estimates are for July 1985.[9] Party membership figures are either the latest recorded official claims, or when such claims are unavailable or seem unrealistic, estimates as of December 31, 1985, by the author of the given country profile in the 1986 *YICA*. Other information in the table includes the name of each party's leader (in most cases the secretary general, or general secretary), dates of the most recent congress or national conference, the party's legal status, and, where relevant, its showing in the latest parliamentary elections.

Party membership claims or our estimates of membership remained fairly stable from 1984 to 1985. Ruling parties in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Kampuchea, Laos, Mongolia, Romania, and Vietnam claimed increased memberships during 1985. Our estimates for members in Brazil and Norway have also been raised. On the other hand, claimed membership declined in the communist parties of Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia. There were no significant changes reported in the membership size of the communist parties of the Soviet Union and China.

The most publicized change in the leadership of a ruling movement occurred on March 11, 1985, when Gorbachëv succeeded to the general secretaryship of the CPSU upon the death of Konstantin Chernenko. In Albania, the death of Enver Hoxha brought the prompt accession of his hand-picked successor, Ramiz Alia. New leaders are noted in the checklist for parties in Bolivia, Honduras, Norway (AKP), Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela—in some cases, e.g., Saudi Arabia, the change is the result of new information rather than of an actual change in leadership.

As can be seen from Table 1 on page 60, a number of communist parties held a congress or national conference (some held two) during 1985. In the case of the Egyptian Communist Party, a clandestine meeting was held either in late 1984 or early 1985. The importance attached by the Soviets to a given party can be seen from the rank of the chief delegate sent by the CPSU. For example, the 2nd Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Workers' Party (MPLA–PT) held in early December enjoyed the prestige of attendance by CPSU Politburo member Heydar Aliyev. Congresses of a number of major Soviet-bloc parties, including the CPSU, were scheduled for early 1986, although the Romanian and Hungarian parties held congresses in 1984 and 1985 respectively.

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[4]*Borba* (Belgrade), Feb. 7, 1985, p. 7.

[5]Belgrade Radio, 1725 GMT, Feb. 7, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–EEU*), Feb. 8, 1985, p. I/5.

[6]See Kevin Devlin, "PCI Against World Conference," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *RAD Background Report* (Munich), No. 22, Mar. 14, 1985.

[7]*L'Unità* (Milan), May 22, 1985, as cited in Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, *Berichte* (Cologne), No. 28, June 1985, p. 4.

[8]See R.F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1985, Table 1.3, p. 14, for a list of the 20 countries with a "socialist" orientation and the names of their movements.

[9]The July 1985 estimates are from US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook: Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Five*, CR WF 85-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1985.

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Table 1: Party Congresses in 1985

Party	Congress #	Date (s)
AB (Iceland)	Biennial	Nov. 7–10
CP of Bolivia	5th	Feb. 9–13
	Extraord.	Aug. 2–5
CP of Canada	26th	Apr. 5–8
CP of Colombia	Conference	Mar. 30
CP of Egypt	2nd	Early 1985 (or late 1984)
CP of Finland	Extraord.	Mar. 23
CP of France	25th	Feb. 6–10
CP of Great Brit.	Special	May 18–20
CP of Israel	20th	Dec. 4–7
CP of Japan	17th	Nov. 19–25
CP of Netherlands	29th	Mar. 1–4
CP of Portugal	Conference	Mar. 30
CP of Uruguay	Conference	Dec. 22
CP of Venezuela	7th	Oct. 24–27
CPM (India)	12th	Dec. 25–30
KPRP (Kampuchea)	5th	Oct. 13–16
MPLA-PT (Angola)	Conference	Jan. 14–19
	2nd	Dec. 2–9
MSzMP (Hungary)	13th	Mar. 25–28
PPP (Guyana)	22nd	Aug. 3–5
PRPB (Benin)	2nd	Nov. 18–24
SUP (New Zealand)	7th	Oct. 26–27
VPK (Sweden)	27th	Jan. 3–6
YSP (Yemen)	3rd	Oct. 11–16

Three movements achieved legal status during the year, one in Africa and two in Latin America. After a coup d'état in the Sudan, the communist party in that country received permission to function openly.[10] A new civilian government in Brazil lifted the ban on the communist party, which had been in effect since 1922, except for the years 1945-47. The party announced that it would compete in the November 1986 parliamentary elections.[11] Finally, the movement in Uruguay was allowed to surface after 12 years of illegality, and it held a national conference at the end of the year.[12]

Moscow-recognized communist parties rule in the same 15 countries as last year. The total membership of these ruling parties is approximately 75 million out of the world total of the 80–90 million claimed by Zagladin. Eleven of these parties constitute the pro-Soviet core, including the 10 members of what Moscow calls the "socialist commonwealth"—Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania (an apparently reluctant member), the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. The Chinese Communist Party alone, however, counts for roughly half of the total of communist members worldwide. Beyond these ruling parties, local communist movements have representatives in governments only on Reúnion and Martinique, in San Marino, and in Syria. Then, of course, there are the 10 ruling "vanguard revolutionary democratic" parties which we have included in the Checklist.

In those communist-ruled states where elections were held during 1985, the general pattern continued to be one of mobilizational "elections" in which 99-plus percent of the electorate voted for single candidates selected by the party. There were, however, two significant departures: in Poland and Hungary. In the first case, some 21 percent of the participating electorate failed to support the candidates of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party—a significant public manifestation of disaffection with the society's communist rulers. In Hungary, in a gesture toward pluralism, voters were offered more than one candidate in all constituencies.

Communist parties generally experienced a drop-off in voter support in elections held during 1985 in countries where they are not the ruling party, e.g., in Belgium (down from 2.3 to 1.2 percent), Cyprus (32.8 to 27.4), Greece (10.9 to 9.9), Mexico (4.3 to 3.2), Norway (0.3 to 0.2), Portugal (18.0 to 15.5), Sweden (5.6 to 5.4), and West Berlin (0.7 to 0.6).[13] Communists lost both of their seats in Belgium, 3 of 15 in Cyprus, 1 of 4 in Martinique, and 5 of 17 in Mexico.

Declining electoral success in democratic states has been accompanied by decreasing membership figures and a variety of factional splits.[14] The Communist Party of Spain has split into three major groups; in Great Britain a New Communist Party of Britain emerged under the leadership of Eric Trevet;[15] and a new League of Communists in the Netherlands (VCN) also surfaced, with some 1,000 members.[16] A split in the Finnish party appears to have been headed off, at least temporarily.

There follows a brief discussion of high points in developments among communist movements in major regions of the world.

Africa (Subsaharan). The response of the South African Communist Party to what it saw as a "state of incipient civil war" was to express concern lest South Africa's workers be diverted "from the true road of revolution."[17]

[10]Interview with General Secretary M.I. Nugud in *L'Humanité* (Paris) as reported by *Pravda*, Apr. 27, 1985, p. 5.

[11]See statement by General Secretary Giocondo Dias in *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. 5.

[12]TASS report from Montevideo in ibid., Dec. 24, 1985, p. 4.

[13]Kevin Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," RFE-RL, *RAD Background Report*, No. 150, Dec. 27, 1985, pp. 49–54.

[14]James M. Markham, "Sharp Decline by Communists in Western Europe," *The New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1986, pp. 1 and 6.

[15]*Kabul New Times*, Dec. 24, 1985.

[16]*NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), Nov. 4, 1985, p. 3.

[17]R.S. Nyameko, "SACTU Celebrates Its 30th Birthday," *African Communist* (London), No. 100, 1985, p. 55.

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In the meantime, Moscow radio continued to offer its transmitters for Zulu-language broadcasts by the SACP–oriented African National Congress.[18]

The MPLA–PT congress mentioned above voted the ouster of pro-Soviet hard-liner Lucio Lara from the Politburo as well as the removal of the country's foreign minister and air force commander from the Central Committee. Nevertheless, the USSR continued supplying military equipment, which totaled about US$2 billion for 1984-85.[19] Soviet-bloc military troops and advisers have suffered casualties in combat against the guerrilla forces of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

Mozambique, celebrating a decade of independence, found itself faced with its own insurgency in the form of the National Resistance Movement (RENAMO). Relying on the Soviet bloc for military hardware and instructors, the regime in Maputo reportedly also accepted 12,000 troops from neighboring Zimbabwe in its efforts to contain the RENAMO insurgency.[20] At the same time, Mozambique's President Samora Machel appeared to be conducting a "nonaligned" foreign policy by visiting first American President Ronald Reagan and later Soviet General Secretary Gorbachëv.

Zimbabwe, the former Rhodesia, held parliamentary elections in July, at which the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) picked up seven more seats (it now holds 64 of the 80 seats reserved for blacks). Prime Minister Robert Mugabe paid a state visit to Moscow in early December, at which time he declared Marxism-Leninism to be his leadership's philosophy and pledged increasing friendship and cooperation with the USSR.[21]

Small land-locked Lesotho allowed its communists to function above ground, although they could not take part in the electoral process. The party had its CPSU recognition implicitly reaffirmed in June by becoming the 66th party listed on the editorial board of *World Marxist Review*.[22]

The Workers' Party of Ethiopia is reportedly preparing a constitution that is supposed to institute a people's democratic republic.[23] In order to pacify rebel forces within the country, the government in Addis Ababa is resettling approximately 1.5. million people under the pretext of a severe drought and famine. As many as 300,000, or some 20 percent of those being resettled, will likely die in the process, according to Doctors Without Borders. About 100,000 have already lost their lives in the resettlement process.[24]

Mathieu Kerekou, president of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB), finally succeeded in purging from the Politburo and party Michel Alladaye, his only surviving co-conspirator from among the officers who staged the 1972 coup that brought Kerekou to power. At the PRPB's 2nd Congress, in November, the latter appeared to consolidate his position; most of the newly-elected Politburo members seemed loyal to him. On the other hand, the party appeared to be experiencing the first challenge to its control in 10 years as economic conditions worsened and unrest rose among high school and university students.

The Americas. Fidel Castro hosted a conference of representatives of communist parties of Latin American and Caribbean countries from June 12 to June 14 in Havana; the meeting issued predictable denunciations of the United States.[25] By year's end, Cuba had government-to-government relations with 16 Latin American countries, and during the year Havana received a US$600 million line of credit from Argentina. Only Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay had no contacts with the Castro regime. Cuba had some 44,000 troops stationed abroad, most of them in Africa.

Peace talks between guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Salvadoran government made no progress during the year. The latter has the upper hand, despite a geographical spreading of the conflict.[26] From exile headquarters in Mexico, the Democratic Revolutionary (Political) Front—an umbrella group comprising the five parties plus several other minor organizations—denounced terrorism and gave hints of returning to El Salvador to participate in the democratic process.[27]

A truce between the government and guerrillas in Colombia virtually ended conflict with the Colombian Revolu-

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[18]See a broadcast of comments by ANC member Thomas Mbeki by Moscow Radio in Zulu to Southern Africa, 1800 GMT, Dec. 9. 1955, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Dec. 16, 1985, p. J/2.

[19]*The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1985.

[20]Radio Truth (clandestine from South Africa) in English to Zimbabwe, Sept. 12, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–MEA*), Sept. 13, 1985, p. U/14.

[21]"Speech by Comrade R. Mugabe," *Pravda*, Dec. 3, 1985, p. 4.

[22]As indicated on the masthead in that journal's June 1985 issue, Toronto edition.

[23]See reportage of Part III of the report by Secretary General Mengistu Haile Mariam, as broadcast by Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic, 1705 GMT, Sept. 3, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–MEA*, Sept. 6, 1985, pp. R/2–3; also see *Pravda*, Sept. 6, 1985.

[24]Clifford D. May, "Moving Ethiopians Causes a Dispute," *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1986, pp. 1 and 4; "Today's Holocaust," editorial in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Jan. 27, 1986, p. 26.

[25]Moscow Radio, TASS in English, 1740 GMT, June 15, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, June 18, 1985, p. K/1.

[26]See articles by James LeMoyne in *The New York Times*, Jan. 10 and 12, 1986.

[27]Michael Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1985, pp. 673-84.

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CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN 1984

L—legal; O—outlawed; R—ruling; U—unrecognized

Subsaharan Africa[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	7,953,000	35,000 claimed	José Eduardo dos Santos	2nd, Dec. 2–9, 1985	R	— (1980); all 203 MPLA approved
B. Benin (PRPB)	4,015,000	No current data	Mathieu Kerekou, (Chair., CC)	2nd, Nov. 18–24, 1985	R	— (1984); all 196 PRPB approved
C. Congo (PCT)	1,798,000	9,000 est.	Denis Sassou-Ngouesso (Chair.)	3rd, July 23–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 PCT approved
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	34,483,000[e]	50,000 est.	Mengistu Haile-Mariam (Chair.)	1st (Const.), Sept. 6–10, 1984	R	n/a
1. Lesotho	1,512,000	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	7th, Nov. 1984	U[f]	(1985)
E. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	13,776,000	110,323 claimed[g]	Samora Moïsés Machel (Chair.)	4th, Apr. 26–29, 1983	R	— (1977); all 226 approved by FRELIMO
2. Nigeria (SWPP)	91,178,000	No current data	Dapo Fatogun	1st, Nov. 1978	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	537,000	7,000 claimed	Paul Vergès	5th, July 12–14, 1980	L	31.1 (1985); 11 of 45 to leftist coalition
4. Senegal (PIT)	6,755,000	No current data	Amath Dansoko	2nd, Sept. 28–Oct. 2, 1984	L	0.5 (1983); none
5. South Africa	32,465,000	No current data	Moses Mabhida	6th, Dec. 1984 (in London)	O	n/a
6. Sudan	21,761,000	9,000 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th (legal), Oct. 31, 1967	L	n/a
F. Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF)	8,667,000	No current data	Robert Mugabe (President)	5th, Aug. 8–12, 1984	R	76.0 (1985); 64 of 100 (64 0f 80 reserv. for blacks)

The Americas[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
7. Argentina	30,708,000	70,000 est.	Athos Fava	Extraordinary, Sept. 5–6, 1983	L	2.0 (1985); none (FREPU coal.)
8. Bolivia	6,195,000	500 claimed	Simón Reyes Rivera (First Secretary)	5th, Feb. 9–13, 1985; Extraord., Aug. 2–5, 1985	L	2.2 (1985); 4 of 130 (FPU coal.)
9. Brazil	137,502,000	15,000 est.	Giocondo Dias	7th (Natl. Mtg.), January 1984	L	(1982)
10. Canada	25,399,000	2,500 est.	William Kashtan	26th, Apr 5–8, 1985	L	0.5 (1984); none
11. Chile	11,882,000	20,000 est.	Luís Corvalán Lepe	16th, June 1984[h]	O	n/a

[a]Arabic numerals indicate the 95 countries in which Moscow apparently recognized the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "J" are 12 significant "revolutionary democratic" parties (a majority of them ruling)—organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

[b]Population figures are estimated totals as of July 1985, from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook—Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-five*, CR WF 85-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1985.

[c]The party secretary general or general secretary, except where some other official is the most important person, in which case his position is noted in parentheses.

[d]An em-dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses. In some cases, data from pre-1985 elections have been updated since last year's Checklist.

[e]An estimate for 1985 from Arthur S. Banks, Ed., *Political Handbook of the World 1984–1985*, Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, 1985.

[f]While the party is countenanced, it was not allowed to participate in the 1985 elections.

[g]See *African Communist* (London), Fourth Quarter, 1983.

[h]Held clandestinely in Chile and in exile.

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The Americas[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
12. Colombia	29,506,000	12,000 est.	Gilberto Vieira White	14th, Nov. 7–11, 1984	L	1.2 (1982); 3 of 199
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,655,000	3.500 est.[i]	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	15th, Sept. 15–16, 1984	L	3.2 (1982); 4 of 57 (United People's Coalition)
(PPC)		No current data	Manuel Mora Valverde	14th, Mar. 10–11, 1984	L	n/a
14. Cuba	10,105,000	434,143 claimed	Fidel Casto Ruz	2nd, Oct. 17–20, 1981[j]	R	(1981); all 499 PCC approved
15. Dominican Republic	6,588,000	750 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1984	L	7.1 (1982); none
16. Ecuador	8,884,000	500 est.	René Maugé Mosquera	10th, Nov. 27–29, 1981	L	3.6 (1984); 2 of 71 (Broad Left Front, and 4.0 to Mauge for pres.
17. El Salvador[k]	5,072,000	1,000 est.	Shafik Jorge Handal	7th, Apr. 1979	O	(1985)
F. Grenada (MBPM)	110,000	No current data	Kendrick Radix	n/a	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	333,000	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	8th, Apr. 27–29, 1984	L	– (1985) 24 of 42 to leftist coalition
19. Guatemala (PGT)	8,335,000	500 est.	Carlos González	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1984)
20. Guyana (PPP)	798,000	200 est.	Cheddi Jagan	22nd, Aug. 3–5, 1985	L	16.8 (1985); 8 of 53 elect. members
21. Haiti (PUCH)	5,762,000	350 est.	René Théodore	1st, 1979	O	(1984)
22. Honduras[l]	4,394,000	650 est.	Rigoberto Padilla Rush[m]	3rd, Mar. 1977	O	(1985)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,428,000	50 est.	Trevor Munroe	3rd, Dec. 14–21, 1984	L	Boycotted 1983 election
24. Martinique	327,000	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	8th, Nov. 12–13, 1983	L	— (1985); 7 of 46 to leftist coalition
25. Mexico (PSUM)	79,662,000	40,800 claimed	Pablo Gómez Alvarez	2nd, Aug. 9–14, 1983	L	3.2 (1985); 12 of 400
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	3,038,000	No current data	Gustavo Tablada	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984), 2 of 96
G. (FSLN)		4,000 claimed	Daniel Ortega (Coordinator, Exec. Commiss.)		R	63.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PdP)	2,038,000	35,000 claimed[n]	Rubén Darío Souza	6th, Feb. 8–10, 1980	L	— (1984); none
28. Paraguay	3,722,000	4,000 est.	Antonio Maidana (First Secretary)[o]	3rd, Apr. 10, 1971	O	(1983)
29. Peru	19,532,000	5,000 est.	Jorge del Prado Chavez	8th (Extraord.) Jan. 27–31, 1982	L	26.0 (1984); 48 of 180 to United Left coal. (6 PCP)
30. Puerto Rico	3,300,520	125 est.	Frank Irrizarry	Unknown	L	— (1984)
Suriname (RVP)	*377,000*	*100 est.*	*Edward Naarendorp*	*1st, 1981*	*L*	*n/a*
31. United States of America	238,848,000	17,500 claimed	Gus Hall	23rd, Nov. 10–13, 1983	L	0.01 (1984); none
32. Uruguay	2,936,000	7,500 est.	Rodney Arismendi	20th, Dec. 1970	L	6.0 (1984); none (in Frente Amp.)
33. Venezuela	17,810,000	4,000 est.	Alonso Ojeda Olaechea	7th, Oct. 24–27, 1985	L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195

[i]There is no good basis for judging what percent of the pre-split estimated membership of the Popular Vanguard Party joined Manuel Mora Valverde in the new Costa Rican People's Party which held a rump 14th Congress in March 1984.

[j]The 3rd Congress of the Cuban Communist Party was held in February 1986.

[k]The Communist Party of El Salvador is one of five parties comprising the Farabundo Marti National Liberation movement.

[l]One of six parties in the Honduran Revolutionary Movement (MHR).

[m]Although Padilla claims to be the leader, there is strong evidence that Mario Sosa Navarro is really in charge.

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Asia and Pacific[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
34. Australia (CPA)	15,658,000	1,000 est.	Judy Mundey	28th, Nov. 4, 1984	L	— (1984); none
(SPA)		500 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	5th, Sept. 28–Oct. 1, 1984	L	— (1984); none
35. Bangladesh	101,408,000	3,000 est.	Muhammed Farhad	3rd, Feb. 1980	L	— (1981)
36. Burma	36,919,000	3,000 claimed	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chair., CC)	3rd (last known) Nov. 1979	O	(1981)
37. China	1,041,346,000	40,000,000+ cl.	Hu Yaobang	12th, Sept 1–11, 1982	R	— (1981); all 3,202 CCP approv.
38. India (CPI)	762,507,000	478,500 claimed	C. Rajeswara Rao	12th, Mar. 21–28, 1982	L	2.7 (1984); 6 of 544
(CPM)		271,500 claimed	E.M.S. Namboodiripad	12th, Dec. 25–30, 1985	L	6.0 (1984); 22 of 544
39. Indonesia	173,103,000	2000 est.[p]	Jusuf Adjitorop (pro-Beijing), Sadiatjaya Sudiman (pro-Moscow)	7th Extraord. Apr. 1962	O	(1982)
40. Japan	120,691,000	470,000 est.	Tesuzo Fuwa (Chair., Presidium) Kenji Miyamoto (Chair., CC)	17th, Nov. 19–25, 1985	L	9.4 (1983) 26 of 511
H. Kampuchea (KPRP)	6,249,000	7,500 est.	Heng Samrin	5th, Oct. 13–16, 1985	R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(DK or KCP)		*No current data*	*Pol Pot*	*3rd, Dec. 14, 1975*	*O*	*n/a*
41. Korea, North (KWP)	20,082,000	3,000,000 cl.	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 10–15, 1980	R	100 (1982); all 615 KWP approved
42. Laos (LPRP)	3,585,000[q]	42,000 claimed	Kaysone Phomvihane (Chairman)	3rd, Apr. 27–30, 1982	R	(Dec. 1975) 46-member Sup. Peop. Assemby LPRP apptd.
43. Malaysia (CPM)	15,664,000	3,425 est.[r]	Chin Peng	1965 (last known)	O	(1984)
(MCP)[s]		*800 est.*	*Ah Leng*	*(Unknown)*	*O*	*(1984)*
44. Mongolia (MPRP)	1,912,000	80,200 claimed	Dzhambiin Batmunkh	18th, May 26–31, 1981	R	99.0 (1981) all 370 MPRP approved
45. Nepal	16,996,000	5,000 est.[t]	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd, 1961	O	n/a
46. New Zealand	3,295,000					
(CPNZ)		50 est.	Richard C. Wolfe	Jan. 26–28, 1979 (first since 1966)	L	— (1984); none
(SUP)		175 est.	George Jackson	7th, Oct. 26–27, 1985	L	0.5 (1984); none
47. Pakistan	99,199,000	200 est.	Imam Ali Nazish	Ist, 1976 (cland.)	O	(1985)
48. Philippines (PKP)	56,808,000	200 est.	Felicismo Macapagal	8th, 1980	L	(1984)
(CPP)		*15,000 est.*	*Rafael Baylosis*	*Reest. Dec. 26, 1968*	*O*	*(1984)*
49. Sri Lanka	16,206,000	6,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	12th, Jan. 27–29, 1984	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168
50. Thailand	52,700,000	1,200 est.	Virat Angkhathavorn (active leader)	5th, Feb. 1984 (clandestine)	O	(1983)
51. Vietnam	60,492,000	1,750,000 cl.	Le Duan	5th, Mar. 27–31, 1982	R	97.9 (1981); 496 of of 614; all 614 VCP endorsed

[n]Based on registration for 1984 elections; the PdP has an estimated 500 to 1,000 militants.
[o]Maidana was arrested in 1980, and Julio Rojas is acting party leader in his absence.
[p]Combined estimate for all factions, including some 250 in exile.
[q]Laotian census of 1985.
[r]The estimate for the CPM includes insurgents in Thailand, plus some 200 or so members in Singapore.
[s]A separate party seeking support from all Malaysians, not just Chinese, as in the case of the CPM.
[t]All factions—75 percent of the total is believed to be pro-Beijing or neutral.
[u]*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Jan. 9, 1986.
[v]*Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 8,1986
[w]Includes the population of East Jerusalem. Israeli Central Burau of Statistics.

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Eastern Europe and the USSR[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
52. Albania (PPSh)	2,968,000	122,000 claimed	Ramiz Alia	8th, Nov. 1–8, 1981	R	99.9 (1982); all 250 Democratic Front
53. Bulgaria	8,980,000	912,000 claimed	Todor Zhivkov	12th, Mar. 31–Apr. 4, 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 400 Fatherland Front
54. Czechoslovakia	15,503,000	1,650,000 cl.	Gustáv Husák	16th, Apr. 6–10, 1981	R	99.0 (1981): all 350 National Front
55. Germany (East) (SED)	16,701,000	2,293,289 cl.[u]	Erich Honecker	10th, Apr. 11–16, 1981	R	99.9 (1981); all 500 National Front
56. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,645,000	870,992 claimed	János Kádár	13th, Mar. 25–28, 1985	R	99.2 (1985); all 352 Pat. Peop. Front
57. Poland (PZPR)	37,236,000	2,112,191 cl.[v]	Wojciech Jaruzelski	Extraord. 9th, July 14–20, 1981	R	78.8 (1985); all 460 Fatherland Front
58. Romania	22,772,000	3,500,000 cl.	Nicolae Ceauşescu	13th, Nov. 19–22, 1984	R	97.8 (1985) all 369 Front of Soc. Dem. and Unity
59. USSR	277,930,000	18,500,000 cl.	Mikhail S. Gorbachëv	26th, Feb. 23–1981	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 CPSU approv. (71.4% CPSU members)
60. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	23,137,000	2,188,943 cl.	Vidoje Zarković (Pres. of Presidium)	12th, June 26–29, 1982	R	— (1982); all 308 Soc. Alliance (all LCY approved)

Middle East[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
I. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,792,000	120,000 claimed	Babrak Karmal	National Conf. Mar. 14–15, 1982	R	Rev. Council rule since Apr. 1978
61. Algeria (PAGS)	22,025,000	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres (First Secretary)	6th, Feb. 1952	O	(1982)
J. Bahrain (NLF/B)	427,000	Negligible	Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajajai	(Unknown)	O	n/a
62. Egypt	48,305,000	500 est.	Farid Mujahid	2nd, 1984 or early 1985	O	(1984)
63. Iran (Tudeh party)	45,191,000	1,500 est.	Ali Khavari (First Secretary)	1965	O	(1984)
64. Iraq	15,507,000	No current data	Aziz Muhammad (First Secretary)	3rd, May 4–6, 1976	O	— (1984)
65. Israel	4,255,000[w]	1,500 est.	Meir Vilner	20th, Dec. 4–7, 1985	L	3.4 (1984); 4 of 120
66. Jordan	2,794,000	No current data	Fa'iq Muhammad Warrad (First Sec.)	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
67. Lebanon	2,619,000	5,000 est.	George Hawi	4th, 1979	L	(1972)
68. Morocco (PPS)	24,258,000	2,000 est.	'Ali Yata	3rd, Mar. 25–27, 1983	L	2.3 (1984); 2 of 306
69. Palestine CP	4,500,000[x]	200 est.	Bashir al-Barghuti	1st (1984?)	U	n.a
70. Saudi Arabia	11,152,000	Negligible	Mahdi Habib	2nd, Aug. 1984	O	n/a
71. Syria	10,535,000	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakhdash	5th, May 1980	L	0.8 (1981); none
72. Tunisia	7,352,000	2,000 est.	Muhammad Harmel (First Secretary)	8th, Feb. 1981	L	0.8 (1981); none
L. Yemen, Aden (YSP)	2,211,000	26,000 claimed	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani[y]	3rd, Oct. 11–16, 1985	R	n/a

[x]Estimate by *YICA* contributor combining data on Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza, Israel, and Jordan.

[y]The checklist does not reflect the January 1986 coup in which Ali Nasir was deposed after trying to eliminate factions opposed to him.

[z]Excluding the population of West Berlin; disaggregation from *World Factbook* based on West Berlin estimate in *Political Handbook of the World 1984–1985*.

[aa]*New Worker* (London), *Oct 11, 1985, back page.*

[bb]Leonidas Kyrkos, the party chairman, is the de facto leader.

[cc]Malta Central Office of Statistics.

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Western Europe[a]	Mid-1985 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date) seats in legis.[d]
73. Austria	7,540,000	12,000 est.	Franz Muhri (Chairman)	25th, Jan. 13–15,	L	0.66 (1983); none
74. Belgium	9,856,000	10,000 est.	Louis van Geyt (President)	24th, March & Dec. 1982 (2 stages)	L	1.2 (1985); none
75. Cyprus (AKEL)	670,000	14,000 claimed	Ezekias Papaioannou	15th, May 13–15, 1982	L	27.4 (1985); 15 of 56
76. Denmark	5,109,000	10,000 est.	Jorgen Jensen (Chairman)	27th, May 12–15, 1983	L	0.7 (1984); none
77. Finland	4,894,000	50,000 claimed	Arvo Aalto (Chairman)	Extraordinary Mar. 23, 1985	L	14.0 (1983); 27 of 200
78. France	55,094,000	610,000 claimed	Georges Marchais	25th, Feb. 6–10, 1985	L	16,2 (1981); 44 of 491
79. Germany (West)	60,082,000[z]	44,500 est.	Herbert Mies (Chairman)	7th, Jan. 6–8, 1984	L	0.2 (1983); none
80. Great Britain	56,437,000	16,000 est.	Gordon McLennan	Special, May 18–20, 1985	L	0.03 (1983); none
(NCPB)		No current data	Eric Trevet (Chair., CC)	"5th," Nov. 23–24, 1985[aa]	L	n/a
81. Greece	9,966,000	42,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis (First Secretary)	11th, Dec. 15–18, 1982	L	9.9 (1985); 13 of 300
(KKE-I)		*12,000 est.*	*Yiannis Banias*[bb]	*3rd May 17–23, 1982*	*L*	*1.8 (1985); none*
82. Iceland (AB)	241,000	3,000 est.	Svavar Gestsson (Chairman)	Biennial cong., 1985	L	17.3 (1983); 10 of 60
83. Ireland	3,590,000	500 est.	James Stewart	18th, May 14–16, 1982	L	— (1982); none
84. Italy	57,149,000	1,588,376 cl.	Alessandro Natta	16th, Mar. 2–6, 1983	L	29.9 (1983); 198 0f 630
85. Luxembourg	367,000	600 est.	René Urbany	24th, Feb. 4–5, 1984	L	4.9 (1984); 2 of 64
86. Malta	332,000[cc]	200 est.	Anthony Vassallo	Extraordinary, May 18–25, 1984	L	1.0 (1981); none
87. Netherlands	14,467,000	10,000 est.	Elli Izeboud (Chairman)	29th, Mar. 1–4, 1985	L	1.8 (1982); 3 of 150
88. Norway	4,160,000	5,500 est.	Hans I. Kleven (Chairman)	18th, Mar. 30–Apr. 2, 1984	L	0.2 (1985); none
(AKP)		*10,000 est.*	*Kjersti Ericsson*	*3rd (or 4th) Dec. 1984*	*L*	*— (1985); none*
89. Portugal	10,045,000	200,753 claimed	Alvaro Cunhal	10th, Dec. 8–11, 1983	L	15.5 (1985); 38 of 250 (Unit. Peop. Alliance
90. San Marino	23,000	300 est.	Ermenegildo Gasperoni (Chair.)	10th, 1980	L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
91. Spain (PCE)	38,629,000	86,000 claimed	Gerardo Iglesias	11th, Dec. 14–18, 1983	L	3.8 (1982); 4 of 350
(PCPE)		35,000 claimed	Ignacio Gallego	1st, Jan. 13–15, 1984	L	n/a
(PCEMR)		No data	Santiago Carrillo (?)	None	L	n/a
92. Sweden (VPK)	8,338,000	17,500 claimed	Lars Werner (Chairman)	27th, Jan. 3–6, 1985	L	5.4 (1985); 19 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claimed	Rolf Hagel (Chairman)	27th, 1983	L	(1985)[dd]
93. Switzerland (PdA)	6,512,000	4,500 est.	Armand Magnin	12th, May 21–22, 1983	L	0.9 (1983); 1 of 200
94. Turkey	51,259,000	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, Oct. or or Nov. 1983	O	(1983)
95. West Berlin (SEW)	1,870,000[y]	4,500 est.	Horst Schmitt (Chairman)	7th, May 25–27, 1984	L	0.6 (1985); none

[dd]The APK withdrew from contention in the 1985 elections in order not to split the Left vote.

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LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP	Workers' Communist Party
APK	Communist Workers' Party
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist)
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army
DK	Democratic Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, also known as the Kampuchean Communist Party—KCP)
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
KKE–I	Greek Communist Party (Interior)
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party
MPLA–PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Party of Labor
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NCPB	New Communist Party of Britain
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party
PCE	Communist Party of Spain
PCEMR	Marxist Revolutionary Communist Party of Spain
PCPE	Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain
PCT	Congolese Labor Party
PdA	Party of Labor
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
PIT	Independence and Labor Party
PKP	Philippine Communist Party
PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
PdP	People's Party of Panama
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
PSUM	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico
PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
RVP	Revolutionary People's Party
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
SUP	Socialist Unity Party
SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
VPK	Left Party Communists
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
ZANU–PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front

tionary Armed Forces (FARC), but did not include the National Liberation Army (ELN). The most dramatic terrorist action of the year occurred in November, when the M-19 guerrilla group seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota. All 35 guerrillas and 64 of the hostages were killed when government troops stormed the building.

Communists in Chile also endorsed various acts of terrorism, a stance that was at variance with the position of the National Accord alliance established in September by many opposition groups. The party operates out of Buenos Aires, and its newspaper *El Siglo* purportedly is published in the "deep underground" within Chile.[28]

Communist parties supported the democratic process in Costa Rica, Brazil, and Uruguay (where a constitutional government was restored during 1985). The party in Uruguay held a national conference in December.[29] In Ecuador, the party was a minor member in a broadly based opposition front.

By contrast, the communist movement in Peru comprises the largest group in the United Left political front (IU), which holds about one-fourth of the seats in each house of parliament. The IU consists of four parties and two coalitions, plus smaller groups and individuals. Outside of Peru's orthodox communist party, the Maoist guerrillas of the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) were capable of undertaking coordinated attacks almost anywhere in the country, including the capital. Their fanaticism would appear to militate against cooperation with other movements.

The Sandinistas in Nicaragua continued to impose harsh restrictions upon the population and closed down the official radio station of the Roman Catholic Church. The Managua regime is openly aligned with Cuba and the Soviet bloc in foreign policy and is largely dependent upon these allies for weapons and other aid.[30]

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[28]TASS dispatch from Buenos Aires in *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1986, p. 4.

[29]For a report, see TASS from Montevideo, *Pravda*, Dec. 24, 1985, p. 4.

[30]AP dispatch from Managua, *The New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1986; James LeMoyne, "Most Contras to Pull Out of Nicaragua," ibid., Jan. 30, 1986, for figures.

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Asia and the Pacific. Ruling communist parties in China, Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam generally continued to pursue existing policy directions. In the case of North Korea, however, there was a perceptible warming of relations with the USSR, with 20 Soviet missions visiting the country. The Soviets have been granted liberal access to North Korean ports and transit rights for flights from the USSR to Vietnam; at the same time, the Soviet Union had promised delivery of some 50 MiG–23 fighters to Pyongyang by the end of 1985.[31]

In China, the current leadership sought to ensure a continuation of its modernization drive by instituting widespread personnel changes and by expanding its reformist policies. One-third of the Politburo, 131 Central Committee members, and more than half of the first secretaries of party organizations of provinces or autonomous regions were replaced. Some 960,000 "third-echelon" cadres of the party (in central, provincial, and municipal organizations) have also been screened in an ongoing rectification campaign, and 60,000 of them were expelled. A further screening will affect the 13.5 million cadres in local organs, large enterprises, and institutions of higher education.[32] A similar shake-up took place in the government; in the military, the number of regional commands was trimmed from 11 to 8, with new commanders named in 7 of the 8 new regions.[33]

With regard to the economy, Beijing has alternated between relaxing and tightening controls. Steps in the latter direction included the imposition of restrictions on the use of foreign exchange and a crackdown upon corruption within the party. At the same time, the leadership has reduced the degree of central planning, enlarged the scope of a flexible pricing system, and allowed the functioning of a small but energetic free-market sector.

Roughly 150,000 Vietnamese troops continue to occupy Kampuchea and to wage war against opposition forces there on behalf of the Heng Samrin regime. The Vietnamese have also had heavy artillery exchanges and border skirmishes with Chinese troops along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier.[34] At home, Hanoi is experiencing serious economic problems. The ruling party has announced its intention to pursue a massive resettlement campaign to eliminate villages by grouping farmers in 426 agro-complexes. A quarter of a million individuals would live in each, with about 25,000 of them farming an average total of 20,000 hectares of land.

Little has changed with the nonruling communist parties of Asia. In Bangladesh, the government lifted a 10-month ban on all political activities, but the opposition parties, including the pro-Soviet communist party and other Marxist groups, rejected the government's terms.[35]

In India, the Communist Party (Marxist) or CPM—the smaller of the two major Indian communist organizations—held a congress at the end of the year in Calcutta, where it reelected its long-time general secretary, E.M.S. Namboodiripad. Three separate articles in *Pravda* covered this congress, emphasizing how the CPM has supported Soviet foreign policy initiatives.[36] The CPM captured one of seven seats at stake in by-elections to parliament from Assam state in December.

In neighboring Burma, the local communist party saw its clandestine propaganda radio station—operating out of Yunnan province in China—go off the air on April 16, 1985, an apparent casualty of growing Rangoon-Beijing intergovernmental rapprochement.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) has yet to reach its target of 500,000 members despite strenuous efforts. The aged JCP official Kenji Miyamoto accused the government of responsibility for an August plane crash (in which 520 passengers—including several JCP leaders—died), and also attacked it for expanding outlays on national defense. The Japan CP is frequently critical of both the Soviet and Chinese communist parties.

In the Philippines, the New People's Army expanded terrorist activities in the countryside and simultaneously pushed "united front" tactics in metropolitan areas. Opposition leader Corazon Aquino met with jailed communist leaders and stated she would accept them into her government if she were to win the February 7, 1986, elections (a statement she later repudiated).[37] The NPA has penetrated from 5 percent (Philippine government figures) to as many as 20 percent (US intelligence) of the nation's 40,000 villages, and in the cities operates through the National Democratic Front (NDF), an umbrella organization embracing workers, women, Moro revolutionaries, Christian clergy, youth, and teachers.[38]

[31]Moscow Radio, Oct. 24, 1985; *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Oct. 7 and Dec. 26, 1985; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Sept. 26 and Dec. 26, 1985; and *Pravda*, Dec. 25, 1985, p. 4, and Jan. 22, 1986.

[32]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 14, 1985, p. 8; *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Apr. 19, 1985, p. 7.

[33]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 22, 1985, p. 45; and Beijing Zhungguo Xinwen She in Chinese, 0606 GMT, Sept. 18, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Sept. 19, 1985, p. K/18.

[34]Joseph A. Reaves, *Sunday Star-Bulletin* (Honolulu), Sept. 8, 1985; Barbara Crossette (from Hanoi), "Vietnam Reports Chinese Troops Have Stepped Up Border Attacks," *The New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1986; UPI dispatch from Beijing, "China 'Wiped Out' Vietnamese Forces," *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle*, Feb. 2, 1986, p. A/8.

[35]*Bangladesh Times* (Dacca), Jan. 18, 1985.

[36]TASS dispatches from Calcutta in *Pravda*, Dec. 26, 27, and 30, 1985.

[37]*San Francisco Examiner*, Dec. 29, 1985, pp. A/1 and A/15; cf. Manila Far East Broadcasting Co., 2300 GMT, Jan. 10, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC), Jan. 11, 1986, p. P/3.

[38]Guy Sacerdoti and Philip Bowring, "Marx, Mao and Marcos," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 21, 1985, p. 55.

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By late 1985, the number of armed insurgents in Thailand had dwindled to a few hundred (from some 12,000 in 1978) as a result of massive defections in connection with a government amnesty program. The communist party's united front efforts in the cities of Thailand have virtually been abandoned.

In May 1985, the Indonesian government executed Mohammed Munir, a member of the PKI Politburo. Three other leaders met the same fate in July. Surviving party leaders live in exile in China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern and Western Europe.

Eastern Europe and the USSR. By year's end, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union seems to be emerging from its 28-month leadership transition. After less than a year in power, Gorbachëv approached the 27th CPSU Congress with many of his enemies and rivals gone from the Politburo or Secretariat. In their place are allies (appointed by Andropov) and his own clients. Three one-time police generals were on the CPSU Politburo at the end of the year: Heydar Aliyev, Viktor Chebrikov, and Eduard Shevardnadze, but there were no army generals except for aging Minister of Defense Sergey Sokolov, who holds only candidate (non-voting) membership.

During 1985, Gorbachëv met individually with each East European party leader except for Nicolae Ceauşescu and saw all of them together on four occasions—at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko, at Warsaw ceremonies in April renewing the Warsaw Treaty Organization, at a meeting in Sofia in October, and in Prague in November on his way back from the Geneva summit meeting. In December, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance met in Moscow to launch an ambitious program for bloc cooperation in science and technology. It is not clear how much systemic diversity Gorbachëv will allow to members of the bloc.[39]

In Albania, Ramiz Alia succeeded the late Enver Hoxha and continued the long-time leader's policies, although he allowed a number of visits to the country by governmental delegations from Western Europe. On the Yugoslav front, there was no improvement in relations, largely because of the continuing issue of Yugoslavia's Albanian minority, centered in Kosovo.[40]

Another kind of ethnic issue involved Bulgaria, where extreme pressure was put on Turks to adopt Slavic names and stop speaking their native Turkish in public. Bulgaria's standard of living in general began to deteriorate, and the New Economic Mechanism underwent criticism early in the year. One full member and one candidate member of the ruling Politburo were dismissed, perhaps as scapegoats.[41]

After Gustáv Husák had conferred with Gorbachëv in Moscow, the Czechoslovak party voiced its opposition to any "market-oriented concepts." Information about the "Prague Spring" given in an interview by a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Secretariat to the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* was refuted in the Italian Communist Party's newspaper by Alexander Dubček,[42] who thereby broke a 16-year silence on those 1968 events.

In East Germany, three members left the Politburo of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED): Erich Honecker's rival Konrad Naumann was dismissed, Herbert Haeber left for "health reasons," and Defense Minister Karl-Heinz Hoffmann died. The purge of Naumann paves the way for Egon Krenz to become Honecker's heir-apparent.[43] The SED sponsored a conference in East Berlin on criteria for effective communist party work, attended by representatives from 11 movements around the world.[44]

A congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party reiterated party endorsement of the country's New Economic Mechanism, a reform which has had its ups and downs since its inauguration in 1968. The conclave was followed by the multicandidate national elections noted above.[45]

Poland today resembles Hungary after 1956 and Czechoslovakia following 1968. The communist regime has proclaimed "normalization" and the end of organized opposition. Yet the ruling Polish United Workers' Party has been able to muster only 127,000 members in the capital city of Warsaw,[46] and overall membership was down some 74,000 from the previous year. Authorities have intensified their drive against dissidents—by the end of 1985, the number of political prisoners exceeded 300 and the Roman Catholic Church was being attacked openly.[47] Despite these efforts, the regime suffered the startling

[39]See Vladimir Kusin, "Gorbachëv and Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1986, pp. 39–53.

[40]See Elez Biberaj, "Albania After Hoxha: Dilemmas of Change," ibid., November-December 1985, pp. 32–47.

[41]TASS dispatch from Sofia, "Plenum of BCP Central Committee," *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1986, p. 4.

[42]*L'Unità* (Milan), Nov. 21, 1985, pp. 1 and 18, trans. in *FBIS–EEU*, Nov. 25, 1985, pp. D/7–8.

[43]Paris radio, AFP in English, Nov. 26, 1985, in *FBIS–EEU*, Nov. 27, 1985, p. E/1; William Drozdiak, "New Leader Emerging," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 12, 1985, pp. A/1 and A/27, dispatch from East Berlin.

[44]*World Marxist Review*, September 1985, pp. 62–78.

[45]Paul Lewis, "Voter Choice in Hungary," *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1985; Budapest radio, MTI in English, 1704 GMT, Mar. 17, 1985, in *FBIS–EEU*, Mar. 18, 1985, p. F/2.

[46]Special Correspondent in Warsaw, "Fraternal Parties," *Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1986, p. 4; *Życie partii* (Warsaw), Dec. 4, 1985, pp. 3–4.

[47]Janusz Bugajski, "Poland's Anti-Clergy Campaign," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Fall 1985, pp. 157–68.

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election setback noted above.

Romania's cult of personality around the person and family of Ceauşescu has no counterpart elsewhere in Eastern Europe; at the same time, the country's economy is the weakest of the region. Although officially only 2.3 percent of the electorate voted against the regime slate in March 1985 elections, there were reports of peasant riots in December.[48]

Five years after the death of Josip Broz Tito, the man and the system have been criticized for bringing on politicoeconomic crisis in Yugoslavia. With an annual inflation rate of more than 100 percent and a foreign debt upwards of US$23 billion at year's end, the economic problems seem unsolvable. In the month of November alone, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) lost 75,000 members, mostly blue-collar workers.[49] The problem of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia's Kosovo province (77 percent of the local population) appears intractable.

The Middle East. The "communist and workers' parties" of Arab countries issued a number of pronouncements during the year. In March, TASS carried a dispatch from Beirut in which these parties addressed the situation in Lebanon—attacking both the United States and Israel and calling upon the peoples of the Middle East to activate a mass movement that would force foreign troops to leave all occupied territories. A longer statement in a similar vein appeared at mid-year; a third, in August, called for an end to the Iran-Iraq war; and a fourth urged support of Arab Palestinians against "aggressive, expansionist, and racist" Tel Aviv.[50]

In Iran, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni commuted death sentences of imprisoned leaders of the once significant Tudeh party in an effort to persuade Moscow to reduce support for Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war. This has not happened, although remnants of the Iraqi communist movement are fighting in guerrilla actions alongside Kurdish forces in the far north of Iraq. The USSR also began beaming clandestine broadcasts in Persian from Baku containing personal attacks upon Khomeyni and even calling for an armed uprising against his "despotic medieval regime."

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan claimed to have increased its membership by 25,000 since 1984,[51] but ongoing rivalry between the Parchami and Khalqi factions precipitated a gun battle at the Arg palace between army members from these factions in September. During the year, Soviet advisers attempted to shift the balance of power toward the Parchami faction, to which party leader Babrak Karmal belongs, and an estimated 118,000 Soviet troops in the country and 30,000 just across the border help maintain the leftist regime in power.[52]

Western Europe. The second conference of communist and workers' parties from the eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, and Red Sea areas took place in January at Nicosia on Cyprus. A three-and-one-half-page declaration by 14 movements plus other unnamed and presumably clandestine ones called for joint action in the region.[53] The first such conference had been held in 1981 at Athens.

Delegates from 18 West European communist parties met during the summer for two days in Paris to discuss the "economic crisis" in capitalist countries.[54] Otherwise, 1985 witnessed disunity and decline within many of these movements.

The French Communist Party (PCF) held a congress in February, where it decided to give up past attempts to forge "unity of the Left" with the Socialists. In a rare development for a Communist party, only 90 percent of the delegates voted for the leadership, and one dissenter was dropped from the Politburo.[55] The PCF also seemed to be losing its ability to mobilize members of the General Labor Confederation (CGT) to participate in strike actions. The party moved toward the March 16, 1986, parliamentary elections with only 10 percent of the electorate expected to vote for it. A former communist intellectual called the PCF's loss of electoral support "an irreversible regression."[56]

The situation in Spain is even worse, because there are now three main parties. In late April 1985, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) ex-

[48]Roger Thurow, "Balkan Paradox," *The Wall Street Journal,* Jan. 27, 1986; Ion Mihai Pacepa, "A Defector's Story," *San Francisco Chronicle,* Jan. 29, 1986, pp. C1–2.

[49]Official figures give the inflation rate as 79.5 percent and the debt as US$20 billion. AP dispatch from Belgrade, *The Wall Street Journal,* Feb. 4, 1986; Henry Kamm, "In Post-Tito Yugoslavia," *The New York Times,* Dec. 18, 1985.

[50]TASS dispatch from Beirut in *Pravda,* Mar. 22, 1985, p. 4; ibid., June 21, 1985, p. 4; TASS from Damascus, in ibid., Aug. 7, 1985, p. 5; and Moscow Radio in English, 1228 GMT, Nov. 3, 1985, in *FBIS–SOV,* Nov. 4, 1985.

[51]Special Correspondent in Kabul in *Pravda,* Jan. 16, 1986, p. 5.

[52]Craig Karp, "Afghanistan: Six Years of Soviet Occupation," US Department of State, *Special Report,* No. 135, Washington, DC, December 1985, pp. 8–10.

[53]"Consolidating Joint Action," *Information Bulletin* (Toronto, companion publication to *World Marxist Review*), April 1985, pp. 6–9.

[54]*Pravda,* June 14, 1985, p. 5; and *Le Drapeau rouge* (Brussels), June 15–16, 1985, p. 6.

[55]Pierre Juquin was the person ousted. See *Le Point* (Paris), Feb. 24, 1985; and Paris Domestic Service in French, 1600 GMT, Feb. 10, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–WEU*), Feb. 11, 1985, p. K/4.

[56]Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," loc. cit., pp. 49–54; the quotation is from James Markham, loc. cit., p. 1.

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pelled its previous leader Santiago Carrillo and removed his followers from regional party bodies. A rival pro-Soviet group, the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE), had been established in January 1984. Finally, a new "Marxist Revolutionary" Spanish Communist Party (PCEMR) was registered in October 1985 by the ousted Carrillo. The CPSU recognizes at least the first two, although Gorbachëv had only received PCPE leader Ignacio Gallego by year's end.[57]

The last of the three largest West European communist parties is the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which lost 50,000 members between 1984 and 1985.[58] More important, as a result of local elections in May 1985, the PCI no longer controls such large cities as Rome, Venice, Milan, Turin, and Parma.[59] Alessandro Natta, who succeeded the late Enrico Berlinguer as PCI leader the previous year, introduced the "leftist alternative" in an attempt to woo socialists. In mid-December, this line received the support of the PCI Central Committee, even though it probably will meet with as little success as the "historic compromise" approach of 1973–79.[60]

A situation not unlike that in Spain is brewing within the Communist Party of Finland (SKP). Parallel party organizations were formed by pro-Soviet hard-liners in 8 of 17 districts prior to the SKP's May 1985 congress. The majority prevailed, however, and the rebels were replaced by loyalists in the fall. The losers sent a delegation to Moscow toward the end of the year.[61]

The movement in Great Britain also split in mid-year. A hard-line minority was expelled and yet won control over the communist newspaper *Morning Star*.[62]

On Cyprus, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) saw itself drop from first to third place in December elections.[63] The Greek Communist Party fell below 10 percent of electoral support, thereby losing its parliamentary status as a "party." Nonetheless, it retained its 13 seats. In Portugal, the local party opted to run as part of the electoral Alliance for the Unity of the People.[64]

[57]Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," loc. cit.

[58]Interview with PCI Secretariat member Ugo Pecchiolo in *L'Unità*, Nov. 1, 1985, pp. 1 and 16, on membership losses.

[59]E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Italy's Communists Have Lost Their Grip," *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1985.

[60]Vienna, ORF Teletext in German, 0901 GMT, Dec. 11, 1985, trans. in *FBIS–WEU*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. L/1.

[61]Devlin, "The Nonruling Communist Parties," loc. cit., pp. 52–53; see also "Statement by the Committee for SKP Organizations," *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1985, p. 5. The Committee is the pro-Soviet minority.

[62]*Kabul New Times*, Dec. 24, 1985. Coverage given the NCPB in recent issues of the British communist weekly *New Worker* (London) suggests that the faction has also seized this publication.

[63]Special Correspondent in Athens, "Results of Elections," *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1985, p. 5.

[64]Special Correspondent in Lisbon, "Success of Democratic Forces," ibid., Dec. 20, 1985, p. 5. Subsequently, the Portuguese CP supported a dissident socialist, and in the presidential run-off on February 16, 1986, it swung its support to the eventual winner, former Socialist Prime Minister Mário Soares. See *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle*, Jan. 26, 1986; and *The New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1986.

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Communist Fronts in 1985

Wallace Spaulding

THE BASIC functions performed by the major communist international front organizations during 1985 did not differ markedly from those performed for many years, although—as we shall see—there was a perceptible change in the face that these fronts attempted to present to the untutored observer. As with the counterpart organizations run by the Comintern between the wars, so today's front organizations exist to perform a basic task: to unite communists with persons of other political persuasions to support, and thereby lend strength and respectability to, Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The extent of Moscow's control is evidenced by the fronts' faithful adherence to the Soviet policy line, as well as by the nature of the member organizations that have withdrawn from the fronts over time (certain pro-Western groups after the cold war began, the Yugoslav affiliates following the Stalin-Tito break, and Chinese and Albanian representatives as the Sino-Soviet split developed).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is said to control these organizations through its International Department (ID),[1] presumably through those Soviet officials who serve as full-time members of the secretariat headquarters of the various fronts. This is the case for the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). Judging by past history, it is possible to infer that it may be the Soviet vice-presidents who exercise this control function in three other major front organizations: the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW).[2]

In addition to Soviet control of each front through the ID and headquarters personnel, front activity appears to be coordinated by the WPC. This is a sensible arrangement, because the Soviets consider the "peace movement" to be the most important common action by "anti-imperialist" forces and the WPC to be the most important of the groups "based on common specific objectives of professional interests"—that is, of the front organizations.[3] A glance at the nearly 250 persons listed on the WPC's Presidential Committee reveals that they include, in addition to ID Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, one or more of the top leaders of each of the other fronts just mentioned, except for the IADL (and the latter does have a representative in the approximately 1,500 members of the World Peace Council proper).[4]

Moscow may consider an additional two organizations to be priority front groups. The first is the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP), which—like the WFTU, WIDF, AAPSO, and WFDY, but none of the other international fronts—has two Presidential Committee members.[5] The other is the Havana-headquartered Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL), which has a

[1]US House of Representatives, *The CIA and the Media*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 574.

Colonel Spaulding, USAR (ret.) is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. *The present article is a slightly revised version of Col. Spaulding's contribution to* Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1986, *forthcoming from the Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.*

[2]See Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1981 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter, volumes in this series will be identified as *YICA* with the respective year of publication), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, p. 455.

[3]*Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, November 1972, p. 103, and No. 3, February 1974, p. 101; J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1982, pp. 43–56.

[4]See WPC, *List of Members, 1983–1986*, Helsinki, pp. 7–33, 167.

[5]Ibid., p. 31.

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Table 1: Major International Communist Front Organizations, 1985

Front	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)	1957	Cairo	Unknown	87	No data
Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace[a]	1970	Ulanbaatar	Unknown	15	12
Christian Peace Conference (CPC)	1958	Prague	Unknown	No data	ca. 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)	1946	Brussels	25,000	No data	ca. 80
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)	1946	Prague	180,000	No data	120 plus
International Union of Students (IUS)	1946	Prague	10 million	120	112
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL)[b]	1966	Havana	Unknown	No data	No data
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)	1945	East Berlin	2 million	135	117
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)	1945	Budapest	150 million	ca. 270	123
World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)	1946	London	500,000	ca. 40	70 plus
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)	1945	Prague	ca. 206 million	92	81
World Peace Council (WPC)	1950	Helsinki	Unknown	No data	142 plus

[a] *Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace*, n.p., n.d., pp. 1, 5.
[b] Union of International Organizations, *Yearbook of International Organizations 1985-86*, Munich, K.G. Saur, 1985, entry C3029.

representative on the WPC Presidential Committee;[6] more important, it presumably hosted the coordinating meeting of major front organizations that took place in Havana in October 1985.[7]

Such consultative meetings of the front groups have been held with increasing frequency in recent years. Beginning in 1982, they have been at least annual events, and there were two such meetings in both 1984 and 1985 (the WPC hosted the other 1985 conclave, in Helsinki in April).

DURING 1985, the top leaders of the major international front organizations maintained a "lower profile" (at least in their capacity as front leaders), than has been the case in recent years. This has been accompanied by a concurrent effort to demonstrate and publicize greater involvement in front activities by individuals not previously so notable—apparently an attempt to enhance the credibility of the line being promoted by the fronts. This could be seen in the WPC's "No to Star Wars" appeal, which seemed the primary theme of the fronts' activities everywhere except perhaps in Latin America (where, as we shall see, the debt issue was highlighted).[8] The appeal, which pictured US President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as offensive rather than defensive and as an attempt to extend the arms race into outer space, was published in the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris) of July 5, 1985. There it was signed by 36 personalities, only one of whom was openly identified with the WPC (its president, Romesh Chandra) and only seven more of whom were identified with national peace committees affiliated with the WPC. Yet, 13 signers were actually WPC vice-presidents (i.e., are among the top 40 members of the organization), 5 were additional members of the WPC Presidential Committee (see above), and 6 more were mere members of the WPC itself.[9] This left only 11 signatories with no known WPC affiliation. This effort to cast the undertaking as "independent," should not obscure the fact that the "No to Star Wars" appeal had earlier been published as a document coming out of the March meeting of the WPC Presidential Committee in Moscow. Yet, even that meeting had stressed participation "by representatives from a wide spectrum of peace and anti-war groupings."[10] The appeal had also been endorsed by a meeting of 13 major communist front organizations in Helsinki in April.[11]

The same playing down of traditional WPC leaders could be seen in preparations for the forthcoming "World Peace Congress Devoted to the International Year of Peace" (to be held in Copenhagen in October 1986). By the time of the June-July 1985 preparatory meeting (also in Copenhagen), it appeared that World Federalist President Hermod Lannung (Denmark) would be the congress chairman.[12] Lannung is a member of the Radical Liberal Party and a traditional pacifist with no direct WPC connection. He is, however, a vice-

[6] Ibid., p. 33.
[7] *CPC Information* (Prague), Nov. 1, 1985. See also *YICA 1985*, p. 388, for earlier mention of OSPAAL's possibly growing importance.
[8] See *New Age* (New Delhi), Mar. 31, 1985; and *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Oct. 18, 1985.
[9] WPC, op. cit.; and *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 6, 1985, p. 2.
[10] *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), No. 4, 1985, pp. 1, 10.
[11] See IUS, *Secretariat Reports* (Prague), No. 4, April 1985.
[12] *Morgenavisen / Jyllands-Posten* (Arhus), Dec. 12, 1985.

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president of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF)—an extension of the WPC, whose president is also Romesh Chandra but which appears more innocuous by virtue of the involvement of relatively "clean" persons in its leadership.[13] The last congress sponsored by the WPC, the June 1983 Prague "World Congress for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War," had as a co-chairman another ILFPF vice-president, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Secretary General Edith Ballantyne (Canada); the other co-chairmen were Chandra and Czechoslovakia's vice-president on the WPC, Tomas Travnicek.[14] Although the casting of Lannung as sole chairman would seem to reflect an effort to mask more effectively Soviet/communist involvement, he told a newspaper reporter that the initiative for the Copenhagen congress had come from "rather East European–oriented" individuals.[15]

As for the prospects of any ILFPF deviation from the general Soviet line, note that the organization's January "Vienna Dialogue" gave appropriate emphasis to opposing the "militarization of space" and that the ILFPF sponsored an "International Dialogue" specifically devoted to this subject in Geneva in June. Moreover, at least three persons working with Lannung on preparations for the Copenhagen congress—Mikis Theodorakis (Greece), Luis Echeverria (Mexico), and Francisco da Costa Gomes (Portugal)—are WPC vice-presidents who had also signed the aforementioned "No to Star Wars" appeal.

The "International Peace Conference on the Pacific and Asian Regions," held in Sydney, October 24–27, 1985, was handled somewhat differently but still involved a masking process. It was technically sponsored by a "broad Australian Preparatory Committee" rather than by the WPC itself. The conference was presided over by Ernest Boatswain, and John Benson served as secretary; the fact that both are members of the WPC Presidential Committee was not mentioned.[16] Chandra, however, was cited as the WPC president when he made the conference's closing address.

Although there had been other regionally-oriented meetings involving the WPC from early September to early November 1985 (Buenos Aires, September 3–6; Guayaquil, October 21–23; and Athens, November 1–3), the Sydney session was the only one that had been mentioned in the WPC's *Peace Courier* as of the end of 1985. Perhaps it was the success of the meeting itself in enlisting "clean" participants—e.g., Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen, Mayor of Sydney Douglas Sutherland, and Australian Council of Trade Unions President Simon Crean, that prompted the publicity. Or it may have been the perceived opportunity to build on the gains made in neighboring, "nuclear-free" New Zealand (which, like Australia, had a Labour government) that made it so important in Soviet eyes. The conference expressed "strong support for New Zealand's peace initiatives and the example and leadership the New Zealand government and people have given the world peace movement." Predictably, the Sydney gathering criticized "Star Wars" and applauded Soviet peace initiatives.[17]

In the trade union field, this same sort of masking took place during the year, with the WFTU ostensibly taking a back seat to "independent" actors. A February "Conference of Asian and Pacific Trade Union Centers on Development and the New International Economic Order"—key front themes for the Third World[18]—was hosted in New Delhi, not by the WFTU but by its Indian affiliate, the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). Participation by affiliates of the socialist-oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Christian-oriented World Confederation of Labor (WCL) was stressed, even though representatives from the latter groups were submerged in a majority from WFTU–affiliated organizations.[19] Most significant in this respect, the new Asian and Oceanic Trade Unions Coordinating Committee set up by this meeting had as its president New Zealand Federation of Labor (NZFOL) President John Knox and ex–WFTU Secretary K.G. Srivastava (India) as its secretary (presumably the latter would be the "full-timer" at the committee's New Delhi headquarters.) Although Knox's union is an ICFTU affiliate, he personally served on the WPC in 1980–83 and was one of the currently non–WPC members who signed the 1985 "No Star Wars" appeal.[20] Also, WFTU Secretary General Ibrahim Zakariya (Sudan) served on the presidium of the February New Delhi conference. The meeting's advocacy of trade union "unity of action," opposition to transnational corporations, and support of "peace" were similar to positions adopted at the October meeting of the WFTU General Council in Moscow.

Consistent with the trend noted above, this latter meeting (the principal WFTU gathering in 1985) played up the participation of over 100 representatives from

[13]See *YICA 1984*, p. 429.
[14]Prague Domestic Service in Czech, 1930 GMT, June 26, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), June 27, 1983, p. D/10.
[15]*Information* (Copenhagen), Dec. 31, 1985.
[16]*Peace Courier*, No. 12, p. 6.
[17]Ibid.
[18]See *YICA 1985*, p. 389.
[19]See *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Mar. 1, 1985.
[20]On his World Peace Council affiliation, see WPC, op. cit., p. 103.

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Table 2: Meetings of Fronts in Havana in 1985 at which Debt Issue Arose

Meeting	Number of delegates	Sponsor	Date	Cuban host
Meeting on Situation of Women in Latin America and the Caribbean	200+	Continental Front of Women (FCM)	June 3–7	Vilma Espin de Castro
Fourth (org.) Congress, Federation of Latin American Journalists (FELAP)	150+	FELAP	July 5–8	Ernesto Vera
Latin American Trade Union Conference on the New International Economic Order and Foreign Debt	330±	Cuban Workers' Central (CTC)	July 15–18	Roberto Veiga
Meeting on the External Debt of Latin America and the Caribbean (for political and other "personalities")	1,200±	Cuban Foreign Ministry	July 30–August 3	Carlos Rafael Rodríguez
Latin American Youth and Student Dialogue on the Foreign Debt	600±	Cuban youth organizations	September 11–14	Carlos Lage
Latin American Press Forum on the Regional Financial Crisis	120±	Prensa Latina	September 17–19	Pedro Margolles

SOURCE: *Granma* (Havana), Weekly edition in English, June 16, July 14 and 28, Aug. 11, and Sept. 22 and 29, 1985.

non–WFTU–affiliated organizations.[21] Similarly, a new International Mineworkers Organization (IMO) was set up in September with non–WFTU Arthur Scargill (UK) as president and ex–WFTU official Alain Simon (France) as secretary general. The latter had been secretary general of the now defunct WFTU Trade Union International of Miners and Energy Workers (whose unions have now gone into the IMO). A similar "balance" was shown at the vice-presidential level, with the USSR's Mikhail Sibrenyy "offsetting" Australia's Barry Swain. Moreover, Scargill and Swain themselves can be characterized as confirmed leftists.[22] Thus, the widely touted blending of pro-Soviet and pro-Western groups in this nearly 4-million-strong Paris-centered organization appears to be heavily weighted toward the East. One might expect the WFTU's trade union internationals in fields other than mining to seek comparable "trade union unity" if they can find enough radical unions within the functional internationals of the ICFTU and/or WCL.

In retrospect, the practice of combining a radical but non–WFTU president with a secretary or "working head" who has a past history of WFTU involvement appears to have been initiated in 1982, when the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament (the "Dublin Committee") was established. The Dublin Committee's president is James Milne, who, though president of the ICFTU–affiliated Scottish Trades Union Congress, has—like Knox and Scargill—been involved in leftist affairs; he became a member of the World Peace Council in 1983 and was one of the "non–WFTU" members who attended the Moscow meeting of the WFTU's General Council in 1985.[23] Dublin Committee Secretary Brian Price (UK) apparently continued on as a WFTU official, making the situation only slightly different from the two cases just cited. In light of all this, it is not surprising that the Dublin Committee held an Asian regional session in New Delhi just after the aforementioned February Conference of Trade Union Centers in that same city (indeed, many of the same persons attended both meetings).[24]

AGAIN, the major worldwide communist fronts ostensibly took a back seat in a series of six conferences in Havana in the June–September 1985 period which were largely focused on opposition to Latin American repayment of accumulated foreign debts (see Table 2). As enunciated by Fidel Castro, this regional variant of the NIEO theme argued that Latin American nations could not possibly pay all their foreign debts, that they should not make any more payments of principal or interest, that they should form a "united front" on this issue and coordinate their economic policies in other ways, and that the creditor nations should reimburse their respective banks for the nonpayments from monies saved by a 10–12 percent cut in defense expenditures. That Castro very much took the lead here does not appear to be much of a "masking," until one remembers that the audience is a Latin American one and that the Cuban leader is likely to have more credibility and respect from this group than would some official of a worldwide front or-

[21]See *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Oct. 18, 1985.

[22]See, e.g., *The Washington Times*, Sept. 24, 1985. This source noted that Scargill had taken his National Union of Miners out of the Western-oriented Mineworkers International Organization in 1983.

[23]WPC, op. cit., p. 85; and *Morning Star* (London), Oct. 8, 1985. *The Times* (London), Apr. 15, 1975, characterized Milne as an outright communist.

[24]*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Mar. 8, 1985.

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ganization widely known to be dominated by the Soviets.

The tone for the whole effort was set in Castro's March 21 interview with Mexico City daily *Excelsior*. The salience of the interview is suggested by the broad play it received in pro-Moscow media.[25] The six Havana conferences were openly dominated by Castro, who attended most of their sessions, formally addressed them, gave press conferences in connection with them, and informally mixed with their delegates during session recesses. Even though the first two of these conferences had not been called primarily to discuss the debt issue, Castro's presence insured that the debt issue would receive paramount attention.[26]

Several additional points should be noted here. First, Vilma Espin de Castro, Ernesto Vera, and Roberto Veiga—vice-presidents of the WIDF, the IOJ, and the WFTU, respectively—hosted the first three of these meetings in their capacities as leaders of the Cuban national affiliates of the pertinent international fronts.[27] Similarly, although three session chairman of the trade union meeting were WFTU officers and two chairman of the "personalities" meeting were associated with the WPC, they were identified in their national capacities only.[28] Also, Cuba's IOJ vice-president Vera participated in the press forum only in his national capacity.[29] It was only in the youth meeting that session chairmen were publicized in their international front capacities—IUS Secretary Victor Paredes (El Salvador) and WFDY Vice-president Jore Prigoshin (Argentina).[30] On the other hand, those associated with moderate or even conservative organizations were also given prominent roles, and their political orientation was emphasized (e.g., Workers Central of Venezuela leader César Olarte at the trade union meeting, ex-President of Colombia Alfonso Lopez Michelson at the "personalities" one, and Jorge Cahve of Venezuela's *Elite* magazine at the press forum).[31] And certain categories of persons were sometimes played up to give the meeting the appearance of "balance," most notably Christian and Indian leaders at the youth conference.[32] All in all, the series of Havana meetings had a rather broad-based appearance (an appearance that approximated reality only in the case of the "personalities" meeting).[33]

Castro was notably polite toward and even complimentary of those at these conferences who propounded solutions to the debt problem that contrasted with his own (most dramatically in the case of the views expressed by Ecuadorean presidential representative Julio Emanuel at the "personalities" meeting). Morever, Castro's government has been quite correct and conventional in its dealings with Cuba's Western creditors.[34] The Soviet Union, too, while publicizing Castro's debt solutions and crediting the Havana conferences with "arousing enormous interest" and Castro with influencing Third World leaders on the subject,[35] nevertheless also gave favorable publicity to the efforts of Latin American governments to settle the debt problem along less radical lines.[36]

Reaction of the international communist fronts varied. The WFTU endorsed the "Havana Appeal" that emerged from the trade union meeting: this called for annulment, *or* a moratorium, *or* immediate suspension of payments, *or* indefinite postponement of payment—i.e., essentially a "no-payment-now" solution that was consonant with Castro's proposal and was also supported on October 23 by a coordinated day of Latin American trade union rallies, demonstrations, and strikes.[37] By contrast, the IOJ Presidium at its meeting in July in Quito (the principal gathering of the organization during the year) did little more than suggest that individual debtor nations renegotiate their loans, despite the gathering's Latin venue.[38] On balance, it would appear that the whole effort on the debt issue from the perspective of the communist international fronts was directed more toward mobilizing Latin American opinion against the United States, the "North" in general, and the allegedly US international financial tools (the World

[25]Moscow TASS, Mar. 28, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 29, 1985, pp. K/1–2; *Information Bulletin* (Prague), No. 13, 1985; and *New Perspectives*, No. 4, 1985. The subject also was taken up by meetings in June of various other Latin American regional fronts—The Trade Union Unity Committee of Central America in Managua, The Latin American Continental Students Organization in Bogota and Santiago de Cuba, and The Latin American University Professionals in Quito (The latter two organizations are represented on the WPC directly, while the first is represented thereon indirectly through its parent organization, the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin America [CPUSTAL]). See WPC, op. cit., p. 168; and *New Perspectives*, No. 6, 1985, p. 2. The debt issue was also mentioned, though not centrally, in a statement issued in Havana on May 31 by the leaders of two other regional fronts, AAPSO and OSPAAL (again, both represented on the WPC).

[26]See *Granma* (Havana—daily in Spanish), June 6, 1985, and *Granma* (Havana—weekly in English), July 14, 1985.

[27]*Granma* (weekly), June 16 and July 14 and 28, 1985; *YICA 1984*, pp. 429, 430, 432.

[28]Ibid., July 28, 1985; 10th WFTU Congress, *Appeal and Resolutions*, n.p., n.d., pp. 50–57; *Granma* (daily), Aug. 4, 1985; and WPC, op. cit., pp. 10, 57.

[29]*Granma* (daily), Sept. 18, 1985.

[30]Ibid., Sept. 14 and 16, 1985.

[31]*Granma* (weekly), July 28, Aug. 11, and Sept. 29, 1985.

[32]*Granma* (daily), Sept. 13, 14, and 16, 1985.

[33]*Granma* (weekly), Aug. 11, 1985.

[34]*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Aug. 16, 1985.

[35]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 21, 1985.

[36]See, e.g., *New Times* (Moscow), No. 41, October 1985, pp. 20–24.

[37]*Granma* (weekly), July 28; *Granma* (daily), Oct. 18, 1985; *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 8, 1985.

[38]*The Democratic Journalist* (Prague), September 1985, p. 5.

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Bank and the International Monetary Fund), than it was toward reaching any specific practical solution to the problem.

THE FRONTS experienced some setbacks in their efforts during 1985. For example, Soviet Peace Committee Secretary Grigory Lokshin described the "harm" done the peace movement by the "lying and damaging concept of 'equal responsibility of both super-powers' for the arms race and for the threat of war," the linking of the peace movement to the campaign for civil liberties in Eastern Europe, and the recognition of the "unofficial" peace movements of that area, which stressed both these themes.[39] He was referring to the line pursued by European Nuclear Disarmament (END). Indeed, it was END's decision to invite "unofficial" peace movements to its Fourth Convention in July at Amsterdam that was cited as the reason for the refusal of the official Soviet-bloc peace organizations to attend the meeting.[40] Nevertheless, the USSR was doubtless gratified that END announced at Amsterdam that—despite having failed to prevent the emplacement of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe—it would try to prevail upon the nations of that area to refrain from cooperating in the "Star Wars" program.[41]

The biggest front meeting of the year—the 12th World Youth Festival, which met in Moscow from July 27 through August 3—had mixed results. Although admittedly initiated by the WFDY and IUS, the huge gathering (some 20,000 foreign and 2,000 Soviet delegates attended) tried to project the image of a pluralistic gathering manifesting broad-based consensus in support of Soviets views.[42] But, both the Yugoslavs and the Democratic Youth Committee of Europe openly criticized the Soviets for dominating the Festival's organization.[43] Also, many Western delegates were critical of the fact that they had either been prevented from bringing literature into the USSR or had been kept from distributing what they had managed to bring in,[44] despite prior assurances from Festival authorities.[45] Then, there were objections by various national groups: for example, West Germans complained over an initial decision to recognize a separate West Berlin delegation, again contrary to agreement.[46]

Most important, there was anger that Soviet interpreters omitted any criticisms of Soviet policies in their translations of foreign delegates' speeches.[47] The greatest furor in this regard arose over excision of criticism of Soviet policy in Afghanistan from translation of the statement by Swedish delegate Katrina Larsson.[48] Indeed, the Afghan issue caused trouble across the board: reportedly, some 60 persons (even including communists) from Norway, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, as well as Sweden, criticized the Soviets on this point.[49]

The Soviet press gave the Festival only mild praise, stating merely that the gathering had furthered the unification of youth against the "aggressive policies of imperialism."[50] More significant, at the November 2 plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (the Soviet communist youth organization), one of the Komsomol secretaries complained about the ineffectiveness manifested by "certain" Soviet youth in debating with their foreign contemporaries at the Festival, and specifically alluded to the Afghan issue in this context. Some observers cite the Festival events as contributing to the subsequent dismissal of Aleksandr Kolyakin as Komsomol secretary for ideology.[51]

SEVERAL developments with regard to the leadership of the major fronts should be noted. In the WPC, where Romesh Chandra (India) remains president, there has been no replacement named for Frank Swift, who gave up his post as executive secretary to return to union work in the United Kingdom. New WPC vice-presidents noted during 1985 were: Orlando Fundora Lopez (Cuba) and Rubens Iscaro (Argentina); new secretaries identified were Kvetoslav Ondraček (Czechoslovakia) and Djanghir Atamali (a second one from the USSR).[52]

Sandor Gaspar (Hungary) and Ibrahim Zakariya (Sudan) continue as president and secretary general, respectively, of the WFTU. Freda Brown (Australia)

[39]See *Today's Peace Movement—A Few Problems and Perspectives*, Vienna, International Institute for Peace, 1985, pp. 23–26.

[40]See statement by Soviet WPC Secretary Tair Tairov in *Disarmament Campaigns* (The Hague), July-August 1985, p. 8. On similar difficulties presented the Soviet-bloc delegates at END's 1984 convention in Perugia, see *YICA 1985*, p. 389.

[41]*The Times* (London), July 8, 1985.

[42]*Political Affairs* (New York), October 1985, p. 16; *Novosti*, July 19, 1985, cited in Sergei Voronitsyn, "The Moscow Youth Festival: A Summing Up," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), No. RL 282/85, Sept. 2, 1985.

[43]Voronitsyn, loc. cit.

[44]Elizabeth Teague, "Post-Mortem on Youth Festival Reveals Flaws in Komsomol's Ideological Work," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research*, No. RL 376/85, Nov. 12, 1985.

[45]BBC Caris Report No. 99/85, June 24, 1985.

[46]*Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, England), Aug. 7, 1985, p. 2.

[47]Teague, loc. cit.

[48]Stockholm International Service in Swedish, 1000 GMT, July 30, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), July 31, 1985, p. P/1; and *Daily Gleaner* (Kingston), Aug. 25, 1985.

[49]*Daily Gleaner*, Aug. 25, 1985; and Teague, loc. cit.

[50]Voronitsyn, loc. cit.

[51]Teague, loc. cit.

[52]*New Perspectives*, No. 5, 1985, pp. 1–2.

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and Mirjam Vire-Tuominen (Finland) remain president and secretary general, respectively, of the WIDF.

The WFDY continues under the leadership of President Walid Masri (Lebanon) and Secretary General Vilmos Cserveny (Hungary), but has new vice-presidents Cesar Navarro (Chile), Abd-al-Basit Musa (Sudan), and Francisco Moya (Cuba) and new secretaries Vladimir Johannes (Czechoslovakia) and Henrik Andersen (Denmark). Another WFDY Secretary Joe Sims (US) has apparently left his position, and no replacement has been identified.[53]

Ahmad Hamrush (Egypt) was not confirmed in the AAPSO presidency,[54] and Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn (Iraq) is now listed as acting president as well as secretary general of that organization.[55] Abd-al-Muhammad Wahhab al-Zintani (Libya) and Vital Balla (Congo) were newly noted as AAPSO vice-presidents during 1985.[56] The IUS, led by President Miroslav Stepan (Czechoslovakia) and Secretary General Georgios Michaelides (Cyprus), has a new Soviet vice-president in the person of Sergey Chelnikov and two newly noted secretaries, Philip Gardner (US) and Victor Paredes (El Salvador).[57] WFSW Secretary General John Dutton died during the year and was replaced by Reginald Bird (UK). O.M. Nefedov is the new Soviet vice-president of WFSW, while Jean-Marie Legay (France) remains its president.[58] President Kaarle Nordenstreng (Finland) and Secretary General Jiři Kubka (Czechoslovakia) still hold the top jobs in the IOJ, while Lodongiin Tudev (Mongolia) and Manuel Tome (Mozambique) are new IOJ vice-presidents.[59]

The (Sixth) All-Christian Peace Assembly, which met in July, left in place the three top leaders of the CPC—President Karoly Toth (Hungary); the Continuation Committee chairman, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia (USSR); and Secretary General Lubomir Mirejovskiy (Czechoslovakia). Georgiy Goncharev (USSR) and Christoph Schmauch (US) joined incumbent Alfred Christian Rosa (Sri Lanka) as deputy secretaries general of the CPC.[60] New CPC vice-presidents noted since the Assembly were: Metropolitan Pankriti of Stan Zagora (Bulgaria), Dr. Alexey Buyevskiy (USSR), Hans Joaquim Oeffler (FRG), and Alice Wimer (US).[61]

The IADL remains under the leadership of President Joe Nordmann (France) and Secretary General Amar Bentumi (Algeria), while the Ulan Bator–based ABCP is led by its President, Khambo Lama Khatkhuu Gaadan and its Secretary General, Prof. Ch. Judger, both of Mongolia.[62] Susumu Ozaki (Japan) apparently remains president of OSPAAL, and Rene Anillo Capote (Cuba) is its new secretary general.[63]

[53] *WFDY News* (Budapest), No. 10, 1985, p. 4.
[54] See *YICA, 1985,* p. 390.
[55] Domestic Service in Anharic (Addis Ababa), 1900 GMT, Oct. 11, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East & Africa* (Washington, DC), Oct. 16, 1985, p. R/1.
[56] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 21, 1985.
[57] *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), No. 11, 1985, p. 53; *World Student News* (Prague), No. 1, 1985, p. 27; and *Granma* (daily), Sept. 14, 1985.
[58] *Flashes from the Trade Unions,* May 17 and Aug. 30, 1985; and *Népszabádsag* (Budapest), Nov. 5, 1985.
[59] *The Democratic Journalist,* Nos. 7-8, 1985, p. 2.
[60] *CPC Information,* July 12, 1985.
[61] Ibid., Sept. 2, Oct. 2, and Nov. 19, 1985.
[62] WPC, op. cit., p. 105.
[63] *New Perspectives,* No. 6, 1985, p. 2.

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Books

East German Quest for Legitimacy

Angela E. Stent

MARTIN McCAULEY. *The German Democratic Republic Since 1945*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

DAVID CHILDS. *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*. London, Allen and Unwin, 1983.

KLAUS VON BEYME and HARTMUT ZIMMERMANN, Eds. *Policymaking in the GDR*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984.

EBERHARD SCHULZ, HANS-ADOLF JACOBSEN, GERT LEPTIN and ULRICH SCHEUNER, Eds. *GDR Foreign Policy*. Edited and introduced by Arthur Stahnke. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1982.

THE German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a state on the dividing line between East and West, whose political development over the past 15 years has provided a barometer of the changing climate in East-West relations. Until recently, however, it was explored almost exclusively in studies by experts from West Germany, while being virtually ignored by scholars writing in English. In the United States, East Germany was a social science orphan with no field willing to accept it as part of its own. For scholars of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it seemed too Western; for experts on Germany it was too much of a Soviet clone. Suspended between Bonn and Moscow, isolated for two decades, dismissed by some as a non-state, the GDR received scant or biased attention.

The picture has changed considerably in recent years. Several books written in English or translated from German into English have appeared, deepening our knowledge of the GDR and placing it in a comparative political perspective. The four volumes reviewed in this essay are representative of this trend. They provide a factual and analytical framework for understanding East Germany's domestic and foreign policy, and they offer the mainstream consensus on the GDR. Two are written by Englishmen—Martin McCauley and David Childs; the other two, the von Beyme/Zimmermann and the Schulz et al. volumes, are collective studies by leading West German experts in the field that were translated into English. Unfortunately, the German works, particularly the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume, suffer from careless editing[1] and uneven translation, with the text at times reading more like German than English. Nonetheless, these two books offer valuable insights into the society and politics of the GDR, provided that the reader is willing to tackle their somewhat indigestible prose.

McCauley's work is a historical treatment of four decades of social and political developments in the GDR, with a useful 70-page chronology at the end. Although its narrative is interspersed with some illuminating analytical points, any overall interpretation of GDR history seems to be left to the reader. David Childs's book combines factual history with analysis and deals well with the major issues of GDR politics and society. His book is not only livelier than McCauley's, but also does a better job of conveying the flavor of life in the GDR; in fact, it is the best of the four in capturing the varied textures and shadings of contemporary East German life.

The von Beyme/Zimmermann volume (which has an excellent 80-page bibliography) provides little historical context. In contrast to the volumes by the English authors,

Angela E. Stent is Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Russian Area Studies Program at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). She has written numerous articles on Soviet policy toward West and East Germany. She is the author of From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German–Soviet Relations, 1955–80 *(1981), and the editor of* Economic Relations with the Soviet Union: American and West German Perspectives *(1985). She is currently working on a book about Soviet policy toward the Western Alliance since 1969.*

[1]For example, the affiliation of Dr. Jacobsen is identified as the Foundation for Science and Politics in Ebenhausen, Saarland. Ebenhausen is in Bavaria.

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which deal solely with East Germany, *Policymaking in the GDR* analyzes that country from a comparative perspective. It tries to apply Western social science theories—for instance, systems theory, cybernetics, and Weberian sociology—to the GDR. As a result of this comparative approach, the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume highlights different aspects of East German society than those emphasized by McCauley and Childs. Class, economic decision-making, and "output policy" are discussed in terms that stress the similarities between East Germany and other advanced industrial societies rather than the uniqueness of the GDR. Finally, the Schulz et al. volume, an abridged version of a much larger book in German,[2] offers a comprehensive treatment of East German foreign policy, and constitutes the best English-language account on the subject to date.

All the books under review shed light on three central issues in the study of East Germany: the regime's struggle for legitimacy and the degree to which the 1970's period of *détente* has helped to legitimize the East German government at home and abroad; the extent to which East Germany has been able to establish a viable national identity in the same period; and the impact of détente on East Berlin's relations with Moscow and Bonn.

CENTRAL TO ALL these studies is the issue of GDR legitimacy. While many Western scholars question to what degree East European populations recognize the legitimacy of their own governments, the consensus is that a historic consciousness of nationhood by Poles, Czechs, or Hungarians endows their respective governments with some degree of legitimacy. East Germany, however, is different in this regard. As McCauley notes, "While the power of the state is great, the authority or legitimacy is low" (p. 4). One reason for this is the fact that East Germans *do not have a clear historical legacy*. While there certainly is a *German* history, there is no distinct *East* German past prior to World War II.

But how could the East German government have expected to secure legitimacy, given the fact that until 1974 the East German constitution included a commitment to the *reunification of the two Germanies*? Until that time, in fact, the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) officially regarded East Germany's separate status as temporary. As a result, the SED's search for acceptance from the East German population was burdened by contradictions; at the same time, the SED's *search for international recognition* was complicated by the West's ostracism of the GDR. From the start, therefore, the regime faced a two-front struggle for recognition, one at home and the other abroad.

In their studies, Childs and McCauley divide the history of the East German struggle for legitimacy[3] prior to the inter-German rapprochement of December 1972 and Bonn's recognition of the East Berlin regime into three major periods. The first, from 1945 to 1953, was marked by the founding of the state, the forced merger of the East German *Social Democratic* (SPD) and Communist (KPD) parties into the ruling SED,[4] and Soviet economic exploitation of the GDR (whereby East Germany paid substantial reparations to the USSR and thereby lost much of its remaining industrial capacity). The second, from 1953 to 1961, saw the beginning of East Germany's economic recovery and the SED's consolidation of power.[5] During the third period, from 1961 to

[2]Eberhard Schulz, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Gert Leptin, and Ulrich Scheuner, Eds., *Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Three Decades of the GDR's Foreign Policy), Munich-Vienna, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979.

[3]The GDR's *Legitimationsdefizit* can be traced to its ambiguous origins. In 1945, none of the victors had a plan for Germany. The initial arrangement of dividing Germany into zones was considered a temporary solution. But Germany quickly became both a cause and a victim of the Cold War. Before the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France were ready to contemplate seriously the future of Germany, accommodation between Stalin and the West had become impossible and Germany remained divided. Invoking a simplistic, revisionist explanation, McCauley claims that Western fears of Soviet expansionism at that time were "greatly exaggerated" and that containment "promised to provide the overseas markets necessary for the expansion of the US economy" (p. 33). He neglects entirely Stalin's role in bringing about the Cold War and the extent to which his imposition of pro-Soviet regimes on a reluctant Eastern Europe was perceived by the United States government to be a breach of the Yalta agreement that could have presaged further Soviet expansion into Western Europe. McCauley asserts that "the Soviets would have preferred to reach an agreement with the Allies on an all-German reunification" (*The German Democratic Republic Since 1945*, p. 44). His assertion is not supported by evidence. David Childs's conclusion that "few in Washington, London or Paris were enthralled by the prospect of German reunification," is probably more correct (*The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, p. 45). One might add Moscow to that list. Despite all that the Soviets wrote and said, the evidence indicates that the Soviets too did not favor a reunified Germany, even one under their control—at least so Anastas Mikoyan was to claim later on. See Hubert Ripka, *Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1950, p. 134.

[4]At the time of the merger (1946), the SED was still a mass party, with more Social Democrats in its ranks than Communists. After Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the SED became a Soviet-type party, and those still professing social democratic values were purged.

[5]During this period the exploitative Stalinist policy of reparations was terminated and the GDR's economy began to revive. Walter Ulbricht, whom McCauley describes as a "reluctant de-Stalinizer" began to consolidate the power and authority of the SED. Yet his ability to create a viable state was constantly challenged by the existence of an open frontier in Berlin, through which 2.7 million East Germans "voted with their feet" for West Germany between 1949 and August 13, 1961, the date marking the construction of the Berlin Wall. The Wall stemmed the flood of refugees to the West and ultimately enabled the SED to stabilize its rule. It began to build a viable nation-state, a process facilitated by its stronger economic ties with West Germany.

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1971, the East German "economic miracle" was brought about as the country's per capita GNP rose to the ninth highest in the world.[6]

The East German leadership employed various means in its pursuit of domestic legitimacy before 1972. Of central importance was the quite successful effort to improve the material quality of life, thus demonstrating the state's ability to meet the basic economic needs of its citizens. The GDR now has the highest standard of living of any CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance) country. McCauley and Childs each also stress the importance of the GDR's success in international sporting events as a way of advertising the superiority of the East German government and the socialist system, as well as of gaining international recognition.

Other efforts of the German Democratic Republic to win domestic recognition met with less success. The regime sought, for example, to develop a distinct socialist culture of its own, but failed in its efforts to mobilize full support from the intelligentsia, in particular that of the key artists and writers. Unlike the majority of the leading political figures in the GDR (who spent the war years in the USSR), most of these intellectuals had emigrated to the West during the Nazi period. Upon their return, they were unwilling to accept the norms of Soviet socialist realism, even though many of them professed to be communists. For a number of years they maintained an uneasy coexistence with the regime, but ultimately refused to accept the party's various political restrictions on art and literature. The SED also tried to increase popular approval through a reconciliation with the churches, or through the formation of four non-communist parties which, though subordinate to the SED, were to provide a limited legal forum for alternative activity.

THE BASIC TREATY (*Grundvertrag*)[7] between the two Germanies in 1972 redefined the nature of East Germany's quest for legitimacy and posed new challenges. While recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) considerably bolstered the legitimacy of the GDR, it also brought with it the danger of greater West German penetration of East German society. Perhaps the most vivid example has been the "nightly emigration" to the West that takes place in the majority of East German living rooms where at least 85 percent of the country's citizens watch West German television. Not only can they follow the exploits of the Ewing family on *Dallas*, they can also see West German news and political programs that contradict the official government version of political reality.

In other respects as well, the rapprochement with West Germany represents a potential challenge to the stability of the regime. East Germans are allowed to hold West German currency and use it to shop in the hard-currency Intershops. However, one's ability to acquire FRG marks does not depend on one's productivity at work; it is solely a function of having relatives in the Federal Republic. As Childs notes, this means that the GDR is "divided into two classes—those with, and those without West marks" (p. 146). This calls into question the guiding principle of developed socialism: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

The rapprochement with West Germany has challenged the SED in still other areas, perhaps most notably in the party's policy on religion, since it sanctions contacts between the churches of East and West Germany. As Childs shows, the Federal Republic now indirectly finances a variety of hospitals, old-age homes, and kindergartens in the GDR through monies given by the West German Catholic and Protestant churches to their counterparts in the East (p. 93). This has helped to legitimize religious worship more than the SED might have wanted. Moreover, contacts between West German and East German religious groups that criticize the arms race, have also facilitated the growth of an independent East German peace movement critical of both the USSR and the United States.

The GDR's response to the dangers arising from West German influence has been an intensification of the policy of *Abgrenzung* (inadequately translated as "demarcation").[8] In practice, this has meant an effort to insulate the East German population from the potentially de-

[6]The GDR has virtually copied the Soviet economic system; it even has its own version of the Kosygin reforms (the New Economic System). During the 1960's and 1970's East Germany's economic performance was more impressive than that of the USSR, although this impressive performance has not been fully reflected in the level of the standard of living.

[7]The Basic Treaty between East and West Germany was signed in November 1972. The treaty normalized intra-German relations. It neither contained Bonn's formulation of "one German nation" nor referred specifically to the GDR's sovereignty. The West Germans had demanded "special relations" with East Germany, but the GDR insisted that their relations be those between two independent states. Finally, a compromise was reached whereby the FRG did not recognize the GDR in international law, adopting the formula of "two states in one nation" and the two countries agreed to exchange "permanent representatives" instead of ambassadors. Both countries applied to join the United Nations and were accepted in 1973.

[8]The policy of *Abgrenzung* vis-à-vis West Germany dates back to the late 1960's when it was first introduced by Walter Ulbricht in the hopes of establishing a separate East German identity by stressing the ideological differences between the two Germanies. (See Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, pp. 90–91.) In 1971, after relations with West Germany were normalized, East Germany's Erich Honecker intensified this policy.

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stabilizing effects of closer government-to-government relations between the two Germanies. Members of the army (NVA) have been forbidden to have contacts with West Germans. Strenuous attempts have been made to distinguish East German from West German society by contrasting the difficulties of life under competitive capitalism with its high unemployment with that of *gemütlich* socialism with full employment. A special television program called "The Black Channel" has been created to counter the claims of some West German programs (Childs, p. 240).

Has *Abgrenzung* been a success? The answer is unclear. As all the authors stress, the East German system today is stronger than it was before 1972 and has gained greater popular acceptance. It has dealt with the West German challenge by forcing "undesirable" critics like the popular singer Wolf Biermann and the philosopher Rudolf Bahro to move to the Federal Republic, and it has also allowed increasing numbers of disgruntled citizens—35,000 in 1984—to emigrate to the West.[9] There has also been an increase in cultural repression, as is well documented by McCauley (p. 186) and by Irma Hanke (p. 233) in the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume. To some extent, then, *Abgrenzung* has worked. The GDR has not been undermined by the inter-German rapprochement. Indeed, some would argue that it has been strengthened, a point to which I shall return later. Arthur Stahnke is most optimistic in this regard, criticizing in his introduction to *GDR Foreign Policy* some of the other contributors for underestimating "the level of popular support for the GDR political system" (p. ix).

[9]The German Information Service, New York.

WHILE VARIOUS AUTHORS may disagree about just how much domestic legitimacy the GDR has secured for itself, they all seem to agree that the regime has gained significant international acceptance since 1972, and that this in turn has had some impact on the domestic situation. Prior to West Germany's recognition of East Germany, the only states that recognized the GDR were the other members of the Warsaw Pact and a few Third World countries. Such limited recognition was the result of the Hallstein Doctrine (in effect from 1957 to 1967),[10] which claimed that the Federal Republic of Germany was the sole representative of the German nation. Under the terms of this doctrine, any state that recognized East Germany could not have diplomatic relations with the FRG. Forced to choose between West and East Germany, most nations chose the former. The GDR retaliated with its own Ulbricht Doctrine, claiming that the GDR would not establish diplomatic relations with any nation that recognized the Federal Republic. This tactic proved to be of little consequence, however, and the GDR remained an international outcast for some 23 years.

As Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen demonstrates in his contribution to the von Beyme/Zimmermann volume, East Germany used foreign trade in its battle against the Hallstein Doctrine during its years out in the cold. In the 1950's and 1960's, the country's foreign economic relations were primarily oriented toward gaining political acceptance—an objective that was best served by creating bilateral ties that fell just short of full diplomatic recognition. Ultimately, however, the two functions of foreign trade—"to achieve international recognition (this entailed a readiness to use economic resources which were urgently needed at home) and to support the production process in the GDR"—came into conflict (p. 151).

Ironically, the Basic Treaty of 1972, while enabling the GDR to achieve a greater international stature, deprived it of the one form of legitimacy it had sought most: de jure recognition as a separate state by the Federal Republic. As Melvin Croan (in Schulz et al., p. 209) and Gerhard Wettig (in von Beyme/Zimmermann, p. 283) stress, the *Grundvertrag* between East and West Germany represented a compromise, a modus vivendi, with an agreement to disagree on some issues.[11] The same was true of the 1971 Four-Power Berlin agreement,[12] as Hans-Heinrich Mahnke points out in his comprehensive chapter on the legal aspects of the Berlin issue in the Schulz et al. volume (pp. 87–93). For East Germany, West Germany is a foreign country. For West Germany, however, East Germany is a separate state within the same nation. Although the GDR derives significant economic benefits from this special

[10]The *Alleinvertretungsanspruch*—the claim of West Germany to speak for the whole of Germany because East Germany was an illegitimate state—was concretely implemented in the form of the Hallstein Doctrine. It was first enunciated by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949–63).

[11]The treaty normalized intra-German relations on the basis of the status quo and the signatories agreed to disagree on the question of the GDR's sovereignty. See also fn. 7.

[12]The Four Power Berlin Agreement was initialed on September 3, 1971. The main points of the agreement were that, in the interests of reducing tension in Berlin, the USSR would ensure unimpeded access to Berlin from West Germany, and West Berlin could maintain and develop its special ties with the FRG, although West Berlin was not a constituent part of West Germany. The Four Powers agreed to disagree on the question of West Berlin's status, because the Western powers maintained that the agreement should cover the whole city, whereas the USSR claimed it could apply only to West Berlin. For the text of the agreement see Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Die Berlin Regelung* (The Berlin Regulation), 1971, pp. 157–71.

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position, politically its status has been a thorn in the side of the regime, a constant reminder that Bonn refuses to treat the GDR as an equal nation-state.

Nevertheless, recognition by the Federal Republic did enable the GDR to gain international diplomatic acceptance. FRG de facto recognition meant that other states could now establish relations with both Germanies. As Eberhard Schulz notes in his chapter in *GDR Foreign Policy*, "conducting an active and convincing foreign policy" has enabled the GDR regime to increase its domestic legitimacy (p. 20). Since 1972, the GDR has gained membership in the United Nations, established diplomatic ties with almost all nations, actively pursued economic, political, and cultural ties with Western Europe, and greatly increased its presence in the Third World, providing logistical and technical assistance to those countries in which the USSR is heavily involved.

One significant aspect of the GDR's quest for international legitimacy not addressed in these books is the question of East German ties with the United States. But this has only recently become an issue; until a few years ago, the United States paid very little attention to the GDR. This was due in part to the GDR's close relationship to the Soviet Union and a US perception of it as the most loyal Soviet ally carrying out Moscow's bidding around the world and fencing in its population with the most heavily fortified border in the world. It was also due in part to deference to the Federal Republic, which took responsibility for conducting relations with East Germany and was uneasy that other Western nations might increase the GDR's legitimacy by dealing with it as an equal. In the early 1980's, when it became clear that the GDR was interested in preserving the fruits of improved relations with West European states—despite deteriorating United States–Soviet relations—the United States changed its stance and initiated more high-level contacts with the GDR as part of its policy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe. While discussions on US–GDR relations continue, any improvement in them will depend to some extent on East Germany's settlement of the wartime claims for compensation by American citizens and groups. Indeed, one factor that has complicated the GDR's acceptance in the West has been its refusal to pay reparations to the victims of Nazism residing in the West. West Germany has taken on the entire burden for compensating various individuals and the State of Israel.[13]

THE GDR'S REFUSAL to accept the Third Reich as part of its historical legacy is but one facet of the more general problem of coming to terms with the past and forging an East German national identity. McCauley argues that prior to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 there was tension between the Soviet and German traditions in the GDR. In order to develop a modicum of stability, the East German regime felt the need to stress the Soviet aspects of its system. After the building of the Wall, however, the GDR felt more secure about turning to German traditions in order to forge a national identity. Indeed, some would argue that the GDR has preserved German, particularly Prussian, characteristics much more than the Federal Republic has. Traditional Germany is alive and well in East Berlin.

Nevertheless, problems have beset the search for an East German identity. For one thing, the GDR has been rather selective in its claims to the legacy of the old Germany, as Ulrich Scheuner points out (in Schulz et al., p. 46). While denying that it is the heir to the negative aspects of German history, most notably the Third Reich, East Germany has been quick to lay claim to the achievements and the renown of great personalities, from Martin Luther to Carl von Clausewitz. For another, the Federal Republic's partial recognition of the GDR has intensified the latter's difficulties in this regard and compelled it to try to differentiate itself all the more clearly from the Federal Republic because of the continued awareness among its citizens of a common German heritage in spite of the division.

Although a number of the authors reviewed here discuss in detail the evolution of the GDR's definitions of state and nation, they do not come to any clear agreement about whether the GDR has succeeded in developing a national identity that is separate from that of the Federal Republic. Childs argues that the GDR has thus far failed: "Yet many East Germans remain sullen, bitter, alienated and angry. They do not necessarily identify with the Federal Republic as they do not identify with the GDR. They regard themselves as Germans. They identify with 'Germany' "(p. 317). Other scholars, for instance Gebhard Schweigler, dispute this view.[14]

CULTURALLY, POLITICALLY, and economically, the GDR remains uneasily poised between Moscow and Bonn. The inter-German relationship has, of course, improved markedly since 1972. Siegfried Kupper,

[13]Talks on compensation for American citizens are currently under way between the United States and the GDR. For a fuller discussion of US–GDR relations, see Ronald Asmus, "Washington's View of Bonn and East Berlin," *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), No. 3, March 1985, pp. 256–63.

[14]See Gebhard Schweigler, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1975.

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in his excellent chapter on the GDR's *Deutschlandpolitik* in the Schulz et al. book, examines how the GDR's policy evolved from a search for an all-German solution to an effort to differentiate between the two German states. "The more improbable German reunification appeared to be to the leaders in the East and West," he argues, "the more they talked about it"(p. 271). Since 1972, Kupper claims, a major GDR goal has been to "create the preconditions for the collapse of the existing state and social system in the FRG" (p. 263). While official propaganda might indicate this to be the case, one may question to what degree the Honecker regime treats this as a practical objective.

Although the GDR has been concerned about the domestic political effects of rapprochement with West Germany, it cannot deny that the inter-German relationship has brought with it major economic benefits it would be loathe to give up. Because the Federal Republic now regards the GDR as part of its domestic market, East Germany, as Horst Lambrecht notes in the Schulz et al. volume, receives significant visible and invisible economic support from the FRG, including de facto membership in the European Community. Lambrecht characterizes East Berlin's attitude toward the economic/political trade-offs of inter-German economic relations as "ambivalent" since GDR officials view it as "politically undesirable but economically extremely advantageous, if not actually necessary" (p. 330). Indeed, the GDR would have to sacrifice most of these considerable economic benefits in return for the political satisfaction of gaining de jure recognition from the FRG.

Even so, the GDR continues to demand full recognition of its nationhood and statehood from the FRG. The *Grundvertrag* was merely a compromise by which both states agreed to disagree; it did not remove the constant tension between the two which becomes evident during times of international crises. An example is the GDR's reaction to the crisis in Poland between August 1980 and December 1981. Probably compelled by a fear that East Germany might be infected by the "Polish bacillus," Honecker took certain measures designed to limit contact with West Germany, among them the unsuccessful demand for full recognition of GDR citizenship by the FRG, and the doubling of the minimum currency exchange for visitors to the GDR from West Germany.[15]

Nevertheless, the evidence of the last two years indicates that the GDR is committed to an inter-German rapprochement: it has responded quite positively to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's intensification of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*[16] and to his *Deutschlandpolitik*, even to the point of defying Moscow by trying to maintain cordial relations with Bonn after the deployment of US Pershing and Cruise missiles in West Germany. This is mainly due to the fact that Kohl's *Deutschlandpolitik* has had a beneficial impact on the GDR. As Wettig points out, "The West German government is concerned to create conditions of external and internal stability in East Germany. It, therefore, regards unrest in the GDR as undesirable"(in von Beyme/Zimmermann, p. 296).[17] Kohl's *Ostpolitik* has also shored up the East German economy by providing new credits and has in some ways increased the GDR's legitimacy by negotiating with it on various matters. The more the FRG deals with the GDR, the more in fact it recognizes the latter as a separate state.[18] One might go so far as to argue that Kohl's *Ostpolitik* makes reunification less likely.

EAST GERMANY'S commitment to an inter-German rapprochement has produced some friction with the Soviet Union. However, the books reviewed here were published before the 1984 GDR–USSR disagreement and do not cover the events that led up to it. These events centered on Honecker's proposed visit to the Federal Republic, the first such visit by a GDR party chief. A few months before the scheduled visit, Moscow launched a campaign against West Germany, accusing it of renewed revanchist designs on Eastern Europe. The attack was clearly aimed at East Germany as well, and the GDR responded by joining Hungary in stressing the need for continued, cooperative ties between smaller socialist countries and the West.[19] In the end Moscow prevailed on Honecker to cancel his visit, but the incident served to strengthen his domestic position by giving the appearance that Honecker has asserted himself against Moscow.

Despite the evidence of East German–Soviet friction, the GDR remains dependent on the USSR for

[15]*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Oct. 10 and 13, 1980.

[16]See Angela E. Stent, "Soviet–West German Relations under Helmut Kohl: Continuity or Change?" in Angela E. Stent, Ed., *Economic Relations with the Soviet Union: American and West German Perspectives*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 27–47.

[17]This quote is mistranslated in the book and is an example of the problems that plague this volume. The text in the book reads: "The West German government is concerned to create conditions of external and internal stability in West Germany." Or am I missing a point?

[18]Probably the most graphic illustration of the commitment of both Germanies to maintaining their rapprochement is the fact that the continuing unmasking of East German spies in high places in Bonn has had no major effect on the inter-German relationship.

[19]See Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Détente and Discord: The Moscow–East Berlin–Bonn Triangle," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1985, pp. 743–74.

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its political and economic viability.[20] Prior to 1971, East Berlin had very little room for maneuver in its relations with Moscow. Ulbricht's removal for resisting Soviet *Westpolitik* toward Bonn clearly signaled the limits for independent action. As Croan points out, "East Germany's ruling elite has always been and still remains critically dependent on the Soviet Union for political, strategic and diplomatic support" (in Schulz et al., pp. 185–86). After all, the USSR created the GDR and still occupies it. And lacking a full measure of legitimacy, East Germany needs Soviet support to ensure its continued existence.

Yet, since 1972, East Berlin has gained somewhat greater freedom of action, particularly in negotiating noncrucial issues with the FRG. The precise nature of its increased independence from Moscow is disputable. After all, *Abgrenzung* from the FRG has been combined with an *Annäherung* (rapprochement) with the USSR. The cancellation of the Honecker visit indicates that East German independent action is constrained.

Moscow has used the inter-German relationship as a channel for East-West dialogue, though Soviet leaders will support this dialogue only as long as they feel that they can control it. The Soviets still use this relationship to remind West Germans that the latter have a stake in maintaining good ties with the USSR, irrespective of Soviet-American relations.[21] The ambiguous status of Berlin gives the Soviets a lever over the GDR, and, as Croan points out, they realize that it is in their interest to keep alive East German anxieties about the destabilizing effects of inter-German ties (in Schulz et al., p. 225). Such anxieties reinforce the GDR's dependence on the USSR. Moscow wants to leave the German question open in such a manner so as to maximize Soviet influence in both East and West Germany.

While the treaties of the 1970's may have resolved the German question legally, in the long run, they have failed to do so politically. In the eyes of the West, the future of East Germany is unresolved, while for the Soviet Union, it is West Germany's future that remains open. Each side wants to ensure that *its* Germany will remain in its camp, while the other Germany will emancipate itself from its superpower protector. As long as this situation prevails, the GDR will face an uphill struggle in its efforts to secure full sovereignty and establish legitimacy both in the eyes of its own people and the eyes of other nations.

[20]See Angela E. Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in Sarah M. Terry, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 55–60.

[21]See Angela E. Stent, "The USSR and Germany," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1981, pp. 1–24.

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Rethinking the Iranian Revolution

Muriel Atkin

ELENA A. DOROSHENKO. *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane* (The Shiite Clergy in Contemporary Iran). 2nd. rev. ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1985.

SEMËN L. AGAYEV. *Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SShA i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'* (The Iranian Revolution, the USA, and International Security). Moscow, Nauka, 1984.

SEMËN L. AGAYEV. *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki* (Iran: The Birth of the Republic). Moscow, Politizdat, 1984.

ARYEH Y. YODFAT. *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran*. London, Croom Helm, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984.

THERE IS MUCH to displease the Soviet leadership with Iran's Islamic Republic: the clergy's unexpected dominance of the levers of political power; the elimination by the clergy of its rivals on the left, including the Tudeh (Communist) party; the regime's criticism of the Soviet Union. Yet the advent of the Islamic Revolution had initially raised great expectations in Moscow about the nature of the developments in Iran. And even after some serious blows had been dealt to Soviet hopes that the developments would prove "progressive," a prominent Soviet official (and expert on the Middle East) still considered it possible to link Iran's revolution of 1978–79 and the Communists' coup in Afghanistan in 1978, calling them the two popular revolutions in the Middle East.[1]

The dramatic changes in Iran occasioned a flurry of Soviet publications intended to explain, at first, why the developments there were promising, and later, what had gone wrong. Some of these publications were written by experts who had been studying Iran long before its recent turmoil. While it is true that all Soviet experts must operate within the boundaries of prevailing official political opinion, some nuance of interpretation does exist, as is illustrated by the contrast between the views of Elena A. Doroshenko and Semën L. Agayev, the two Soviet authors whose books are reviewed here. But these experts do not merely reflect the political opinions of the leadership in Moscow, they contribute to their formulation as well. Although they are based in academic institutions, they are expected to provide studies which inform the policymakers.[2]

Different experts are linked to officials with differing views. Agayev, for example, is associated with Rostislav A. Ul'yanovskiy, a deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department; Doroshenko is associated with Yevgeniy M. Primakov, until recently the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and now director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

FOR MORE than a decade, Elena Doroshenko, a member of the Institute of Oriental Studies, has been the Soviet Union's leading scholar of religion in modern Iran. In the wake of the Islamic Revolution, she has figured prominently among academics offering explanations of the Iranian upheaval. Recently she revised her most important work published before the Islamic Revolution, a 1975 study of Iran's Shiite clergy.[3]

When the monograph first appeared, it was part of a trend emerging in Soviet scholarly studies to go

Muriel Atkin is Associate Professor of History, George Washington University (Washington, DC). She is author of Russia and Iran, 1780-1828, *published in 1980, and numerous articles on Soviet-Iranian relations.*

[1]R.A. Ul'yanovskiy, introduction to Agayev, *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*, p. 15.

[2]Ul'yanovskiy, "Moral Principles in Politics and Politics in the Sphere of Morals," in Agayev, *Iranskaya revolyutsiya*, p. 15; B.N. Ponomarëv, "High Award of the Motherland—to the Main Center of Soviet Oriental Studies," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), December 1980, pp. 3, 5.

[3]Although the men whose work centers on the fostering of Islam do not literally constitute a clergy in the sense that the term is used in Christianity, it is a useful term to apply to the diverse corporate group devoted to promoting Islam, from the humblest teacher of the Koran to children to the most revered interpreter of Shiite doctrine.

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beyond stock criticism of religion. Rather than present religion as a bad, un-Marxist, nonmaterialist fantasy rooted in earlier, oppressive stages of social evolution, Doroshenko and many of her colleagues chose to examine religion in terms of how it affected this-worldly phenomena—its influence on people's social, political, and economic behavior.[4] But this intellectual current did not engulf such influential people as Ul'yanovskiy, who continued to advocate the more stereotyped, negative interpretation of religion as an important tool for dulling the minds of people in capitalist society and for perpetuating clerical oppression of the masses.[5]

In the new version of her monograph, Doroshenko refines the approach used in the first edition, further reducing, though not entirely eliminating, ideologically based judgments. In addition, she carries the discussion forward to the end of the 1970's and gives more attention to Ayatollah Khomeyni and others who rose to prominence during the Islamic Revolution (pp. 163–72).[6] Doroshenko also revives her discussion of Iran's earlier political controversies in light of the victory of the Islamic republicans.

One of the main strengths of Doroshenko's approach lies in her reliance on detailed description rather than on overt Marxian analysis. This quality is important not only because the author is a knowledgeable specialist and has much information to convey, but also because by emphasizing careful description she argues implicitly that meticulous research is as important an element of scholarly discourse as is proper ideology.

The significance of this approach becomes clear when one compares Doroshenko's work with that of the late Ye. A. Belyayev, a leading Soviet Islamicist of the previous generation. Belyayev's treatment of Shiism contains just enough description to illustrate his thesis that religion offers a false, often illogical solution to human problems. Thus, for example, when he discusses one of the most important Shiite observances—the mourning during the month of Moharram for the martyrdom of Husain (the Prophet's grandson)—Belyayev focuses on those practices that are likely to strike his readers as bizarre and repugnant (self-flagellation or some believers' refusal to wash during that month). The implication is that the Moharram observances are fanatical and barbaric.[7]

By contrast, Doroshenko's discussion avoids pejorative labels and stresses the great significance this mourning period has for Shiites. Gone is Belyayev's emphasis on the more extreme practices; instead, there is the description of practices such as the opening of their houses by the wealthy to neighbors coming for mourning ceremonies. Although processions of flagellants are mentioned, they are introduced as part of a larger process of public displays of faith that have turned into political demonstrations on occasion (pp. 74–75).[8]

While Doroshenko includes the de rigueur citations from the Marxist patristic literature, she does so with restraint. Indeed, in the second edition of *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo,* she cites the work of the US scholar Shahrough Akhavi far more often than the "classics of Marxism-Leninism."[9]

While revising her book, Elena Doroshenko appears to have also revised her assessments of the strength of Islam in Iran and the influence of the Shiite clergy. Her views had originally been strongly colored by Marxist conventions about the nature of social progress. For example, in the introduction to the first version of her book, she ascribed the power of the clergy in Iranian society to, among other things, the fact that until recently 90 percent of the Iranians were illiterate fanatics.[10] In the second version, the sentence remains the same, except that the Iranian "fanatics" are now referred to as deeply religious (p. 7).[11]

Doroshenko has also discarded her earlier argument that the evolution of society and the spread of socialism, communism, and modernization in Asia were undermining Iranian belief in Islam, and in turn were forcing the Shiite clergy to fight a rearguard action (in league with the monarchy) to preserve its own influence and to combat socialism.[12] This perspective is evident

[4]Among other noteworthy examples of this trend in the mid-1970's (prior to the upsurge in Islamic activism that gave the issue greater urgency) are L.R. Polonskaya, "New Tendencies in the Modernization of Islam (The Case of Pakistan)," in *Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysl' stran Vostoka* (Religion and Social Thought in Countries of the East), Moscow, Nauka, 1974; M.T. Stepanyants, *Islam v filosofskoy i obshchestvennoy mysli zarubezhnogo Vostoka (XIX–XX vv.)* (Islam in the Philosophical and Social Thought of the Non-Soviet East [19th-20th Centuries]), Moscow, Nauka, 1974; and S.A. Tokarev, *Religiya v istorii narodov mira* (Religion in the History of the Peoples of the World), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976.

[5]Ul'yanovskiy, "Moral Principles," p. 4.

[6]For example, the first edition slighted Ali Shariati, a social theorist who combined certain elements of Marxism with his own interpretation of reformist Islam and greatly influenced the ideology of the Mojahedin-e Khalq guerrillas, whereas the second edition devotes 10 pages to his life and work.

[7]E.A. Belyayev, *Musulmanskoye sektantstvo* (Muslim Sectarianism), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury, 1957, p. 28.

[8]See also Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenststvo v sovremennom Irane*, 1st ed., Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp. 58–59.

[9]Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1980. Overall, Doroshenko demonstrates a broad familiarity with Western scholarship on Iranian Shiism.

[10]Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., p. 6.

[11]The label "fanatic" still appears occasionally in the second edition, mostly in connection with anti-leftist activities in the Islamic Republic.

[12]Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*, 1st ed., pp. 7, 111, 149, 159, 161.

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in the following passage near the end of the first edition:

Faced with the growth of national liberation movements in developing countries and the spread of "the spirit of unbelief," which has captured ever broader circles of the population, the ruling circles in Iran are uniting with the clergy as well as with the rulers of other countries of the East, for the purpose of strengthening Islam.[13]

Such assertions are missing from the second edition. Instead, Doroshenko depicts Islam as growing stronger in the late 20th century and becoming associated with liberation movements. Her argument is that modernization in Iran has not weakened Shiism after all, but has strengthened its hold on the masses by increasing the gulf between the haves and the have-nots. Similarly, the influence of the Shiite clergy on ordinary Iranians is not waning, because the clergy has ably responded to the challenge of modernization by adapting Islam to contemporary conditions. If, ultimately, the strength of Shiism in contemporary Iran is the product of backwardness, she concludes, it is nevertheless exceedingly strong (pp. 3, 65, 75, 77, 135). Finally, while noting that the clergy's political activism can be traditionalist, the author differentiates between two contrasting types of traditionalism, a conservative-reactionary one and a patriotic one devoted to the protection of the lowly (pp. 97, 215 fn. 12).[14]

Among the most dramatic changes in Doroshenko's interpretation is her treatment of the political crisis of the early 1960's, which developed when the clergy denounced the government for a series of reforms subsequently dubbed the White Revolution. In the first edition of her book, Doroshenko treated the Shah's reforms as progressive in Iran's context, emphasizing those provisions that dealt with land reform and the improvement of the status of women. According to her, these reforms were opposed by the "reactionary part of the landowners and clergy" as well as by nationalist clerics. While she attributed considerable disruptive power to the clergy, she was guarded when discussing clerical objectives. In any case, she concluded that the clergy's opposition to the reforms cost it public support.[15] Her view was typical of the interpretation found in Soviet sources published prior to the Islamic Revolution, according to which the Shah, for all his faults, was a modernizer who brought Iran out of the "feudal" era.

In the revised account, the reforms under the Shah become targets for criticism. Many negative statements about the opposition have been deleted (although the economic interests of the clergy receive occasional mention as being a factor in its opposition to the reforms) and its positive aspects elaborated. No longer is the focus on land redistribution and women's rights, but on the Shah's efforts to strengthen his own position and his ties to the United States while ensuring Iran's dominance in the Persian Gulf. Far from playing a reactionary role, the clergy is now credited with mobilizing broad public support by making "sharp attacks on the economic and ideological expansion of the imperialist powers in Iran and the monarchy's dictatorial regime" (pp. 28, 74, 120–21, 124). Gone is the notion that the clergy alienated its followers by opposing reform.

In light of the Islamic Revolution, Doroshenko has greatly expanded her discussion of Ayatollah Khomeyni's life and politics. Her account of his activities now includes the information that, while in exile for opposing the White Revolution, Khomeyni continued to speak out on topical issues and to build an effective clandestine network inside Iran. She characterizes his message as one of advocating a theocracy while opposing the Shah's dictatorship, pervasive corruption, and the power of imperialism over Iran. According to Doroshenko, this "won him the sympathy of the broad popular masses" (pp. 127, 162–63, 202–03).

No longer does Doroshenko accuse Khomeyni of using the tenets of Islam to oppose social and economic reform; now she judges his concept of a theocracy to be remarkable within Shiism because of its activism. As she points out, for Khomeyni the martyred imams are significant not merely because they died for their faith, but because they fought misrule and injustice. Moreover, the role of the highest ranking Islamic jurists is not only to interpret religious law and wait for the return of the Hidden Imam, but also to be active leaders in changing society (p. 159).[16]

Given the author's views on the influence of Khomeyni and Islam in the Iran of the 1970's, it is not surprising that Doroshenko ascribes to the clergy a dynamic and crucial role in making possible the revolution of 1978–79. Still it puts her in direct opposition to other Soviet interpreters of Iranian events, men like Agayev, who portray the clergy as joining the revolutionary struggle only after it was well under way. Indeed, in *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki,* Agayev argues that the clergy tried to sell out

[13]Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo,* 1st ed., p. 158.

[14]In making this argument Doroshenko draws on the work of A.I. Ionova, another leading Soviet scholar of Islam who has risen to prominence since the late 1970's.

[15]Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo,* 1st ed., pp. 105–109.

[16]See also Doroshenko, *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo,* 1st ed., p. 118.

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the revolution at the last moment by making a deal with the last prime minister under the monarchy, Shapour Bakhtiar. Agayev further contends that the old regime was brought down in February 1979 by an uprising led by the Fedayan-e Khalq and the Mojahedin-e Khalq guerrillas (with the participation of the Tudeh party) without any contribution by the clergy or its adherents (pp. 56–58).[17]

While Doroshenko accepts the standard Soviet argument that the initiative for the revolution lay not with the clergy but with the masses, she nevertheless portrays the clergy as having played the leading role in opposing government policies throughout the 1970's, and not just in the last months of the monarchy. In addition to ascribing importance to Khomeyni personally and to his network of supporters, she argues—as do other Soviet authors—that the clergy was uniquely equipped for opposition politics in the 1970's, because it had not been as repressed as was the secular opposition; thus the clergy was able to preserve its institutional structure and lines of communication throughout the country. However, when elaborating on this point, Doroshenko goes beyond other Soviet authors by contending that it was the clergy's special position in Iranian society that enabled it to be more open in its criticism of the regime. According to her, not only did mosques retain their vital importance as places of prayer, but they evolved into forums for political discussion. Moreover, though some clerics came from wealthy families, the diversity in social origins among the clergy helped make it attentive to the urban poor. Hence, by the end of the 1970's, it was the clergy around whom the "progressive intelligentsia" and students rallied and not vice versa (pp. 4, 65, 69, 191–92).

SEMËN AGAYEV, a specialist on Iran, is affiliated with the Peoples of the Near and Middle East Institute of the Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences, the leading Soviet center outside of Moscow for the study of the modern Middle East. Since the late 1960's, he has published extensively on Iranian politics and foreign relations. His two books under review here, both introduced by Ul-'yanovskiy, differ strikingly from Doroshenko's in their approach to the study of Iran. Not only are they emphatically polemical rather than scholarly, but each serves primarily as a vehicle for criticism of anti-Soviet and anti-communist elements both in Iran and in the United States. Nonetheless, these volumes, like some of Agayev's other works, are informative precisely because they detail current trends in the Soviet political assessment of the Iranian revolution.[18]

Given Ul'yanovskiy's prominence as a section head in the International Department, his introductions to the Agayev volumes deserve some comment, even if they simply repeat arguments he has made elsewhere. The introduction to *Iranskaya revolyutsiya, SSha i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost'* is in fact a reprint of an article that first appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and is little changed here except for specific references to the way Agayev's book illustrates Ul'yanovskiy's points.[19] In this essay, Ul'yanovskiy makes briefly the same argument that Agayev makes in roughly 250 pages, namely, that the United States and Iran's clerical politicians are the villains of the hostage crisis and the Iranian revolution. According to Ul'yanovskiy, the American government contributed significantly to the making of the hostage crisis. Once the crisis developed, Jimmy Carter and later Ronald Reagan justified their actions in terms of high principles. But, in fact, he points out, they used the crisis to advance their own political interests, stimulate jingoism and anti-Sovietism, and strengthen the American military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. At the same time, Iran's Shiite clergy, by leading the mass movement that became the revolution and by invoking Islam to rally public support, assumed moral responsibility for carrying out profound social changes once the revolution had triumphed. Instead, the clergy usurped the revolution for its own rightist ends, and betrayed the aspirations of the masses. Ul'yanovskiy stresses that much of this change in political direction occurred during and immediately after the hostage crisis, when the clergy began to repress all who disagreed with them, and especially the genuine revolutionaries of the left. He concludes his essay by arguing that the clergy's efforts to Islamicize society are unrealistic and must inevitably fail. (Many of the same points are also restated in his introduction to Agayev's other book, *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki.*)[20]

[17]See also S.M. Aliyev, "The Anti-Monarchical and Anti-Imperialist Revolution in Iran," in *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), 1979, No. 4, pp. 53, 57; K.A. Merkulov, *Islam v mirovoy politike i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh* (Islam in World Politics and International Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnoye Otnosheniya, 1982, pp. 256–58; L.S. Sklyarov, "The Establishment of New Organs of Power in Iran (1978–1981)," *Iran: Istoriya i sovremennost'* (Iran: History and Contemporaneity), Moscow, Nauka, 1983, pp. 201–02.

[18]Notably his "Left Radicalism, Revolutionary Democracy, and Scientific Socialism in the Countries of the East," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), May-June 1984, pp. 133–47.

[19]Ul'yanovskiy, "Moral Principles in Politics and Politics in the Sphere of Morality," in Agayev, *Iranskaya revolyutsiya*, pp. 3–14; idem, "Moral Principles in Politics and Politics in the Sphere of Morality," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), June 22, 1983, p. 10.

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Little need be said about how Agayev elaborates in *Iranskaya revolyutsiya* on Ul'yanovskiy's points. His assertion that the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the hostages in April 1980 was a "planned failure" which successfully accomplished its secret mission of bolstering President Carter's image and demonstrating American military strength is typical of his polemical style. According to him, American military officials knew that the rescue mission involved great risks if it progressed beyond the first stage to open combat, which would take place near to the Soviet border. Thus, by recalling the American force from Tabas, the United States enjoyed the benefits of demonstrating its power of intimidation at low cost to itself. Agayev further argues that the operation was a "military adventure of the type that later becomes the norm for the foreign policy of the U.S.A." (pp. 181 and 163–70).

The book's most noteworthy contribution is its assessment of the consequences of the hostage crisis. For all of the Soviet Union's relish in America's discomfiture at the time of the crisis, the results of that crisis were negative for the Soviets, concludes Agayev. The reason the seizure of the United States embassy became so important in Iranian domestic politics, he argues, is because it coincided with a powerful tide of anti-Americanism. Agayev praises this attitude for being linked in the popular mind with a quest for profound social change, but he complains that the hostage crisis diverted the Iranians from proper objectives to the less significant issue of the hostages themselves. As a result, when the hostages were finally released, none of Iran's most important demands had been met. Instead, it was the United States that benefited while the Iranian people suffered. The United States strengthened its political and military position in the region, and American corporations received substantial compensation from the Iranian government. In Iran, the clergy achieved political dominance, but then became unresponsive to the people's needs (pp. 31, 81–82, 133, 264–66, 270).

In *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki,* Agayev focuses on the period from the last weeks of the monarchy to the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and the resignation of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. His thesis is that the revolution itself was a popular uprising in favor of the "socialist transformation of society," which happened to voice its objectives in Islamic terms (pp. 311, 316). The clergy then exploited the popular victory to seize power for itself and thwart any substantial revolutionary change. Agayev illustrates these points with frequent quotations from the Koran and various unidentified sources. He also allows himself to gloat over the misfortunes of all those of whom he disapproves.

The most interesting aspect of this book is its very different treatment of some of the topics covered in *Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo*. Where Doroshenko introduces nuances, Agayev offers diatribe. The two authors' treatment of the social theorist Ali Shariati (1933–77) is a case in point. Agayev credits Shariati with contributing politically to the revolutionary movement by linking Islam with opposition to the Shah. However, the author describes Shariati as a man using Islamic language to disguise ideas that came "dangerously close" to atheist socialism, and he punctuates this description with a quotation from the Koran that warns against attributing one's own words to Allah (p. 42). By contrast, Doroshenko gives much more attention to Shariati's ideas taken as a whole and argues that while he borrowed certain concepts from Marxism, he also differed on major points, including his rejection of atheism and his belief that only through Islam could the Muslim world be saved from bourgeois corruption. To her, Shariati is not a sly manipulator, but an eclectic thinker whose most distinguished trait was his courageous opposition to the monarchy (p. 170).

One aspect of *Rozhdeniye respubliki* offers the tantalizing prospect of some insight into Soviet ideas about the future of the Islamic Republic: Agayev's comparison of Khomeyni with Robespierre. The author raises the question in his introduction whether such a comparison is apt, then proceeds to start every chapter by quoting rather unilluminating citations from or about Robespierre, and finally concludes that a degree of similarity does exist between the methods of both revolutionary leaders' followers. Given the analogy of Islamic Republicans to Jacobins, any reader seeking some indication of Soviet expectations about the outcome of Iranian developments may well wonder just what is or will be seen as the counterpart of the Thermidorian Reaction.[21] Agayev mentions that, unlike in revolutionary France where it remained for the Jacobins to destroy feudalism, in Iran feudalism was defeated before the late 1970's. Therefore, Iran's Thermidorian reaction occurred early—before the victory of the Islamic Revolution—in the form of the Bakhtiar administration (pp. 311–34).

[20]In their works both Agayev and Doroshenko repeat similar arguments about the fate of the Islamic Revolution. See Agayev, *Iran: rozhdeniye respubliki*, pp. 6–13, 308–09; Doroshenko, 2nd ed., pp. 46–47, 192, 207–09.

[21]Thermidor is the 11th month of the French Revolutionary Calendar. The Thermidorian Reaction refers to the coup d'état of 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), which marked the downfall of Robespierre and the end of the Reign of Terror.

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THE TWISTS and turns of Iran's Islamic Revolution cleary surprised Soviet observers, and they responded by revising their interpretation of the events there. Yet, in a broad sense, there are still certain political parameters that define the range of permissible opinion. For example, all Soviet sources now invariably view the revolution as a promising opportunity that went wrong.

Nonetheless, significant variations do exist within those parameters, as is illustrated by the two Soviet authors reviewed here. Some Soviet observers, like Agayev, aim primarily at providing a rationale for current policy, citing just enough selective information to support an argument in favor of that policy. Others, like Doroshenko, place greater emphasis on more substantive research, producing evidence with a weight of its own rather than merely confirming the accepted opinion of the moment. Both types of works are important as much for what they do not say as for what they do say.

GIVEN THE UPSURGE of interest in Iran that the Islamic Revolution occasioned among Americans and the concern about the Soviet role in the developments there that proved so disadvantageous to the United States, a book offering a brief overview of Soviet-Iranian relations could provide the American reader with a useful introduction to this subject. Initially, it might seem that Aryeh Yodfat's *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran* would serve such a purpose. The author is well-read, writes in an effectively concise style, and offers some prudent judgments. Unfortunately, however, there are so many serious problems with his facts, sources, and methodology that the book's positive features are overwhelmed by the negative ones. Not only does this book fail to give the specialist any new insight into Iranian-Soviet relations, it is also likely to misinform the nonspecialist.

Yodfat's chapters on the historical background (dating back to the late 19th century) say nothing of note that has not been said better in works already available in English.[22] Moreover, there are some serious lapses in Yodfat's recounting of history. For example, when discussing the opening decade of this century, he rightly notes the importance of the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement, which allotted a sphere of influence to Russia in northern Iran and to Britain in the southeast (pp. 3–8); yet he omits mention of Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11 or the fact that Russia intervened both politically and militarily in the ensuing turmoil.[23]

Some of the explanations Yodfat offers are also simplistic and ill-informed. He asserts, for example, that the open opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah was made possible by the policy of "liberalization" Jimmy Carter urged upon the Shah (particularly in the area of human rights) and that the possibility of Carter's disapproval of the Shah's actions deterred the Iranian leader from crushing the opposition (as he had done in 1963). Yet, the author offers no substantiation of this important point. Clearly, the assertion accords well with Yodfat's view that the United States has a track record of letting down its Third World allies and playing into the hands of countries siding with the Soviet Union against American interests (pp. 35–36, and 27–28).

The fact is that the Carter administration did not push the human rights issue in the case of Iran nor did it give encouragement to the middle-class intellectuals who by 1977 were beginning to criticize the Shah more openly. When Carter visited Iran in December 1977 he was conspicuously silent about human rights, much to the dismay of those middle-class intellectuals. In any event, it was not they who made the revolution but, above all, Khomeyni and his vast network of clerical and lay followers, as well as various leftist guerrilla organizations. None of these people or groups were predisposed to seek American permission to make a revolution. The incident that set into motion the cycle of protests culminating in the fall of the monarchy—namely, the January 1978 protest demonstration by seminarians in Qom—was not provoked by the American stance on human rights but by an Iranian newspaper article in which the Minister of Information attacked Khomeyni. Finally, the Carter human rights policy could

[22]For works focusing largely on Iranian foreign policy, Russian and Soviet relations with Iran, or communism in Iran, see particularly Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968; idem, "Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter Century of Freeze and Thaw," in Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, Eds., *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1974; idem, "Russia and the Middle East," in Ivo J. Lederer, *Russian Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500–1941*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1966; idem, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941–1973*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1975; Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974; John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East 'In the General Direction of the Persian Gulf'," *The Russian Review* (Cambridge, MA), April 1970, pp. 143–53, and July 1970, pp. 247–61; Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982; Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966.

[23]Mohammed Ali Shah, urged on by the Russian ambassador, used the Persian Cossacks (organized and commanded by the Russians) to stage a counter-coup against the constitutionalists. Russian troops occupied Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan and a center of constitutionalist opposition; they also entered northeastern Iran in an unsuccessful attempt to restore Mohammad Ali to the throne and stayed on even after failing in their primary objective.

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not possibly have deterred the Shah from acting against the opposition because he was not to be deterred, though he may have acted indecisively and ineffectively. During 1978, his forces continued to jail and kill opponents of the regime. Not until late in that year, when the tally of casualities was already high, did the Carter administration begin to criticize the Shah.[24]

Another problematic aspect of Yodfat's book is his handling of sources. In his discussion of Soviet policy toward Iran since 1978 he often ascribes attitudes to the Kremlin that are based solely on a superficial and literal reading of statements in the Soviet mass media. On this basis he asserts, for example, that the Soviets "genuinely believed that American intervention [in Iran] was imminent" in 1978 and thus "were greatly surprised when it did not come" (pp. 48–49). (The Soviets certainly made much of the alleged danger of American intervention for propaganda purposes, but that hardly proves that they "genuinely" thought it likely.) He also argues that it was the United States that created the crisis in Iran by stirring up the latent opposition there in hopes of taming the overly independent Shah. The book is replete with such uncritical assessments.

At other times, Yodfat overlooks essential information in the Soviet media. For example, he contends that through the end of 1978 the Soviet Union still thought that the monarchy might survive in Iran and, therefore, refrained from anything more than mild criticism of the Shah in the mass media. He reports that the occasional calls for the Shah's ouster were "not in the main press" (p. 50). However, already on September 12, 1978, *Pravda* had carried an article quoting a Tudeh statement to the effect that the monarchy was incapable of solving the social problems that underlay Iran's political crisis. The statement predicted that the Iranian people would continue their "just fight" until they achieved their "national and democratic goals." The next day a similar article quoted the Tudeh's call for a provisional coalition government.[25] On November 4, 1978, *Pravda*, this time without attribution, referred to the efforts of the Iranian people to "liquidate 'despotism, corruption and tyranny'."[26]

Finally, not only does Yodfat use Soviet sources poorly, but he confines himself to a very limited range of them, relying on the mass media exclusively when dealing with the post-1978 period. He ignores journal articles and books, such as those by Doroshenko and Agayev, that contain a wealth of information about Soviet attitudes toward Iran. Unfortunately, to study contemporary Iran without consulting such sources is to underestimate the range of Soviet opinion on the subject and the relevance of this opinion for Soviet policy toward Iran.[27]

[24]Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 195–96, 201, 205–06; Shaul Bakhash, "Who Lost Iran," *The New York Review of Books*, May 14, 1981, p. 22.

[25]*Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 12, 1978, p. 5, and Sept. 13, 1978, p. 5.

[26]*Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1978, p. 5.

[27]The best work to date that does mine Soviet publications for information about Moscow's recent policy toward Iran is Robert O. Freedman's thorough and knowledgeable *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970*, 3rd ed., New York, Praeger, 1982.

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Soviet Military Politics

Dale R. Herspring

YOSEF AVIDAR. *The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union.* Jerusalem, Magnes, 1983.

PAUL J. MURPHY, Ed. *The Soviet Air Forces.* Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 1984.

ELLEN JONES. *Red Army and Society.* London and Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1985.

JIRI VALENTA and WILLIAM POTTER, Eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security.* London and Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1984.

DAVID HOLLOWAY. *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race.* 2nd ed. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984.

JONATHAN ADELMAN. *The Revolutionary Armies.* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1980.

JONATHAN ALFORD, Ed. *The Soviet Union: Security Policies and Constraints.* New York, St. Martin's, 1985.

RECENT events such as the Reagan-Gorbachëv summit, the subsequent limited warming in US-Soviet relations, as well as the 27th CPSU Congress all serve to focus attention anew on the Soviet military and its role in the politics of the USSR. With regard to foreign policy, what is likely to be the Soviet military's response to improved US-Soviet relations? On the home front, how will the marshals and admirals respond to Mikhail Gorbachëv's effort to modernize the economy if it should turn out to involve reallocating funds away from the military? Further, to what degree is the military, as a distinct institution, likely to oppose Moscow's new leader on such issues? Finally, what will be the long-term impact on military politics in the USSR of the ouster of a dynamic professional soldier of the stature of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov from his posts as chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of defense? The answers to these questions will have important implications for the course of Soviet domestic politics as well as US-Soviet relations.

Three general conceptual approaches have been suggested for analyzing civil-military relations in the USSR. Roman Kolkowicz has advocated an interest-group model, in which Soviet military politics are characterized by constant conflict between two definable dichotomous institutions.[1] In this view, the party's primary concern is to control the military, with the result that there is constant tension between the two institutions. A unitary approach, advocated by William Odom,[2] sees Soviet military officers, just like party cadres, as executants of party policy, and maintains that the former share a common orientation with the latter. Conflict, to the degree it occurs, is largely intra-institutional, that is, it pits lower levels of the bureaucracy against higher ones. Finally, Timothy Colton has advocated a "participatory" model which, while it sees the military as an institution having its own interests, argues that so far the party has satisfied the military's core interests.[3] Consequently, conflict has been minimal. The most profitable way to look at civil-military relations, Colton argues, is to focus on the degree of military participation in national security decisionmaking. All of the authors reviewed here rely to varying degrees on one or another of these three models.

YOSEF AVIDAR in his study of Soviet civil-military relations focuses on the decade from the death of Stalin

Dale R. Herspring, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, is the author of numerous works on communist militaries, including The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms, *(1984, co-authored with Robbin Laird). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.*

[1]Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, Eds., *Civil–Military Relations in Communist Systems,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, pp. 9–25.

[2]William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in ibid., pp. 27–52.

[3]Timothy J. Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in ibid., pp. 53–75.

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(1953) to the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev (1964). Avidar devotes particular attention to the Zhukov affair and to the impact on party-military relations of Khrushchev's efforts to cut back on the Soviet armed forces in the early 1960's. Conceptually, Avidar relies on the interest-group model. The key to Soviet military politics during this period, in his opinion, is the degree to which Khrushchev satisfied the military's interests. Thus, when party and military interests coincided, as during the period from 1953 to 1957, relations were tranquil. However, with the ouster of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov and the reassertion of party control through the Central Committee resolution of October 1957, relations worsened. A further deterioration occurred in subsequent years as a result of the U–2 affair of May 1960, the forced withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962, and Khrushchev's efforts to cut the military both in size and budget. The result was increasing alienation of the military, which, Avidar maintains, contributed significantly to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964.

The book edited by Paul Murphy contains a number of worthwhile articles tracing the development of the Soviet Air Forces since the 1917 revolution.[4] For example, the first article, by Stuart Cohen, addresses the overall question of civil-military relations and employs a conceptual framework similar to that utilized by Avidar. Party-military relations (or in this case party–air force relations) are seen as antagonistic. Thus the primary task of the party-political apparatus is to control the military.

Ellen Jones, in her excellent study of Soviet manpower issues, adopts a different conceptual approach. After a lengthy discussion of problems presented by the increasing number of minority recruits in the Soviet military (the impact of which she sees as meliorated somewhat because the educational level of all Soviet youth, including those from minority nationalities, is rising), of the demographic problems represented by the shrinking number of young people (for which she suggests a number of viable solutions), and of the importance of the armed forces for political socialization, she argues that rather than being antagonistic, the relationship between the party and the military is symbiotic. And, she adds, interdependence between civilian and military officials is likely to grow in coming years as the military's social role increases. She concludes that "the interdependence of military and civilian institutions is based on much more than shared values" (p. 220).

Jones adopts a similar approach in her article on military research and development in the book edited by Jiri Valenta and William Potter. In contrast to those who maintain that institutional (that is, bureaucratic) factors contribute significantly to research and development, Jones argues that the process is primarily driven by the party's military policy and the country's military doctrine. Her views closely resemble those of William Odom.

The third group of authors reviewed here utilize a framework closer to Colton's. David Holloway, for example, in his updated study of the role of military power in the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present, most clearly articulates the Colton position when he states:

> *. . . the party, by stressing the importance of conflict between states and the need for cohesion and solidarity at home, has provided an ideology that gives clear purpose to the Armed Forces' existence. Party policy has given the officer corps a good standard of living and high status, and has furthered their professional interests by allocating generous resources to defense. Finally, the party has provided capable and cautious leadership (with some glaring exceptions) in foreign policy, avoiding risky adventures that might provoke war.* (p. 158)

The result, according to Holloway, has been a smoother relationship than either Avidar or Cohen recognizes, but one that carries the potential for more conflict than Jones seems to foresee.

Those who accept the Colton approach (implicitly or explicitly) recognize that the relationship between the two institutions has not always been conflict-free. Jonathan Adelman, for example, in his outstanding comparative study of the impact of the early developmental period on Chinese and Soviet civil-military relations, notes that the Red Army differed radically from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) because the former was initially viewed by party leaders as a hostile organization—to be subverted and then controlled—whereas in China, the party and army were one.

Analysts in the third group focus on determining the area and extent of military influence (or "participation," to use Colton's term) in decisionmaking. They agree on a number of things. First, the Politburo is the key decisionmaking body; the military as an institution is clearly subordinate to it. For example, David Fewtrell, in an article in the collection of essays edited by Jonathan Alford, notes that although the Defense Council certainly plays a role in matters affecting the allocation of

[4]Of particular interest is the article by Philip Peterson in the Murphy book, entitled "Reorganization Trends," which discusses developments not only in the Air Forces, but in the Soviet military in general. Peterson's assertion that "the Soviets are reorganizing their services to more effectively insure the capacity to conduct combined-arms actions at each echelon of strategic and operational leadership" (p. 277) has serious implications for Western planners and strategists.

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A second area of general agreement is that the Soviet military's primary source of authority in national security decisionmaking is its monopoly over expertise and informasecurity decision-making is its monopoly over expertise and information. As Dimitri Simes puts it in his article on the Brezhnev period in the Valenta and Potter book, "the absence of alternative sources of expertise in a position to challenge the uniformed military leaves the Politburo no choice but to rely heavily on the judgments of marshals and admirals" (p. 83). Likewise, Raymond Garthoff, writing in the same volume, notes that the Soviet military has a strong voice in SALT matters, "not only owing to its responsibilities for security, but also owing to a near monopoly of expertise and relevant information. Soviet military leaders, well aware of this advantage, will not easily share this source of power" (p. 155). In essence, regardless of who makes the ultimate decision on military matters, it is the military that provides data on which such decisions are based.

A third area of agreement is that the bureaucracy plays an important role in decisions affecting weapons development programs, although there remains disagreement over *how* important this role is. Arthur Alexander, in his now classic study of the weapons procurement process, which is reproduced in the Alford volume, assigns greater weight to the bureaucratic process. Holloway, by contrast, argues that both the bureaucratic process *and* policy decisions by political organs play important roles. In Holloway's words, "the build-up of military power since the late 1950s must be seen as the product of conscious political choices, and not only as the result of pressure from a military-industrial complex" (p. 160). In this regard, Valenta's article in the Valenta/Potter volume on Soviet decisionmaking leading to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is particularly noteworthy. It illustrates the complexity of the decisionmaking process and shows the limitations of the "rational decision-maker" mode of analysis of this process. Since no one in the Soviet Union would dare override a Politburo decision, the key question is to ascertain the extent to which the military as an institution is able to influence decisions before they get to the Politburo.

A final point, on which all the writers reviewed here agree, is the importance that both political and military leaders of the Soviet Union ascribe to military power as a means of furthering the foreign policy interests of the USSR. For example, from his reading of Soviet writings, Holloway argues that military power is seen as fulfilling three major functions: first, to deter a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; second, to defend the socialist community; and third, to aid national liberation movements (p. 82). There would appear to be a proclivity on the part of Soviet political leaders to be responsive to the military's requests for funds, equipment, and manpower when such requests are framed in the context of furthering these objectives, particularly the first two.

THE MATERIAL reviewed here deals primarily with events prior to 1980. A review of developments in the area of Soviet military politics since that time would be useful as a means both of evaluating the three approaches represented here and of looking at the likely course of events in coming months and years.

The most notable development in Soviet military politics during the early 1980's was Marshal Ogarkov's open defiance of the Soviet political leadership. Beginning in 1981, he feuded with the leadership in general and with the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, in particular. For example, at a time when the political leadership continued to support détente and improved US-Soviet relations, Ogarkov publicly questioned the utility of both.[5] This difference of opinion was particularly evident in the respective books published by Ogarkov and Ustinov in 1982.[6] In his volume, Ogarkov adopted a much harder line on topics such as the nature of the threat facing the USSR (he saw the nature of imperialism as being unchanged, aggressive, and predatory); the value of détente (he stressed military force, not détente, as the key to the USSR's security); and the danger of a conflict (he accused the United States of preparing for war). Ustinov's positions on all of these questions were more upbeat. He saw détente as having positive as well as negative aspects; he viewed military force as important, but only as one of a number of tools to protect Soviet national security interests; and although he felt that the international situation was serious, he avoided suggestions that the United States was preparing for war. In addition, Ogarkov also was more outspoken regarding the military's views on broader issues of national security decisionmaking and long-term economic planning.[7]

For purposes of this essay, it is worth noting that at no time during the early 1980's did the Soviet military *as an institution* adopt independent positions in public. During the entire time when Ogarkov was pub-

[5] I discuss this problem in greater depth in an unpublished manuscript, "Marshal Ogarkov and the Structure of Soviet Military Politics: 1980–1985."

[6] Cf. N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for the Defense of the Fatherland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982; and D.F. Ustinov, *Sluzhim rodine, delu kommunizma* (We Serve the Country and the Communist Cause), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982.

[7] See my article "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," forthcoming in *Comparative Strategy*.

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licly feuding with Ustinov, none of the Chief of the General Staff's colleagues openly supported him on any of the issues mentioned above. If anything, the overwhelming majority of professional soldiers appear to have looked not to their chief of staff, but to their defense minister and to the political leadership for guidance on policy-related matters. An extensive search of Soviet military writings revealed not a single citation from Ogarkov on the subject of East-West relations in the published writings of any of his principal subordinates.

This failure of the Soviet military to line up along institutional lines in juxtaposition to the party is particularly significant given the uncertainties of political leadership in the USSR during the early 1980's. The ossified direction of an ailing Brezhnev, followed by the brief tenures of Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, meant the absence of a strong political leader to counter the hard-charging, aggressive Chief of Staff. Based on the framework suggested by Avidar, one might have expected senior military officers—many of whom probably privately supported Ogarkov—to back him up. The result could have been an expansion of military influence in both foreign and domestic policies. But they held back. Why?

One is tempted to point to the good living standards enjoyed by the Soviet officer corps and the availability of budget resources in sufficient amounts to construct a modern military machine.[8] Could the military leaders feel they were already getting everything they wanted, and hence considered Ogarkov's comments/demands excessive? Probably not. The defensive tone of Ustinov's speeches during the 1980's to military officers, and expressions of concern by Ogarkov and others over the size of the military budget (Ogarkov called strengthening the country's defensive capabilities "a vital necessity" in his 1985 book),[9] suggest that there are at least some in the military who are not satisfied with the party leadership's views on these subjects. Therefore, any attempt by Gorbachëv to reallocate funds away from the defense budget is likely to result in grumbling from the military, as might hints at further steps toward warmer relations with the United States.

EVENTS of the 1980's would tend to support the conceptual approach adopted by Holloway and others. Ogarkov did not view himself as a mere executant of party policy, yet the military as a whole did not behave as an interest group. While Ogarkov doubtless saw himself as a loyal party member, he clearly believed it appropriate for a senior military officer to participate in the formulation of policy in sensitive areas.

Ogarkov's ouster is bound to have an important impact on civil-military relations. His "assignment to other duties" deprives the military of an articulate and technically sophisticated spokesman in the country's highest political-military councils and is all the more significant if, as one suspects, he was even more aggressive in defending military interests (as he saw them) in private. Although it could be argued that the replacement of the deceased Ustinov, basically a civilian, by Marshal Sergey Sokolov, a career soldier, should provide for stronger military influence at the highest levels of the political-military decisionmaking process, Sokolov's background would suggest otherwise. A review of Sokolov's writings over the past 10 years leaves the reader with the impression that Sokolov has spent most of his life as an apparatchik (his primary area of responsibility prior to becoming defense minister appears to have been logistics). Unlike Ogarkov, he does not appear to have authored a single major doctrinal or operational concept throughout his career. In Sokolov, then, Gorbachëv is probably dealing with a person of less presence, one who is less likely to oppose him at the highest level on domestic or foreign policies. Although Ogarkov's successor as chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of defense, Sergey Akhromeyev, is bright and is thought by some to be an Ogarkov protégé, he has for now—at least—hewed more closely to the party line.[10]

All of this could change, however. Sokolov is thought by many to be at most an interim leader. Given his age (he will be 75 in July), he is likely to leave the Soviet political scene in the not-too-distant future. This could bring Akhromeyev to the top military post, and conceivably the promotion might make this talented officer more assertive. Sokolov's departure could also conceivably open the door for Ogarkov himself to become defense minister, a possibility that has been rumored in some circles.[11] In view of Ogarkov's strong will and

[8]See, e.g., the articles in the Murphy book, which chronicle the continued improvement in the capabilities of the Soviet Air Forces; also, John Collins, *US-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985*, Washington, DC, Pergamon-Brassey, 1985.

[9]N.V. Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, p. 80.

[10]See, e.g., S. Akhromeyev, "On Guard of Peace and Socialism," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Feb. 22, 1985; idem, "The Superiority of Soviet Military Science and Soviet Military Art—One of the Most Important Factors of Victory in the Great Fatherland War," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1985, pp. 49–63; idem, "The ABM Treaty—An Obstacle on the Path to the Strategic Arms Race," *Pravda* (Moscow), June 4, 1985; and idem, "The Great Victory and the Lessons of History," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 5, 1985, pp. 3–20.

[11]See, e.g., Robert Hutchinson, "Ogarkov Tipped as Next Soviet Defense Minister," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (London), Oct. 25, 1985, pp. 929–33.

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intellect, such a development would have important implications for Soviet military politics. While Gorbachëv undoubtedly recognizes the importance of Ogarkov's talents for the creation of a modern, efficient military, the party chief would want to make sure that he had sufficient strength within the upper ranks of the Soviet political leadership to control Ogarkov's strong personality before bringing him back to central responsibilities.

AS ALMOST all of the authors reviewed here have noted, however, only a small part of the interaction between the military and civilian organizations occurs at the level of the chief of staff or defense minister. What then of the bureaucracy? Will anything change here as a result of Ogarkov's ouster? Briefly, the answer is no. The bureaucratic process appears to be too strongly embedded for the departure of even an individual like Ogarkov to change it radically. Personalities and policies play a key role at the highest levels of the Soviet political spectrum. But their impact within the bureaucracy is more modest.

It is not that the bureaucracy is unresponsive to policy choices from above. Indeed, individual decisions can be enforced in particular areas, as Jones's analysis of Moscow's response to demographic problems illustrates. Furthermore, a forthcoming study on Soviet military policy by Michael MccGwire shows that major changes have occurred in Soviet military doctrine and forces as a result of conscious decisions by the political-military leadership.[12] Nevertheless, conversations with Soviets as well as a review of Soviet writings suggest that under normal circumstances, the bureaucratic process often has a life of its own.

Most likely, the military's monopoly of expertise will combine with the systemic secrecy prevalent in the Soviet Union to ensure that the military as an institution will retain its pivotal position in areas directly relevant to national security.

On broader policy issues, there are some signs that senior Soviet military officers may be concerned over aspects of Gorbachëv's arms control policies as well as his efforts to cut back on military spending.[13] However, they currently appear to lack the strong dynamic leader necessary to challenge the country's top political leader. This could change were Gorbachëv to run into serious domestic problems or if US-Soviet relations deteriorate further. For the present, the role of the Soviet military at the highest level of decisionmaking can best be described as subdued, but restive.

[12]Michael MccGwire, *Soviet Military Objectives*, Washington, DC, Brookings, forthcoming. This book, which explores the impact of external influences on Soviet military doctrine and force structure, will doubtless elicit considerable interest in both academic and government communities.

[13]See Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," forthcoming in *Orbis*.

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NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors,
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DKP LEGALITY

TO THE EDITORS: In the March-April 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism* there is an interesting and well-documented article entitled "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1984." A reading of the "Checklist" did, however, raise one question on which I would appreciate further clarification.

On page 97, entry number 52 refers to the existence of a Communist Party in West Germany, which has 50,842 members, is led by Herbert Mies, and enjoys the right to function as a legal organization. However, the information at my disposal indicates that the Communist Party is banned in the Federal Republic of Germany. I would appreciate learning from the analysts of the "Checklist" whether or not the information I have is correct.

In the FRG, the Communist Party was dissolved as the result of a sentence handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court on August 17, 1956. The party appealed to the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe, alleging that this sentence violated Articles 9 (freedom of thought), 10 (freedom of expression), and 11 (freedom of association) of the European Convention on the Human Rights of Man of November 4, 1950. This complaint was submitted as number 250-57 before the Commission against the Federal Republic of Germany.

The demand was declared inadmissible by the Commission. The Commission deemed that the Federal Constitutional Court was correct in having declared that the German Communist Party was unconstitutional and thus deserved to be dissolved. It is to be recalled that the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Article 21, paragraph 2) declared unconstitutional those parties that, by virtue of their program or the activity of their members, tend to threaten the free and democratic constitutional order or to overthrow or endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Perhaps the most important of the arguments used by the Commission was that which stated: The aim is to prevent totalitarian elements from being able to exploit to their benefit principles recognized by the Convention, i.e., to invoke the rights of freedom to suppress the rights of man. I expressed this last point of view in a footnote to page 48 of my essay "Central America Between the White House and Revolutionary War," published in the spring of 1980 during the Carter presidency.

When I see the Communist Party of West Germany classified as "legal" in your "Checklist," I presume that the situation has changed. If this is the case, could you please furnish me with the particulars concerning when and how this change took place?

DR. EMILIO MAZA
Guatemala City

THE EDITORS RESPOND: Dr. Maza correctly notes the August 1956 decision of West Germany's Federal Constitutional Court to outlaw the Communist Party of Germany. That party, the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (KPD), was never relegalized.

However, in September 1968 a new, legal German Communist Party (*Deutsche Kommunistische Partei*—DKP) was constituted. The DKP, which quickly absorbed much of the membership of the outlawed KPD, has been allowed to operate in the Federal Republic of Germany as a legal organization ever since. (On this development, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1970, pp. 349–57.)

THE EDITORS

ON SHABASHNIKI

TO THE EDITORS: Patrick Murphy in his etymological explanation of the word *shabashniki* ("Soviet *Shabashniki:* Material Incentives at Work," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1985) neglects to mention that the word actually comes from the Jewish day of rest —*Shabbes* in Yiddish, or *shabash* as it appears in Ozhegov's dictionary of the Russian language (Moscow, Russkiy yazyk, 1983, p. 790).

At the same time, I would like to take this opportunity to let you know how much I appreciate your journal.

ISABELLE T. KREINDLER
Department of English
University of Haifa
Israel

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ON IMRE NAGY AND KÁDÁRISM

TO THE EDITORS: In his otherwise interesting review in the January-February 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism,* Vladimir Tismaneanu repeats a few factual errors and questionable judgments contained in *Hungary 1956 Revisited,* written by Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller.

1. Imre Nagy's "last words" to the court in 1958, as quoted by Fehér and Heller, are indeed moving: "One thing alone would repulse me: to be rehabilitated by those who will murder me." Alas, according to the testimony of his co-defendants who survived the trial, Nagy said nothing of the sort. He declined to take advantage of his right to address the court; he did not ask for leniency. Only after the death sentence was pronounced did he make a one-sentence statement, in which he asserted his faith in the ultimate judgment of history and the labor [communist] movement. Nagy was a genuine hero; there is no need to enhance his reputation with fictitious additions.

2. Fehér and Heller claim that Nagy rejected "Khrushchevism" as being a "paternalistic consolidation of Stalin's decaying work." Nagy had done nothing of the sort. He had admired Khrushchev for trying to make up with Tito and especially for his de-Stalinization campaign. Whether a Eurocommunist or not, Nagy was a true believer who lost his faith in Khrushchev only when Soviet troops entered Hungary on November 1, 1956, and crushed the revolution three days later. Again, it is unnecessary to embellish Nagy's past by assigning to him political attitudes held by Fehér and Heller and decidedly not by Nagy himself.

3. Nagy's associate, Géza Losonczy, did not confess to being a Titoist spy "during his last year." Losonczy was first arrested, tortured, and tried in 1951, when he made his "confession." He was released in 1954. He was a member of Nagy's cabinet during the 1956 revolution. He died in prison in 1957.

Finally, while this is not the place to begin a debate about Kádár's Hungary, allow me to object to Dr. Tismaneanu's reference to what he calls "the fellow-traveler-style literature concerning Kádár's 'liberal' despotism." Although the word "liberal" does not apply to the Kádár regime, that government *is* a more tolerant and indeed paternalistic dictatorship than any other in the Soviet bloc. US Secretary of State George Shultz is hardly a fellow traveler for having referred to Kádár as a "wise man" to whom, he found, it was "well worth listening." Having contributed a brilliant analysis of Nicolae Ceauşescu's Romania to the January-February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism,* Mr. Tismaneanu surely knows the difference between domestic conditions in contemporary Romania and Hungary. All communist despotisms are not alike.

CHARLES GATI
Dept. of Political Science
Union College
Schenectady, NY

MR. TISMANEANU RESPONDS: I am really indebted to Professor Charles Gati for his illuminating comments on my essay on critical Marxism. In my opinion, a resumption of the debate concerning the fate of Marxism—both as theory and practice—in Eastern-Central Europe would be more than welcome. The main thrust of my article was to indicate the innovative approach to the moral and political dilemmas of Soviet-type regimes undertaken by the distinguished scholars who are grouped in the Budapest School.

At the same time, I did wish to dispel a certain aura of benevolence surrounding not only the Kádár regime, but also the Yugoslav one, both perceived in the West, and not without *some* legitimate reasons, as less oppressive and dogmatic than other post- or neo-Stalinist societies. I share with Professor Gati the conviction that there are enormous differences between Ceauşescu's grotesque performance and Kádár's paternalistic behavior, distinctions that cannot be overlooked by any fair-minded student of communist affairs.

All this notwithstanding, it seems to me obvious that Kádár's more "enlightened" pattern of domination has failed to bring about more than a mere promise of genuine political pluralism. True, all communist despotisms are not alike, but they are still communist despotisms. The forced exile of the members of the Budapest School in Hungary and the harassment of certain intellectuals there who have spelled out "inconvenient" ideas (Miklos Haraszti, Gaspar Miklos Tamás, et al.) are more than telling in this respect.

I would not deny the enviable fact (enviable at least from the Romanian or Czech perspective) that critical intelligence is less humiliated in Hungary than in other communist countries. But I think this situation should not be allowed to overshadow the Budapest regime's authoritarian features, which strikingly manifest themselves whenever the ruling party is confronted with real opposition. Economic reforms in Hungary may be a source for optimism, but the communist party is still the sole repository of political authority, even if it does not rely as decisively as some communist regimes on the political police and censorship.

It was only in this sense that I made an ironic comment on the fellow-traveler-style literature concerning the Hungarian experience under János Kádár. It is precisely this kind of semi-jubilant assessment of the Kádár regime that tends to engender feelings of frustration among Hungarian dissident intellectuals who are depicted by official propaganda as professional troublemakers working against the long-term interests of Hungarians. The margin of freedom is certainly wider in Hungary than in Ceauşescu's neo-feudal despotism, but observance of many basic human rights still belongs to the realm of unfulfilled desiderata in both of these states.

With regard to Imre Nagy's controversial "last words," I would dare to say that they belong to the oral tradition of the radical practice in this century. Professor Gati may be right in his belief that these words were apocryphal, a figment of imagination generated by passionate commitments to Nagy's memory. György Krasso, a Hungarian intellectual, who is among the

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most knowledgeable persons regarding the 1956 Revolution, offered the following information in an interview published in the Hungarian *samizdat* periodical *A Hirmondo* (The Messenger), No. 2, December 1983: "What became known was what he [Imre Nagy] did *not* say. The official press and the official white book on the case obviously contained nothing on the subject. But almost every publication issued in the West contained the text of a dramatic declaration. According to this version, Imre Nagy, availing himself of the right to speak his last words, is reported to have said that he had twice tried to save the honor of socialism in the valley of Danube, but that in both cases he had been prevented from doing so . . . . And that he was afraid of only one thing—that his murderers would be amongst those commemorating him . . . . A similar version of this last speech can also be found in [Sandor] Kopacsi's book (*In the Name of the Working Class*, London, 1979). Kopacsi was, of course, present at the trial, but even so, it seems that these words were in fact never pronounced. According to a version which *would seem more accurate* [Italics added—V.T.], Imre Nagy did *not* avail himself of the right to speak his last words; he said that the circumstances of the trial proved there was no point in saying anything. However, later, when the death sentence had been passed, and the judge, in accordance with the rules of judicial proceedings, asked him whether he wanted to appeal for pardon, he replied that he was not going to; he said he would have been rehabilitated by the international labor movement. Now, taking into consideration Imre Nagy's character, I think this version—so far unpublished—is more likely than the other one" ("The Memory of the Dead," interview with György Krasso, *Survey* [London], Summer 1984, p. 144).

It results that both versions, i.e., that mentioned by Heller and Fehér and the one defended by Krasso, converge on the most significant point: Imre Nagy's enduring commitment to the cause of humanist socialism, which for him was something absolutely different from, or opposite to, the frozen logic of bureaucratic domination. He went beyond the limited register of Khrushchevism, which was nothing but a desperate attempt to get rid of the most embarrassing and terrifying features of mature (read paranoid) Stalinism. Imre Nagy's political writings in 1955 and 1956, as well as his practical decisions as head of the Revolutionary Hungarian Government were thus primarily inspired by concern for the future of democracy in a really emancipated social space. Such a project may have been naïve and doomed to failure, but it was nevertheless inspired by the noblest motivations.

I have been told of more than one former Stalinist for whom the revelations of the 20th CPSU Congress amounted to an existential watershed, a painstaking break with an abhorred past. It was the privilege of Nagy (and his group) to have anticipated these crucial semantic, political, and ideological changes, and to have called for a *total* reconsideration of the *whole* socialist experience.

As for the strait jacket imposed by Kádárism on historical research, it is significant that the records of the Nagy affair, including the interrogations and trial, have not been published in Budapest. This is perhaps an indirect avowal of the regime's inability to face its specious legitimacy, or better said, to admit that its birth certificate was signed in blood.

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU
Foreign Policy
Research Institute
Philadelphia, PA

CORRECTIONS

Due to a printer's error, part of a sentence in Robert Sharlet's review essay "Politics of Soviet Law," published in the January-February 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, was omitted. The first two full paragraphs on page 59, column 3, should read:

> "For his part, Ioffe has in view primarily the period since Stalin, in which he sees a series of profound contradictions between the theory and the practice of Soviet law.
>
> On the other hand, the two legal scholars are in sharp disagreement over the function of law and the role of the jurist in the Soviet system. These differences are further magnified by the fact that Ioffe is drawing on past experience while Hazard is looking to the future."

* * *

In the insert to the map of Afghanistan on page 3 of the January-February 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism*, the large block of territory at the lower righthand corner was inadvertently mislabeled. The country should, of course, have been identified as India.

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